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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a cultural history of the practices and ideas that constituted poor relief
under the Nazi regime. It argues that Nazis practiced an inward-looking and exclusionary type of
charity that aimed at the salvation and protection of German people, not the alleviation and
resolution of material problems. Nazi officials, who came to power with little experience or
interest in social work or public welfare, drew on the traditional moral values of a middle class
who often perceived the increasing visibility of poverty and destitution in modern Germany as a
threat to bourgeois order. A new National Socialist conception of poverty, infused with moralracial interpretations, became a central theme of Nazi propaganda and a call to action to animate
German collective action to building an idealized and homogenous national community through
initiatives like the Winter Help Aid. However, these charitable activities only served the
purposes of the National Socialist government—to spread Nazi ideology, protect Nazi loyalists,
and guarantee a Nazi future. These thinly veiled initiatives often created conflicts with the needy
individuals, German donors, and social workers, all of whom had their own expectations about
how poor relief should unfold and used charity as a mode to negotiate and renegotiate the
contours of society under Nazi rule. This shifting notion of poverty would also come to serve as
justification for Nazi imperial ambitions in Eastern Europe as well as shaping relief efforts once
Allies began bombing the German home front. However, Nazi conceptions of poverty ultimately
jeopardized the ability to respond effectively to new conditions of destitution wrought by total
war. Consequently, needy civilians reevaluated once more their social values and the usefulness
of Nazi ideals as the Third Reich crumbled to the ground.
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INTRODUCTION
The biting cold had already set in as fall in Vienna gave way to winter in 1909. For
shoppers, commuters, and other among the crowds passing along the Ringstrasse, the cold
proved a mild inconvenience as they carried on with their business. However, for Vienna’s
homeless population, freezing winter temperatures presented a formidable obstacle to finding
work or shelter. Wandering the streets looking for work became a perilous endeavor while
huddling under a blanket to beg similarly provided no respite. Sleeping on park benches could be
life-threatening, and many among Vienna’s homeless population sought any warm space
available, even taking refuge below ground in the sewer tunnels.1 To be homeless during the
Viennese winter meant more than suffering deep, bitter cold. It meant fighting for one’s
wellbeing, dignity, and survival on the borders of society while much of the Viennese population
looked the other way.
In this winter of 1909, before World War II, before the Great Depression, and before the
Nazi rise to power, one such man found himself homeless, shuffling between emergency
shelters, warming halls, and soup kitchens, reliant on the meager support offered either by
Viennese municipal authorities, local private charities, or small, solicited donations. This man
had failed to gain admittance into school, ran out of money, and, consequently, lost the room he
once rented with an acquaintance. For a short time, he slept on park benches and in alley ways.
When the weather became unbearable, the young man had no choice but to move into one of
Vienna’s many homeless shelters. Just like the thousands of destitute men who had passed
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through the threshold of the Asyl für Obdachlose, he arrived in the shelter starving and sickly
with only a threadbare jacket and a pale, faded suit to protect him from the elements.2
The man spent several months in and out of various local shelters in districts like
Meidling and Edberg, always finding it difficult to hold down a steady job. According to one
acquaintance he met at a shelter, the man had no suitable disposition for hard work. He lacked a
strong work ethic and physical fitness for sustained labor.3 Nevertheless, the man learned from
others in the shelter how to navigate the realities of destitution, and consequently he was
introduced to a society that he had never before experienced. In the dilapidated spaces of
poverty, he believed he was witnessing the crumbling bonds of family as needy husbands and
wives fought, cheated, and squandered away any small trickle of income they might have on the
vices that had sprung up in the modern urban world. In his view, poverty mangled and deformed
people, decayed them by eroding their ethical and moral fibers. For this man living amongst the
poor, the culprits to this moral degeneration were two-fold: Marxism and Judaism.
This man’s fortunes soon improved. He found steadier work painting postcards, and, by
February 1910, he had moved into a room at a men’s hostel.4 Once the winds of war blew
through Europe, he enlisted in the German army in 1914 after a euphoric experience upon
hearing the declaration of war on Munich’s Odeonsplatz. He returned to find a Germany at odds
with itself, struggling to establish its first representative democracy while simultaneously
undermining and destroying it. By January 1933, the man had seized on sweeping vulnerability,
constructed convincing political propaganda, and became German Chancellor. That man was
Adolf Hitler. His formative years in Vienna as a poor and starving artist helped forge his views
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on Jews and Socialism as corrupting influences and informed his views on poverty.5 It was with
these views that Hitler rose to power, preaching a gospel of national renewal as millions of poor
Germans struggled under the burdens of unprecedented economic collapse. He promised to fight
against “enemies,” both political and racial, who he believed fettered the German people from
realizing their greatness.
Hitler’s promises generated no concrete policy solutions to the social problems he feared
surrounded the German people and threatened a national community. Instead, as he reflected in
Mein Kampf on his months of material destitution, he only levied vitriolic critique against the
prevailing Weimar system of poor relief, suggesting that public poor relief only compounded the
problems. Hitler condemned, without providing much support, the “ridiculous” and “useless
charity silliness” he received during his “struggle for survival” in Vienna for the way it merely
encouraged degenerate lifestyles.6 Hitler responded to these social ills only by suggesting
ominously that the German people had a social responsibility to “destroy the incurable social
tumors.”7
Hitler understood the presence of poverty in German society as signals of vulnerabilities
within a national community. However, despite the existential lens through which Hitler read
poverty, scholars have paid little attention to the role that poverty and poor relief played in
shaping the social dynamics of the Third Reich. The concept of poverty occupied critical space
in the propagandistic constellation of Volksgemeinschaft, or people’s community, that the Nazis
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hoped to build. It represented a central theme around which Nazis orchestrated public events and
motivated collective action, a touchstone for political rhetoric and social discourse. Many of
those suffering from poverty—beggars, the unemployed, the disabled or infirm—struggled to
claim a place among the nation’s “respectable” citizens. They had been cast out by much of
Germany’s traditional middle class for their inability to find work, to conform to “normative”
customs or sociability, and this was construed by Nazis as deeper moral flaws. Nazi-led poor
relief, by shaping the narratives of “respectability,” helped to define and redefine the social
norms of German society by publicly delineating between the values considered “desirable” and
“undesirable.”
This process of social and cultural stratification unfolded both in the professional settings
of Nazi welfare offices and the familiar spaces of local street corners. It was a process that took
many different turns over the course of the Third Reich, guided by many different actors. The
mechanisms of poor relief became a kind of cultural currency, collective action in which
ordinary Germans could participate to demonstrate their commitment to a Nazi project. Material
relief emerged also as a critical justification for Nazi imperial expansion into Eastern Europe,
and growing uncertainties about material security during World War II influenced how
individuals interacted with one another and the Nazi state. As notions of poverty and responses
continued to shift from 1933 to 1945, it still mobilized Germans in ways for other things did. The
power of poor relief to animate individuals toward a cause, in this case a Nazi cause, ultimately
demands investigation as a critical force for shaping the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion
during the Third Reich.
This dissertation argues that poor relief mechanisms of the Third Reich were inwardlooking and exclusionary programs focused more on the donors of welfare initiatives than the
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needy. Nazi welfare authorities celebrated their programs as opportunities for citizens to take
part in the salvation of the German nation through public displays of collective unity and
outward support of Nazi values, while ordinary Germans used charitable giving to express their
own social aspirations and ideals. Through this collaboration between welfare experts and lay
participants, these gestures of public participation contributed to forming the normative values
and moral rules that shaped social dynamics under Nazi rule. This was not a steady, uniform, or
singular process because individuals experienced and participated in charity in different places at
different times. Social workers often found institutional expectations, steeped in Nazi
propaganda, challenging to fulfill. Some Germans bristled at the frequent demands for donations
while other enthusiastically offered contributions. Needy individuals, too, shaped this process
through their demands for relief which, in some instances, escalated into tense, even violent,
confrontations with social workers. Taken together, participating in Nazi charity helped to define
and redefine notions of poverty and, by extension, the limits of social morality both at home and
in occupied territory. Indeed, Nazi charity remained a formative mechanism for communitybuilding until World War II changed the experience of need and destitution and the Nazi project
began to crumble under Allied bombs.
German Narratives of Welfare and Charity
Institutional poor relief has a long history. While much of the body of scholarship focuses
primarily on the historical developments of the “welfare state,” the mechanisms that address
destitution are not new, nor are they a particularly modern phenomenon. Indeed charity, and
conversely, poverty existed as a central feature of German religious live during the medieval
period. Catholic teachings emphasized the importance of ‘good works,’ and charity provided the
opportunity for individuals to earn salvation. Along with material vulnerability that was
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pervasive during the medieval period, mendicant orders, those who voluntarily lived in poverty
as a means of imitating Christ, helped to create a spiritual economy grounded in almsgiving.
Whatever impact charitable giving might have had on the wellbeing of the destitute, the primary
object of poor relief in the medieval period remained salvation and not the alleviation of material
deprivation.8 As religious conflict tore through Europe in the 16th century, so too did it reshape
the landscape of poor relief. Protestant reformers critiqued Catholic poor relief as
“indiscriminate,” not to mention misguided for its relationship to salvation which was bestowed
on man by God through faith alone. Lutheran reformers worried that Catholic relief techniques
encouraged so-called fraudulent begging which, for Protestants, constituted “undeserving”
poverty. Some scholars have argued that the distinction between “deserving” and “undeserving”
poor is rooted in Protestant theology.9 Martin Luther, in particular, directed considerable vitriol
toward the “undeserving poor”, decrying vagabonds as “tramps and liars” who, who, armed with
the powers of Satan have “cheated” citizens out of their money.10 He also contributed to the
drafting of new poor relief laws in Leisnig in 1523 where he encouraged the close monitoring of
beggars by local workers. Protestant municipalities came to rely on civil authorities to provide
poor relief, a secularizing trend that most Catholic resisted vehemently.
These conflicts coincided with new humanist political thinking responding to growing
poverty and new urban crises across Europe.11 Such reformers were not interested in prohibiting
begging per se but instead showed interest in making more effective use of poor relief resources.
Work, as a result, became a central category that very often represented the delineation between
8

Larry Frohman, Poor Relief and Welfare in Germany from the Reformation to World War I. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008.
9
Frohman, 19.
10
Liber vagatorum, The Book of Vagabonds and Beggars: with a vocabulary of their language. Trans John
Camden Hotten. London: John Camden Hotten, Piccadilly, 1860: p. 4
11
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‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving,’ and determined how relief would be distributed. Additionally,
new techniques for regulating and organizing poor relief emerged in Germany. For example, new
legislation in Nuremberg in 1530 created municipal offices whose responsibility was to inspect
and evaluate local beggars—effectively creating early social workers. Magistrates relied on
censuses to gather information about a town’s poor citizens and the resources they needed.
Increasingly, poor relief became tied to locality, making towns responsible for their own poor
while restricting beggars from elsewhere.
Policies like these embody the trends of secularization and centralization of poor relief,
which began in the mid-15th century, trends identified and described by the likes of Max Weber
and Michel Foucault and which have provided some scholars with a broader “master narrative”
that has structured the historiography of poor relief. This is a process over which scholars
continue to argue, as will be discussed below. There can be no question about the increased
presence of municipal, regional, and, eventually, national authorities in the organization and
operation of poor relief, this does not simultaneously represent the decline of confessional
influence—no matter how deeply religious reformers might have feared it themselves. Indeed,
scholars like Warren Rosenblum have demonstrated how religious influence on poor relief
actually grew, particularly in the 19th century. Figures like Protestant pastor Johann Heinrich
Wichern, who would found the Inner Mission charity in 1848, gained considerable influence as
an expert on penal reform and commanded the attention of politicians in the Prussian Ministry of
the Interior, even serving as the head of the Department of Prison Affairs from 1857 to 1874.12
With the introduction after World War I of the Bielefield System, a system of cooperative
municipal surveillance between local police forces and welfare officials, private confessional
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organizations developed an even closer relationship with state authorities as charity leaders
worked with local law enforcement to address crimes of vagrancy and begging.13
Despite Rosenblum’s recent attempts to problematize the historiography of social relief,
these same historical narratives of secularization, bureaucratization, and rationalization have
been used to describe welfare and poverty in modern Germany. Indeed, these narratives have
proven for some to be influential in explaining the rise of racial exclusion, National Socialism
and the Third Reich. While some research had been conducted earlier, studies about German
welfare emerged with increasing frequency beginning in the 1980s.14 Writing in the shadows of
debates about a German Sonderweg, or a special path to “modernity,” scholars looked toward
poor relief as a symptom of the broader inability of Weimar democracy to cope with the
challenges of modern, industrial society that had been swiftly thrust onto Germany.15 Not
satisfied with the conclusions offered by the Bielefeld School or David Blackbourn and Geoff
Eley, Detlev Peukert forged his own interpretation that moved beyond their historiographical
binary of non-modernization versus modernization. Rather than asking when or how Germany
started down its “divergent” path away from a “normative” modernity and toward the destruction
of National Socialism, Peukert located the seeds of fascism within the processes of
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Rosenblum, 121, 142.
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modernization itself.16 Where other historians equated modernity with progress made evident
through industrialized economies, bureaucratized governments, and liberal reforms, Peukert
advocated a “skeptical decoupling of modernity and progress.”17 Once historians can relinquish
the idea that modernity is an inherently progressive process, Peukert demonstrated that National
Socialism itself emerges as a product of modernity.
While Peukert introduced his ideas about modernization in Inside the Third Reich, he
elaborated more clearly in his work on the Weimar Republic. Peukert characterized “modern”
societies as those exhibiting particular economic, social, and cultural features: rationalized
production systems, industrialized infrastructure, specialized divisions of labor, mass media,
radical aesthetic styles, among many others.18 In the case of Germany, Peukert identified the
beginnings of “classical modernity” just before the turn of the 20th century, but it was not until
the Weimar Republic that Germans faced considerable challenges coping with the realities of
“modern” society. Ultimately, “crises of classical modernity” would topple the Weimar
Republic, and Peukert identified Weimar’s welfare system as the prime catalyst of that collapse.
A paradigmatic product of modernization, Weimar’s welfare program relied on a highly
organized bureaucracy and social scientific—in some cases relying on eugenicist ideas—meanstesting to identify, evaluate, and classify the large populations of Germans guaranteed relief by
the Weimar Constitution. As the economic emergencies dramatically increased the number of
Germans claiming benefits, the Weimar welfare created financial burdens too great for its
government to bear while simultaneously, through its “rational” and “scientific” methods,
stigmatized whole social groups for their deviations from “normative” standards. As a result,
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Peukert demonstrates that it was the very products of modernization themselves, none more
emblematic that Weimar welfare, which invited National Socialism to Germany’s political
stage.19
For the next fifteen years, scholars applied Peukert’s model to different dimensions of
Weimar welfare, both advancing his thesis and critiquing his conclusions. Elizabeth Harvey,
investigating social policy and young people following World War I, explores the disciplining
features of youth welfare policies and argues that they intensified as the Great Depression struck
and were carried on into the Third Reich.20 Young-Sun Hong and David Crew relied on Weimar
welfare to critique Peukert’s arguments. Hong researches the political battles waged between the
political, confessional, and humanitarian social reform groups during the Weimar Republic. She
argues that the utopian visions of competing reform groups belie a much more complex,
multivalent “path to modernity” than Peukert would allow. However, Hong demonstrates that
these competing interests ultimately revealed the democratic inefficiency of the Weimar
government, and the resulting broken promises over social security both jeopardized the welfare
system itself and undercut the legitimacy of the republican constitution altogether, creating the
conditions for Hitler’s rise to power. David Crew, relying on a more everyday historical
approach championed by Peukert himself, demonstrates how the modernization “process”
described was an uneven and contingent one, not straight-forward or inevitable. He argues that
Weimar welfare did not emerge exclusively from impersonal “discourse” but as well from the
“daily interactions of hard-pressed officials and impatient, frequently desperate clients.”21 Crew
narrates a story of welfare where the individual assertions of needy clients clashed with the
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authority of social workers to create unpredictable and contradictory consequences that
challenged Peukert’s singular welfare narrative.
This approach helped to not only explain the rise of Nazism but also situate the bio-racial
hierarchy in broader European intellectual, social, and cultural development.22 Weimar-era poor
relief initiatives, many of which were influenced by social science and notions of social hygiene,
imparted a utopian optimism that all social and health problems could be solved, everything from
tuberculosis to homelessness.23 However, this “biologization of society” meant that an
increasingly intrusive government set “normative” standards against which individuals would be
judged.24 Eugenics emerged as a viable and “scientific” method of social and medical “problemsolving,” aimed at combatting the “degeneration” of national populations in the wake of World
War I. Eugenics became a solution to Germany’s social problems championed by both the
political left and right, from sex reformers and contraception advocates to confessional leaders
and conservative politicians, as a means of easing the growing social burdens that Germans
seemingly felt especially during the economic crises of the Weimar Republic.25 Through welfare,
relief, and health policies, Weimar bodies were subjected to intense scrutiny and judged by
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authorities and experts to be “normal” and “productive” or “defective” and “criminal.”26
Professionals coded urban space in much the same way by labeling working-class tenements as
dens of “asocial” activity that threatened to encroach on “respectable,” middle-class
neighborhoods.27 Both literally and figuratively, welfare policies defined the margins of German
society by condemning working class neighborhoods and denying needy individuals relief. As a
result, Weimar welfare played a critical role ascribing value to social difference and
marginalizing groups of society. These studies, then, demonstrate that relief policies in the
Weimar Republic not only created an unbearable financial burden for the state but also
normalized social disciplining so essential to the National Socialist racial state.
The wave of welfare scholarship that emerged in the 1990s focused primarily on the
Weimar Republic. This body of scholarship very obviously evoked the Third Reich, and despite
a historiographical “vanishing point,” to borrow a term from Helmut Walser Smith, firmly
situated in the genocidal violence of the early 1940s, only a select few studies were published
that addressed the Third Reich directly.28 The most comprehensive was written by Christoph
Sachße and Florian Tennstedt, published as the third installment of a three-volume series
entitled, Geschichte der Armenfürsorge in Deutschland. This research remained grounded in the
same historiographical perspective and stressed how modern techniques contributed to Nazi
persecution. For Sachße and Tennstedt, the welfare program must be understood as an
“instrument of domination” for the Nazi state.29 They argue that Nazi Germany operated as a
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“welfare state” geared not toward the integration of destitute individuals but at their exclusion
from a “healthy” Volksgemeinschaft. This signaled a dramatic shift in the conception of social
citizenship. While the Weimar government pledged its support for the security and freedom of its
citizens, the Nazi regime signaled through its welfare program that citizenship would only be
extended to those who would help realize “the racist utopia of ‘the healthy Volk of the future,’”
and these efforts were successful. 30 For according to Sachße and Tennstedt, “Through the wealth
of social-political measures meant to survey, collect, support, and separate, the
Volksgemeinschaft because a social reality.”31
Research about Weimar and Nazi welfare offered a new explanation for the origins and
methods of Nazi exclusion while opening new perspectives on the perpetration of violence
against those declared social “outsiders.” Overall, modernity as a historical concept has, as
historian Drew Sweeney insists, served historians well for uncovering explanations about how
Nazi Germany came into being.32 However, scholars have been investigating relief practices to
answer the same historiographical questions for over twenty years. As evidence, an article
appeared as recently as 2005 tracing the relationship between German welfare and modernity.33
This lens of modernity has its limits. Sweeny continues to argue that this perspective “treats
signifying systems (world views, ideologies, languages) and social structures (states, colonial
empires, economies) as static phenomena, overlooking the ongoing and productive struggle over
meaning that takes place within and between ideologies or languages as well as the social
practices … that in part constitute or transform social structures over time.”34 Modernity as a
30
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concept narrows the interpretive aperture and only allows in a small group of historical actors. It
reveals that the Nazi racial state—categorized by “scientific” racial classifications and
bureaucratized social discipline—partly resulted from a small group of technocrats and
politicians who controlled the bio-social mechanism of Nazi welfare. The racial boundaries that
separated a Volksgemeinschaft from the “unfit” or “asocial” were drawn by a group of
professional elites through institutional coercion. This model helps to explain how Nazi officials
built an institutional framework aimed to achieve a racially homogenous society, but it draws a
straight line between the intent of Nazi welfare policies and the genocidal outcomes of the Third
Reich. Simply by placing welfare and genocide in the same historical arc—the arc of
modernization—historians have taken for granted the complicated developments that actually
substantiated this relationship.
Despite claims by one historian that “welfare and social policy have played an
increasingly central role in accounts of Nazi Germany,” little new scholarship has been published
in the past two decades since the flourish of work in the wake of Peukert—and welfare still
remains confined to a framework of modernization.35 This is surprising considering the wave of
new and innovative scholarship about poverty in modern Europe that has emerged over the past
decade. As has been demonstrated, research on welfare has largely been narrated from an
institutional perspective, focusing on the policies and legislation that framed social work and, as
a result, privileging the social disciplining nature of welfare. What falls away are the
personalities and individuals that actually substantiate the world of social work, like poor
individuals who petition for relief or even social workers who review those requests.
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Rather than starting from the perspective of welfare institutions, scholars contributing to
a new body of research about poverty have inhabited the viewpoints of the poor themselves.
Historians like Andreas Gestrich, Beate Althammer, Lutz Raphael, among others, focus on the
lived realities of groups of needy individuals: beggars, waifs, unemployed, the “deviant” poor,
the sick poor, among many others. 36 They deploy vivid narrative sources, including everything
from autobiographies and court testimony to welfare petitions and suicide letters, to capture the
particular attitudes and experiences of the poor themselves. The harsh, rigid lines drawn by
social welfare institutions become blurred. By recovering these individual voices, scholars have
revealed how the unemployed negotiated categories of “deserving” and “legitimate” poor.37 They
highlight the complex networks on which needy individuals relied to help make ends meet,
networks that lay beyond the professional offices of social workers. This included relationships
established through familial and elective networks as well as tactics of self-help, informal
economies and even crime, ultimately unveiling a much more multivalent world of poor relief
than scholarship has previously allowed.
Noticeably absent from this exciting body of literature is the Third Reich. Of the dozens
of articles featured in these volumes, only one addresses Nazi Germany explicitly. While the
authoritarian nature of Hitler’s Germany might make it a relative outlier for these works that
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generally focus on more liberal governments like Britain, France, and the Weimar Republic, it’s
absence practically begs the historical analysis. This lack of attention is particularly surprising
considering the persistent rhetoric, discussion, and expression about poverty, destitution, and
relief in Nazi Germany. Propaganda from the Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt (NSV), a
pervasive fixture of ordinary German life, dripped with language compelling Germans to support
their needy Volksgenossen. With banners overhead announcing “Gemeinnutz geht vor
Eigennutz,” or “The good of the community comes before the good of the individual,” Hitler
Youth members on local thoroughfares peddled badges that implored fellow Germans to fight
“against hunger and cold.” Millions of Germans participated in relief by donating to collection
drives, volunteering for relief initiatives, or becoming a member of the NSV. Hitler himself
relied on the rhetoric of poverty and the seeming perils of destitution to demand the importance
of a united and homogenous Volksgemeinschaft.
This dissertation begins the historical analysis of relief and poverty in the Third Reich
that, until now, other scholars have largely omitted. It begins to explore what poverty and poor
relief meant under an authoritarian regime. Conceptions of poverty and responses to it were not
static or uniform over the course of the Third Reich, and this dissertation visits the numerous
valences that poverty occupied in the German imagination. It asks what it meant for professional
social workers and ordinary citizens to participate in and shape poor relief schemes during the
Nazis’ reign and identifies the collisions between national policy and local realities.
It investigates, once World War II began, the consequences of exporting those ideas about
poverty into occupied space seized by the German army and how, once war intensified on the
German home front, poverty became a collective wartime experience that demanded
transgressive responses to overcome.
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It should come as no surprise that, in a regime almost synonymous with violent
exclusion, responses to poverty also became a part of the Nazis’ mechanisms for persecution.
Plenty of scholars have argued that Nazi welfare existed as a mechanism of exclusion, but few
scholars have presented sustained inquiry into what that exclusion and persecution actually
looked like. Those that have focus on the Jewish experience inside Nazi Germany. Marion
Kaplan devotes attention to the exclusion of Jews from Nazi relief argues that Nazi relief policy
contributed to the “social death” of Jews. 38 Wolf Gruner expands Kaplan’s arguments.39 He
rightly points out that Nazi officials did not formally exclude Jews from public relief until 1939,
even though measures explicitly prevented them from participating in initiatives like the
Winterhilfswerk (WHW), the popular Nazi-led winter relief initiative. Yet before destitute Jews
became sole responsibility of municipal Jewish communities, local German politicians
developed their own measures to exclude Jews from German welfare offices. Initiatives
developed by the Deutsche Gemeindetag, the national representative body of German
municipalities formed in 1935, to confiscate Jewish property and deny Jewish relief went far
beyond orders issued from Berlin, unveiling the spontaneous and grassroots efforts to eliminate
Jewish life in Germany.
Scholars have demonstrated clearly how Germans used welfare as a tool for excluding
Jews from local communities, and this dissertation takes cues from scholarship on Jewish relief
and German poverty to explore precisely how destitute individuals experienced social exclusion
during the Third Reich. Poor relief also became a mechanism for creating, ostracizing, and
excluding new “social enemies” of the Nazi Reich. In addition to denying benefits to some for
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exhibiting “asocial” traits, Nazi welfare authorities—as well as ordinary Germans who supported
who took part in NSV activities—celebrated particular social values and cultural characteristics.
Through the NSV’s posters, trinkets, and badges manufactured a shared language of charity that
permeated public spaces with images, symbols, and gestures. The NSV helped to manufacture
together with the German public an exclusive culture grounded in Nazi values that advocated
large, traditional families, a shared, “Germanic” past, and a racially homogenous society.
Together, through the relief programs and manufactured culture, Nazi welfare authorities
and those who contributed helped to create popular and participatory networks aimed to rebuild
and remake German society into a Nazi utopia. Given these characteristics of the Nazis’ relief
mechanisms, this dissertation argues that the relief schemes of the Third Reich amounted to Nazi
charity, a seemingly paradoxical formulation considering Hitler himself abhorred the notion of
charity. Nevertheless, Nazi relief programs were not about the poor—they hardly aimed to
eradicate, much less alleviate, material destitution in the way that modern welfare programs
aimed to before the Third Reich. Instead, Nazi relief focused its attention on the donors, the
Volksgenossen who participated in poor relief. Nazi charity provided an opportunity for
conspicuous participation, to demonstrate publicly one’s commitment to a national cause. Nazi
authorities framed their welfare programs as an opportunity for national salvation, much in the
way that medieval poor relief existed as a mode for individual salvation. While the Nazis’
apparatuses experienced ground-level challenges, both in terms of popular support as well as
professional cooperation, the programs themselves turned away from modern understandings of
the “social question” and instead encouraged “good works” on a national scale to redeem the
German nation, to ultimately horrific ends.
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Poor Relief and Volksgemeinschaft
For Hitler, national sanctification demanded a strong and cohesive national community.
This dissertation seeks to understand the social dynamics in which Nazi charity unfolded and, in
doing so, coincides with recent trends in Third Reich historiography that explore the dynamics of
sociability, community, and the aspirations toward a Volksgemeinschaft, or people’s community.
The concept of Volksgemeinschaft existed well before the Third Reich, and historians have been
using it to explain the social dynamics of Nazi Germany since the 1970s. Earliest interpretations,
namely Tim Mason, saw the notion merely as the propagandistic construction of the Nazi regime
with no bearing on the lived realities of ordinary Germans. Instead, Mason saw sustained class
conflict as the more fitting representation of Nazi society, an image far away from the idealized
homogenous community celebrated by Nazi propagandists. 40 However, a renewed interest in the
history of everyday life, sparked by Alf Lüdtke and his investigations into the history of
everyday life, revealed the degree to which Nazi symbols, gestures, and ideas had penetrated
Germany’s private spheres.41 The intimate proximity between Nazi ideology and ordinary
citizens inspired for historians questions about popular consent and collective participation in a
way that eluded social historians of past generations. Moved by this approach to understand
Volksgemeinschaft as basic foundation of Nazi society, leading historians like Richard J. Evans
to argue, “Above all, what Hitler, and the Nazis wanted was a change in people’s spirit, their
way of thinking and their way of behaving.”42 This change in German sociability depended on
the propagation the values resided in notions of Volksgemeinschaft. According to Martina Steber
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and Bernhard Gotto, “Volksgemeinschaft was the Nazis’ central social concept,” a means to
transcend the class, sectarian, and regional that divided German society.43 Bound up within this
concept were promises made on behalf of the Nazi government to the Volksgenossen: a steady
job, secure health, and a happy life. Volksgemeinschaft offered Germans an “imagined order”
which gave its members a bright future to anticipate with a community of like-minded
neighbors.44
The most compelling ways historians have deployed the concept of Volksgemeinschaft is
not by asking whether or not it was real, per se, but to understand it as a shared ideal, what
Michael Wildt calls “social aspiration.”45 This approach allows the social imaginings of ordinary
Germans to guide historical inquiry rather than relying on the Nazis’ own propagandistic
framework. Peter Fritzsche, for example, investigates conceptions of Volksgemeinschaft
understand how National Socialism appealed to the German public and captivated a nation. He
found embedded within German popular consciousness a longing to rediscover the strong social
bonds that people imagined existing before World War I. Hitler and his Nazi Party crafted a
platform that tapped into this desire by promising to recreate Germany’s lost greatness and to
eliminate “enemies”—namely Communists and Jews—of the nation.46 Becoming a National
Socialist was not an act of coercion or the inevitable result of a pathological modernity. By
accessing popular social aspirations, Nazis co-opted the values and imaginings of
Volksgemeinschaft to gain widespread support. As a result, Germans found the Nazi political
platform compelling and became Nazis by choice, not force.
43
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Fritzsche provides a noteworthy example of how scholars could access the processes by
which ordinary Germans built notions of community through their own shared imaginings and
values and the ways in which they hoped to realize that community. His work encourages
scholars to deploy Volksgemeinschaft as a historical construction built by the historical actors
themselves. This has sparked an explosion of scholarship that investigates the nuances that
Germans projected onto Volksgemeinschaft and the various means through which Germans
sought to realize their own social aspirations. In all dimensions of life—associational,
professional, and private, for example—Germans sought to realize the utopian society that they
believed Volksgemeinschaft could promise. Programs like Kraft durch Freude, the Naziorganized leisure program organized by the Deutsche Arbeitsfront, created space for Germans
not only to pursue unique leisure experiences but also to capture moments of individual
expression, allowing them to tie into Nazi Germany their own individualist passions.47
Associational life in general, including arts guilds and sporting clubs, encouraged broad popular
participation that wove Nazism into everyday lives.48 On a much more microhistorical level,
Andrew Bergerson examines how Germans deployed expressions of conviviality to signal to
others the boundaries of their own personal communities. Everything from shaking hands to
hanging banners all carried profound consequences that reveal the constant undulation of
German social dynamics as the Third Reich dawned.49 Even violence, Michael Wildt shows,
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provided the impetus for the breaking, making, and remaking of municipal order and personal
relationships to realize a new utopian Volksgemeinschaft.50 Exploring more the state monopoly
on violence, Robert Gellately demonstrates that consent to a new social order was “inextricably
linked” the coercive tactics deployed by German Police and the Nazi SA to ensure a sense of law
and order after the collapse of Weimar.51 Some more extreme examples rely on genocidal
violence itself as the medium through which Germans began not just to imagine but realize their
national community.52 Even Nazi imperial exploits have been framed as opportunities through
which Germans could participate in their community-building missions.53
Claudia Koonz has taken the form of Volksgemeinschaft further in her study which
identifies the ethical rules that structured sociability and community under Nazi rule. Koonz
traces the emergence of what she calls a “Nazi conscience,” a “secular ethos” that defined the
poles of right and wrong in the Third Reich.54 Koonz shows how a group of “ethnocrats”— legal
professionals, university researchers, medical specialists, and Nazi politicians—created and
controlled knowledge about race. By weaving racial theories into education curricula,
associational life, and political culture, Nazi professionals carefully crafted a set of principles
that made anti-Semitism not just attractive but a moral obligation. Even Germans skeptical of the
Nazi cause found themselves captivated by an “ethnic righteousness” that compelled Nazi
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society toward the Final Solution.55 Koonz’s research is especially profound because it renders
the spread Nazi racial ideologies knowable, disseminated through society neither by coercing
individual Germans or awakening inherent racial animus. Instead, Nazi deployed educated and
professional experts to wage a calculated and strategic public relations campaign to build,
promote, and ingrain Nazi ideals into German society.
What these scholars illustrate so astutely is that the borders and categories that defined
German society during the Third Reich were not inherent in a Nazi system: they had to be
imagined, built, and rebuilt over the course of Hitler’s reign, a process that unfolded in all
corners of German society, not just by Nazi bureaucrats.56 This dissertation benefits from these
conclusions. It uncovers at the junction between professional expertise and popular culture the
forge of German social ideals, where high “intellectual” perceptions about poverty and welfare
met the public imaginings of community. In doing so, the following research destabilizes the
static and “modern” institutional mechanisms of Nazi relief to reveal a much more dynamic and
responsive network whose approaches, responses, and responsibilities changed constantly under
Nazi rule.
Despite the cachet that Volksgemeinschaft enjoys with many scholars today, some are
skeptical about it as a core concept for understanding German society under Nazi rule. The
concept has critics from two camps. First, scholars question how Volksgemeinschaft factored into
the lived experiences of historical subjects. This, in many ways, a reinvigoration of the Marxist
critique that Tim Mason levied in a previous generation. Jill Stephenson, for example,
investigates the rural communities of Württemberg to argue against the pervasive appeal of
Volksgemeinschaft. Stephenson demonstrates that a Nazi utopian society not only failed to work
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its way into the lived experiences of southwest Germans, but also that the ideas and values had
little applicability to a strongly-entrenched rural culture. Directly addressing arguments made by
Michael Wildt, Stephenson argues that the strong community bonds built in rural Württemberg
before the Third Reich meant that Nazi propaganda failed to take hold as it had elsewhere. In
some cases, rural inhabitants met Nazi intrusion with hostility and ultimately, Stephenson argues,
“learning to live with the Nazi regime was not the same as supporting it.”57
Second, on a more historiographical level, scholars critique the concept of
Volksgemeinschaft as an analytical trap for historians that can stand in for its own explanation.
Ian Kershaw, while recognizing the concept’s usefulness, critiques the concept for its
“inexactness,” identifying three different interpretations of its usage.58 Along with this
historiographical confusion, he contends that historians might easily point toward pervasive Nazi
propaganda and vibrant associational life as evidence of Volksgemeinschaft. Yet for Kershaw,
the simple accessibility of Volksgemeinschaft through these outlets cannot demonstrate the
strength of individual conviction for Volksgemeinschaft values. In other words, the appearance of
Volksgemeinschaft does not necessarily signify the existence of Volksgemeinschaft—whatever
that might actually signify anyway. In a similar vein, Geoff Eley laments the use of
Volksgemeinschaft as its own explanation whereby German society exists for Volksgemeinschaft.
He worries, much like Kershaw, that the concept of Volksgemeinschaft obscures the complex
social, political, and cultural aspirations that Germans used as building blocks to construct the
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concept altogether.59 Eley reminds readers that Volksgemeinschaft represented an important and
shifting constellation that found its way into all strata of society.
While these scholars critique the historiographical category of Volksgemeinschaft, Moritz
Föllmer scrutinizes this notion that Nazi society was collectivist at all and, thus, questioning the
social tendency toward Volksgemeinschaft altogether. The signals were all there, he concedes.
Germans could hardly escape the pervasive talk of Volksgemeinschaft. “Gemeinnutz geht vor
Eigennutz,” the slogan of the NSV, subordinated the individual to the collective good. Indeed,
Föllmer draws attention to scholars of World War II who emphasize how Nazi administrators
interpreted individualism as a threat to the German war effort.60 However, glimpses of
individualism do emerge in Nazi society, so much so that Föllmer suggests the dominant
interpretation of collectivism deserves reevaluating.61 Föllmer argues that individuality must not
be grounded in the Western liberal mode anathema to National Socialism. Instead, he uncovers a
multifaceted concept of individuality that allowed Berliners to pursue their own personal
ambitions while weaving their interests into National Socialism.62 This “legitimate
individualism” proposed by Föllmer pushes back against some of the fundamental perceptions
that historians have about the nature of National Socialism.
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Volksgemeinschaft is a critical concept for this dissertation because the Nazi welfare
system aimed to realize a particular vision of German society—regardless if that vision was
coherent or not. This dissertation responds to the historiographical tensions that arise from
debates about the concept of Volksgemeinschaft. It takes seriously as an ideological force the
calls by Nazi welfare administrators for a homogenous Volksgemeinschaft by welfare operations
and the propaganda that resulted, for this, too, were the result of social fantasies imagined and
projected onto German society. However, these ideas did not move through German society
unaltered, just like welfare mechanisms and projects did not exist untouched. Nor were they the
exclusive product of a small, elite group of “ethnocrats” so central to Claudia Koonz’s
explanation regarding the moral principles that propelled Germans toward violent exclusion.
Consequently, the historical record demands that the concepts and apparatuses of social cohesion
be contextualized with the values and meanings that ordinary Germans used to build them. This
dissertation responds to Eley’s call for balance between the cultural approaches that explore
consent and popular participation with the social research focused on economic structures and
social discipline.63 This echoes earlier sentiments expressed by Detlev Peukert himself, who
argued that “avoid getting lost in the pointillism and miniaturism” of the history of everyday life,
historians must “have a clear grasp of the complexity of the structures of people’s lives.”64 This
dissertation about Nazi welfare seeks to strike just this balance between the institutional
authority and popular culture. The structures of Nazi welfare cannot be ignored. National and
municipal policies dictated how Germans received pensions, unemployment insurance, and
health care. The institutional tentacles of Nazi relief reached into private lives and demanded
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particular standards. However, these structures did not operate in a vacuum, and scholars have all
but ignored the millions of individuals who interacted with German welfare under Nazi rule.
This includes not just the poor individuals who found themselves waiting in welfare offices but
also the ordinary people wearing WHW badges or the volunteers collecting donations. These
individuals, their interactions with and responses to Nazi relief, created a culture of popular
participation through which they negotiated and renegotiated the meanings of welfare and the
expectations of “normative” life under Nazi rule. For the first time, this dissertation situates Nazi
poor relief outside the limiting context of institutionalized and professional social welfare,
capturing the collective and collaborative endeavors of exclusion and violence that unfolded
under Nazi rule.
Source Material
This dissertation is based predominately on institutional sources produced by Nazi
officials which provide a necessary scaffolding of the institutions under investigation. These
documents include circulars, directives, and memos describing the policies and practices of
institutional welfare—how, for example, a particular WHW collection drive would be organized,
the distribution of the Sammelbüchsen, or collection boxes, the assignments of each collector and
where he or she would solicit donations, and the protocol for returning collection boxes and
donations. Additionally, I examined court proceedings, job applications, and administrative
inspections for indications of attitudes and ideas about poverty. Social workers appeared
regularly as character witnesses for young people standing trial. Police officers often filed reports
that detail the spaces and people in poor neighborhoods. Mood reports provided by the
Sicherheitsdienst, the intelligence bureau for the Nazi Schutzstaffel (SS), paid close attention to
food, housing, and the general material conditions of local communities. Along with sources
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from the Nazi-institutional perspective, this work also relies on the voices and reports compiled
by the Social Democrats in exile, or Sopade report. More than a simple counterbalance to
National Socialist voices, the Sopade reports provide a more candid—though not unbiased—
perspective on the everyday practices of Nazi society. This dissertation excavates from these
sources the hidden voices and figures that constituted poor relief both inside and beyond the Nazi
welfare office.
As underrepresented voices become increasingly audible, worries emerge about what
they actually can say about the nature of poverty and poor relief in Nazi Germany. Scholars have
already written about how welfare petitioners tailored their language to fit the specific tropes of
“deserving poor.”65 In some ways, this is interesting on its own for understanding how needy
individuals tried to write themselves into a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. However, it also means
contending with a thick layer of National Socialist bias which lends itself to reinforcing the
social disciplining tropes of Nazi welfare that have been well established by now. When read
through administrative documents, the voices of the poor themselves must be read with some
skepticism, for they were presented with an agenda not to represent accurately the dynamics of
Third Reich poverty but instead to present a convincing case to merit state support.
This dissertation also aims to situate institutional sources in a broader cultural
framework. Welfare institutions did not monopolize discourse on poverty and relief and, as this
work attempts to demonstrate, the meaning of poverty was negotiated not just by professionals
but by ordinary individuals as well. Popular representations of poverty in film, literature,
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photography, and journalism, among other sources created for mass consumption, although
compromised by censorship, reflect broader values toward poverty that resonated with society atlarge. By relying on popular culture as a barometer, this dissertation tries to capture both the
complexities of perspectives about poverty as well as the limits of popular imagination. Scholars
can better understand how individuals draw their social boundaries.
Together, these sources help to tell a more nuanced story about Nazi perspectives of and
approaches to poor relief in the Third Reich. They make the argument that Nazi poor relief
represented a collaborative undertaking by both professionals and laypeople who together
defined the limits of German society based not solely on the “scientific” approaches to relief
prescribed by Nazi welfare professionals. Germans could participate in poor relief and help
shape the meaning of “neighbor” and “enemy” at a time when such designations had devastating
consequences. Chapter one explores the earliest public response to poverty in the Third Reich:
the Bekämpfung des Bettelunwesens, or the war on begging. This quasi-military operation against
beggars, which immediately followed the violent repression of Nazi political opponents,
represents a definitive public statement about how Nazi agents responded to poverty. While
popular images of poverty proliferated in the vibrant new world of Weimar media, the Nazi
operation against beggars squashed from the public realm any nuances about who “beggars,”
and, by extension, the “undeserving poor” actually were: existential threats to German society.
This action set the tone for the welfare programs that unfolded in its aftermath. It demonstrated
that poor relief too would grow from the unambiguous, zero-sum Nazi worldview of neighbors
and enemies.
Where chapter one investigates early dynamics of exclusion, chapter two relies on
collection drives to explore limits of inclusion. Central to chapter two is the Winterhilfswerk, or
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WHW, the six-month collection campaign that attracted millions of donors every year. With
parades, demonstrations, and concerts, among countless other events, organizers built around the
WHW a spectacle meant to communicate a sweeping sense organic and spontaneous
commitment by the German public to the values of Nazi Volksgemeinschaft—namely, collective
sacrifice and racial purity. The images, values, and emotions communicated by the WHW
ultimately belied its deeper purpose: to delineate a “people’s community,” not to address
poverty. Poverty, largely absent from the WHW’s rhetoric altogether, became a tangential
specter to the more urgent goal of forging a homogenous Nazi society. In spite of this, ordinary
Germans found ways to subvert Nazi pressures and build ulterior outlets for community through
the WHW and other collection drives.
Chapter three examines the professional atmospheres where poor relief unfolded in Nazi
Germany. It steps into local welfare offices to know better who decided how to provide relief.
Despite national propaganda campaigns that portrayed a unified front committed to Nazi values,
views closer to the ground reveal cracks in the welfare structure. Education, politics, and
responsibility all shaped the working dynamics between agents in welfare offices. Social workers
questioned each other’s political loyalties. Administrators lacked critical education. Case
workers bore colossal workloads, very often torn between the ideological expectations of the
Nazi state and the practical needs of destitute individuals. The point here is not to explain the
mechanics of local welfare but instead to capture how institutional culture—in addition to the
popular culture described in previous chapters—molded the boundaries of German society.
When World War II arrived, mobilization for war distinctly altered the scope and
obligations of Nazi welfare. Chapter four follows NSV agents as they mobilized alongside the
Wehrmacht and exported welfare beyond the borders of the Altreich. Poverty and destitution
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emerged as propagandistic narratives that justified the invasion and annexation of Austria and
Poland. Behind German soldiers who flooded the Polish border in September 1939, Nazi welfare
workers marched as well, establishing offices, claiming space, and promoting the values of
National Socialism through their professional responsibilities. The NSV, along with its new
responsibilities supplying and facilitating the operations of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle,
became an integral part of the Nazi imperial project. Along with providing a physical occupying
presence, relief practices became a conduit for transmitting Nazi values, including racial
hierarchies, into occupied space. Where domestic relief fostered a culture of exclusion by
defining “enemies,” Nazi-led relief in occupied Europe became an integral part of a genocidal
machine.
Finally, chapter five captures Nazi-led relief at its limits. When total war breeched the
German borders, it brought unprecedented destitution reaching all elements of civilian life. Not
only did Allied aerial bombing destroy buildings and bodies, but also it created a sense of
material insecurity, particularly among urban civilians. Nazi-led welfare was neither oriented nor
equipped to handle the concerns about material wellbeing wrought by total war. Instead, Nazi
relief agents remained committed to protecting the integrity of a Volksgemeinschaft. This meant
deliberately understaffed welfare offices and relief stations when civilians needed the most help.
As Nazi-led relief faltered in the face of total war, civilians took responsibility for resolving their
own struggles—not out of deeply Nazi commitment but to survive. They peered beyond the
boundaries of völkisch values and some turned to trading, marketeering, and even plunder and
theft to endure the war. Civilians did not abandon Volksgemeinschaft altogether, but they did
explore alternate values, engage new relationships if it meant a possibility to survive World War
II.
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A story of Nazi-led welfare can never be comprehensive. Individual, local, municipal,
and regional contexts all contain delicate nuances deserving of their own dissertations. While this
current dissertation cannot hope to map every wrinkle and every shudder that jerks at the fabric
of history, it can cast new and relevant light on subject that has receded into the shadows. These
chapters tell a story in which ordinary Germans, alongside Nazi administrators and relief
workers, built the categories and boundaries of a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. They relied not solely
on Nazi ideology but cultural dispositions, community relationships, and professional
responsibilities. Individuals wove into their everyday lives the gestures and symbols of poor
relief and, with them, the tactics of inclusion and exclusion. Rather than an impersonal and
bureaucratized welfare state that targeted subjects for social discipline, Nazi-led poor relief was
meant to be personal and emotional—and not just for those in need. Poor relief under Nazi rule
served as a path for Germans to “virtue,” to leading a “moral” life. Yet this path helped to make
violent exclusion a very real part of everyday German life and ultimately led straight to the gates
of Auschwitz.

33

CHAPTER ONE
The Bekämpfung des Bettelunwesens: Making Enemies and Establishing Order, 1931-1933
In 1929, the Great Depression ripped through Germany with utterly devastating effects.
Signs of Germany’s demise at the hands of the Great Depression were visible on the surfaces,
spaces, and bodies across the country. Almost instantaneously millions of Germans found
themselves destitute while millions more stood on the precipice of despair. All Germans were
vulnerable: workers, artisans, and professionals. Welfare rolls expanded exponentially, so by
1933, nearly a quarter of all Hamburg citizens, for example, received some cash benefits from
the local welfare office.1 Administrators could not sufficiently staff welfare offices as case
workers struggled with the influx of needy Germans demanding relief. Where some cities barely
managed, some actively cut welfare benefits while still others simply ran out of money. In a
number of German municipalities, welfare costs vastly outpaced annual tax revenues. The result:
over a million registered unemployed Germans received no benefits guaranteed by the Weimar
constitution.2
The Great Depression created unbearable burdens for the Weimar Republic, few more so
than the state’s increased financial responsibilities resulting from severe unemployment.3 The
devastation reached its peak in 1932 when almost 30 percent of Germany’s workforce had no
job.4 However insurmountable these burdens might have seemed, perhaps more destructive to the
Weimar government was the fundamental crisis of legitimacy that these financial burdens
incited. This had been a challenge that the Weimar government faced from the very beginning
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made all the more acute thanks to economic depression. The Weimar constitution promised basic
rights for its citizens, rights of the unemployed and of women and children to state support.5
These sweeping guarantees proved unsustainable once the Great Depression hit, constituting one
colossal step toward the end of Germany’s first democracy.6 Without a functioning relief system,
the Weimar Republic could no longer protect the basic rights it guaranteed.
As the Weimar Republic began to crumble during the Great Depression, political factions
fought to claim political legitimacy in Germany. Hitler’s National Socialist Party with its
paramilitary brown shirts clashed openly with Communists and Socialists. Even once Hitler was
granted the German chancellery on January 30, 1933, these violent skirmishes remained crucial
to the Nazis’ assertion of legitimacy. Hitler deployed numerous tactics to secure his political
power, from violent intimidation by SA storm troopers to “preventive detention” from state
police to proactively arrest political opposition—though perhaps none more influential than the
popularity that the Nazi Party enjoyed in 1933.7 Meanwhile, the battle for political legitimacy
could not simply be won through violent attacks and police repression. Indeed, Hitler offered a
carefully crafted message to win over the German people. The horrors of World War I loomed
large in German collective memory, so the Nazis staked their reputation on providing a political
platform promising a new, revitalized Germany. This meant rectifying Germany’s international
standing, economic situation, and social fabric, an undertaking that also meant vilifying
Germany’s “enemies,” namely Jews and Communists. Through his passionate rhetoric and
captivating imagery, Hitler convinced vulnerable and disillusioned Germans of the salvific
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potential of National Socialism. These messages encouraged Germans to consent to Hitler’s rule
and support his vision of a stronger and prosperous Germany.
As the violent political struggle against Social Democrats and Communists began to wind
down, somewhat curiously at the end of September 1933, Herman Göring and Joseph Goebbels
orchestrated a nationwide police offensive targeting beggars. The operation, called the
Bekämpfung des Bettelunwesens, lasted for one week, and across the country, local police forces
arrested and incarcerated thousands of beggars and vagrants. The Ministry of Propaganda
unrolled a massive campaign to “educate” the German public about the “threats” that beggars
posed to the whole nation. Goebbels explained the Bekämpfung as a prerequisite for upcoming
Winterhilfswerk, the first winter collection drive organized under Nazi rule. By staging the
Bekämpfung as a prelude to the relief drive, Goebbels established a necessary relationship
between police repression and charitable activity under Nazi rule.
Scholars have seldom discussed the Bekämpfung with any sustained attention. The
Bekämpfung often appears in historical narratives anecdotally without much deeper scholarly
analysis.8 While they often identify beggars among the “asocial” victims of the Nazi regime,
historians have yet to offer much investigation about the space beggars occupy in a National
Socialist worldview. Nazis certainly imagined that beggars posed a disproportionate threat to the
foundations of the German nation, yet beggars were but one of many different social and
political “enemies” that Nazis faced upon coming to power. One might assume, considering the
order of events, that Nazis considered beggars a menace nearly equal to Communists or
Socialists. Historian Wolfgang Ayaß, however, has demonstrated the Nazi Party reached out to
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vagrants during the last moments of the Weimar Republic. He continued, “Once they had gained
power, however, the Nazis gradually abandoned their attempt to win the support of the homeless
and turned instead to persecuting this sub-proletarian stratum with measures that became even
harsher as time went on.”9 So the question must be asked: why, after a sustained battle against
their political opponents, did Nazis turn so enthusiastically toward beggars? What explains this
shift in perspective? And what does this tell historians about the nature of the early moments of
the Third Reich?
The Nazi offensive against beggars was hardly a foregone conclusion. German attitudes
of beggars and vagrants changed over the course of the Weimar Republic for a number of
reasons as dominant narratives of poverty as a fundamental moral failing saw challenges from
science and culture. Social scientific explanations for poverty had slowly begun to change as
social workers relied on systemic issues like housing availability, public health, and social
security, to explain destitution. Additionally, begging and vagrancy had become more prevalent
in the Weimar Republic, especially as unemployment skyrocketed and destitute Germans sought
solutions to their material needs. Not only was begging more prevalent, but also poverty was
more visible than ever before due to innovations in photography technology and mass media.
Literature, film, photography, and journalism all featured stories and representations of beggars
that ordinary Germans readily consumed. Individuals encountered poverty not just on urban
streets but in their living rooms.
This chapter aims to situate the Bekämpfung in this much more complicated culturalhistorical context. It argues that the Bekämpfung was not the inevitable result of increasingly
negative attitudes toward beggars and vagrants at the end of the Weimar Republic, for popular
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opinion about begging was hardly unanimous. While the Bekämpfung might have been violence
of a type from the pattern established during sustained battles to suppress Nazi political enemies,
that stull does not explain why beggars would have been next in that progression. Nazi officials
made a decision to attack beggars as a physical manifestation of both the devastating poverty of
the Great Depression and a lingering depravity of the Weimar Republic that disrupted bourgeois
sensibilities. The consequences of this resonate far beyond the arrest and incarceration of beggars
of vagrants. As will be demonstrated, the Bekämpfung itself accomplished mixed results.
Nevertheless, simply by organizing and conducting the operation, Nazis revealed early
conceptions of and approaches to Germany’s social problems. This amounts to much more than
simply targeting a marginalized group but instead sheds light on the early mechanics that Nazis
used to begin reshaping the boundaries of German society during the Third Reich
To make its arguments, this chapter begins in the Weimar Republic and explores how
poverty fit into popular German consciousness. First, this chapter listens to the various voices
that contributed to perceptions of begging during the Weimar Republic—from the famous and
ordinary, popular and private, visual and textual. Here, readers understand that, at the dawn of
the Third Reich, visible poverty—best exemplified by street beggars—seemingly threatened
bourgeois claim to social order. Some appeared dismayed at the sight of plight of the needy
while others proved annoyed that beggars had begun to encroach onto their space. By contrast,
others expressed anger at the ways that society had mistreated the poor, suggesting that efforts to
relieve poverty merely hid it from view rather than address the economic and social problems
causing it. While there might have been conflicting views about how the poor should be treated,
there was nevertheless the shared recognition of a profound sense of estrangement of poor
citizens from the rest of society, a distance that was growing deeper. This sense of estrangement
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from needy Germans, the “othering” of the poor, was in no ways new to the Weimar Republic or
even the modern era but had become particularly acute since the turn of the 20th century thanks
to the wide availability of new media and the growing influence of social sciences. This chapter
begins by mining representations of the poor to understand popular perceptions about destitute
citizens before the Third Reich.
Next, this chapter moves to the Nazi rise of power and the earliest approaches to poor
relief. It demonstrates that the Nazis were both unprepared and, largely, uninterested to address
issues of material destitution and poor relief. The National Socialist Welfare Association (NSV)
began as a local relief organization in Berlin that was quickly thrust into power after 1933,
hardly equipped to tackle the consequences of economic depression. The Nazis began
reorganizing the depleted Weimar system while pressing private confessional and humanitarian
organizations, like the Catholic Caritas Association, the Protestant Inner Mission, and the
German Red Cross, into ostensibly mandatory service. While some new municipal schemes
emerged to alleviate material destitution in the first months of the Third Reich, the Nazis
themselves provided little response to Germany’s social problems outside of propaganda and
rhetoric until the Bekämpfung des Bettelunwesens. This sweeping police operation not only
aimed to physically remove beggars from public space. It also confirmed an ideological and
propagandistic framework that interpreted beggars as a fundamental threat to the wellbeing of
the German nation, a sentiment shared by many bourgeois Germans during the Weimar
Republic. As a result, the Bekämpfung highlighted an early Nazi affinity not for inciting
revolution but for maintaining continuity with past value systems. Finally, this chapter addresses
the fallout of the operation, its debatable effectiveness, and the precedents it established for Nazi
social policy moving forward.
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The purpose here is not to make an intentionalist argument establishing an inevitable
connection between early Nazi social policy and unprecedented genocide. In fact upon coming to
power, Nazis had no real conception of poverty or plans to address it. They offered few original
ideas about poor relief during 1933 at all. As a result, the Bekämpfung provides scholars one of
the earliest glimpses into how Nazi officials conceived of and confronted Germany’s social
issues after the Weimar Republic collapsed. Ayaß argues, “Instead of destroying poverty, it was
considered cheaper and more efficient to destroy the poor.”10 The Bekämpfung reveals that the
problem, in the eyes of Nazi officials, was not poverty at all or the social destitution that erupted
out of the Great Depression but the beggars themselves. This chapter demonstrates that, from
early on, Nazi officials imagined social problems not as the result of interrelated developments in
economics, industrialization, demography, and culture, but instead as a set of “neighbors”
threatened by “enemies” who warranted uncompromising responses.
Visible Poverty and Social Order
As the Third Reich began, poverty was more visible in Germany than ever before. The
onset of the Great Depression meant that millions of Germans were without work, searching for
alternative sources of income. Everyone, from educated professionals to unskilled laborers,
found themselves vulnerable to unprecedented economic forces and reshaped Germany’s urban
landscape. While behemoth tenement housing structures like Berlin’s Meyers Hof had already
become monuments to Germany’s working-class plight, the anonymous masses seeking out any
trickle of income only sharpened the focus on the picture of a struggling population.11 They
began to traverse the boundaries between space coded as “working class,” entering middle-class
boroughs to seek out a few pfennig. In this way, poor Germans became an increasingly common
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fixture of the modern German landscape in new ways. Certainly the needy had been the subject
of journalism and photography before the Weimar Republic, but the proliferation and
accessibility of new media meant that reports about beggars, vagrants, and tramps entered into
readers’ homes and offices at a much higher frequency. These pervasive images, both in print
and in everyday life, exacerbated tensions between the comfortable and the destitute. The order
and shape of public places, like sidewalks, thoroughfares, parks, and plazas, had been a matter
both of private interest and of national and international concern in Germany during and after
World War I.12 The new orientation of public space informed how individuals understood and
approached larger trends of economic and politics.13 Whether new traffic patterns, lighting
ordinances, or store security, these developments imparted onto public surfaces a sense of order
with both local and national resonance because of the way these new initiatives communicated
government ambitions about economic and political challenges. The increased visibility of
poverty in these very spaces jeopardized this new urban order. Begging and hawking not only
offended bourgeois sensibilities but also exposed the fragility of post-war order. These public
actions challenged middle-class hegemony over public space that wealthier Germans assumed as
their own.
Siegfried Kracauer, one of Weimar Germany’s most prolific cultural commentators,
expressed a keen interest in these spatial dynamics emerging on urban surfaces and in urban
spaces during Germany’s first experiment with democracy.14 Kracauer was fascinated with the
complex hieroglyphics of the modern metropolis and the challenges of deciphering them.15
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Fixated on the ordinary and menial dimensions on everyday life, he cast a critical eye over
popular culture, attempting to make legible the fragmented language of urban modernity. His
feuilleton pieces scratched beneath the glitz and glamor of bourgeois leisure to expose not a
unifying mass culture but merely a thin shell that hid the increasing isolation of individual
citizens.16 While his reporting most often took him to theaters and cinemas, Kracauer also
explored the grimier spaces of urban Berlin. In January 1931, Kracauer wrote a piece describing
his visit to one of Berlin’s largest homeless shelters located on Ackerstraße in the Mitte district.17
Relying on his training as an architect, Kracauer first drew attention to the homeless
shelter’s physical structure, a decrepitly industrial façade. The building had not originally been
designed to house the homeless at all. Municipal transportation authorities had built the huge
warehouse to clean and store Berlin’s tramcars. Kracauer noted that the uninviting exterior was
matched only by the cold interior, exacerbated not just by the rusting train tracks and exposed
steel supports but also by the perpetually broken space heaters.
Berlin Mayor Gustav Böß once declared in 1929 that the individualization of public
welfare cases was one of the cornerstones to Berlin’s relief network.18 Yet inside the shelter,
Kracauer found no individuals, only huddled masses. Shivering, hundreds of men stood trying to
stay warm near heaters that, despite working seldom, “still brought donors considerable solace,”
Kracauer noted ironically.19 Anywhere between 1,800 and 2,500 men shuffled through the doors
of the Ackerstraße shelter daily during the winter months, yet these men found little more than
monotony. Inside the shelter, idleness ruled. Signs discouraged them from trading or gambling.
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To offer some semblance of intellectual stimulation, the shelter did offer a small amount of
entertainment. Patrons could listen to a small radio or check out a book from the library. On the
shelves sat books like Quitzows und ihre Zeit and volumes of Friedrich Justus Knecht’s biblical
histories, as well as issues of Die Gartenlaube from the 1880s and the defunct literary magazine
Nord und Süd. Kracauer commented that this “haphazard” and “irrelevant” literature only served
to detach and distract already disaffected people further from society, offering them no
connection to their contemporary reality. After spending nine long hours sitting idly like old
abandoned train cars, the shelter manager commented, “Around 5PM, they leave for the night
shelter where they can sleep. Once the night shelter closes at 6AM, many come back to us
again.”
The shelter manager continued, “It is difficult finding work. And if it would be found,
these people must be supported for a time in order to familiarize themselves with an existence fit
for humans [ein menschenwürdiges Dasein].”20 He recognized that his patrons needed more
substantial assistance yet could only offer an open space and a cup of coffee. The shelter
provided no meaningful support—no employment, no housing, no resources. Rather, the shelter
perpetuated a cycle of monotony, encouraging the destitute to shuffle from shelter to shelter and
confining them to a small sliver of the city; it did not assist the poor but instead hid them from
middle-class Germans who laid claim to public space. The shelter, however, did not just hide the
poor from more affluent city dwellers but rendered them almost completely invisible even to
themselves. For those inclined to clean up a bit, the Ackerstraße shelter did offer shaves and
haircuts for 10 and 30 pfennigs. The barbershop, which stood in the corner of the huge, empty
space, was for Kracauer emblematic of broader attitudes toward the poor during the late 1920s.
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Barbers clipped, snipped, and shaved clients who sat in front of a mirror-less wall, unable to see
their own reflection. Hidden from themselves, even the poor did not have to suffer the visible
distress instigated by the condition to which they had sunk.21
Kracauer’s article offers a strong critique of Berlin’s poor relief system. However, he saw
these troubling practices as a function of the ways that his society understood poverty. Kracauer
describes a society where poverty only really existed where it was seen, and most people only
worried about it when they could see it. For many, it was seen as a systemic problem related to
housing availability, widespread unemployment, or health care but instead an aesthetic problem-one that marred urban spaces. Concerns about visible poverty had become more pressing since
World War I. The fallout of a lost war, unprecedented hyperinflation, and economic collapse had
brought Germans to the streets in large numbers to eke out a living. Peddling, hawking, and
begging—all potentially expressions of destitution—increased and became central features
visible in Germany’s postwar urban landscape.
According to Kracauer, the Ackerstraße shelter served as a kind of anti-space to hide the
poor and maintain a specifically bourgeois order that reinforced middle-class dominance of
public space. While they offered some degree of respite to the city’s neediest inhabitants, shelters
also kept poor citizens away from Berlin’s more grandiose and lustrous spaces, places like
Kurfürstendamm. The Berlin thoroughfare garnered neither the political weight of Unter den
Linden just across town nor the panache of Paris’ Champs Elysees. However, Kurfürstendamm
had all the trappings of a modern bourgeois boulevard. New bold storefronts projected grandeur
onto the sidewalks and inspired imaginings of luxury and status. As nighttime fell, bright neon
lights transformed mild-mannered cafes into indulgent swirlings of jazz and cabaret. In the
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stores, restaurants, and theaters, Germans could cultivate particular tastes and styles as they
bought goods, ate and drank, and saw sights. The experiences and sensations along
Kurfürstendamm conditioned a set of preferences and expectations distinct from those cultivated
among the industrial tenements in boroughs like Wedding and Berlin’s other working-class
districts. Modern architects, artists, and planners had etched the symbols of social class onto the
urban surfaces of Kurfürstendamm, establishing it as a distinctly middle-class space.
However in 1919, Frau Sabine Hesemeyer, a local resident of the deeply bourgeois
borough of Charlottenburg, was troubled by the scenes she saw walking along Kurfürstendamm.
She sensed grating dissonance between the shine of Berlin’s premier shopping thoroughfare and
the growing presence of poor beggars. Passing the cafes and stores, Hesemeyer encountered a
number of beggars and solicitors many appearing as war veterans. Following World War I,
beggars and hawkers found their place between the shops and along the sidewalks to solicit
donations from passers-by. They often dressed in war regalia, uniforms and medals, and became
regular fixtures of the street scene and a constant reminder of Germany’s tumultuous past five
years.22
This phenomenon was by no means unique to Kurfürstendamm. Begging veterans
constituted a noticeable part of the postwar German landscape, both in cities and elsewhere. This
meant that ordinary Germans were confronted regularly with the scars of war that had disfigured
the bodies of those who served a nation. Some chose to beg without their prosthetic arms or legs,
drawing attention to the extent of their sacrifice unto the German nation. These scenes often
alarmed passers-by who reported that such “disfigurements” generated a “disturbing
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impression.”23 Not satisfied with a stationary position on the sidewalk, other veterans regularly
boarded passing trains to sell cheap wares and solicit small donations. They often sold matches
and played music, in some cases earning donations from passengers while in others inspiring
annoyance among the train riders.24 Perhaps few representations represent this haunting
ambivalence better than Otto Dix in his painting, “The Match Seller.” At the center of Dix’s
1921 painting sits a blind, quadriplegic World War I veteran perched on the sidewalk next to a
door. In his lap rests a wooden box filled with cheap packets of matches. While the poor veteran
calls out to the passers-by to purchase his wares, no one stops to give him any attention. All the
painting shows are a collection of well-dressed legs—one pair clothed in a high-end dress with
black heels, another leg in a pair of tan-striped trousers with brown brogues, and another bluesuited leg with black and white leather shoes—each represented a person with no time for the
veteran. The only attention the match seller receives is from a small brown dog, urinating on his
leg.25
The presence of begging veterans along Kurfürstendamm troubled Frau Hesemeyer and
many others like her. She expressed her emotions in a letter to the Berlin Ministry of Labor in
which outlined her concerns about begging veterans in these public spaces. In her letter, she
clearly expressed sympathy toward veterans, worrying “that our brothers, who willingly put their
lives at stake in the field, now must eke out a living by begging.”26 Yet she did not focus on
sympathy in her letter but rather she “felt shame” as she passed begging veterans “along
Kurfürstendamm and Berlin’s busy thoroughfares.”27 While we know very little about who Frau
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Hesemeyer actually was, she identified a very specific context that triggered her shame: seeing
poor veterans begging along Kurfürstendamm. It does not appear that her shame extended to
poor veterans in general—those beyond the spatial realm of Kurfürstendamm—but was incited
by those who interceded into Hesemeyer’s world, an encounter motivated from the veteran’s
perspective, by destitution. Nevertheless, this shame did not compel her to donate to the veterans
and only moved her to try and render the beggars invisible: she looked away.28
Frau Hesemeyer shows that she has more concern for begging disabled veterans for the
legs in Otto Dix’s painting. However, her letter abounds with ambiguity. Her shame emerged as
a byproduct of an altered streetscape caused by the presence of veterans who had descended into
a lamentable state of begging. By their very presence, the begging veterans would not allow Frau
Hesemeyer to forget one of Germany’s deep post-war problems, a problem she might have easily
forgotten otherwise. By presenting themselves as veterans, the bodies and actions of poor men
become a much more complex signifier in the urban landscape.
These ambiguities seem to vanish in the response she received from the Berlin Labor
Ministry. Citing investigations from the Labor Ministry, the respondent suggested that not onetenth of all begging war veterans were even war veterans at all, or even suffered from any sort of
physical or psychological disability.29 “The overwhelming majority of them,” the letter reported,
“are beggars with work-shy personalities, a portion of whom beg professionally.”30 While many
of these beggars had disabilities that predated the war, others often feigned blindness or mental
disabilities to attract attention. The respondent also suggested that in all likelihood, beggars
earned as much as 300 or 400 marks per day, a sum greatly exceeding any kind of state,
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municipal, or charitable assistance. For the Labor Ministry, begging represented a highly
subversive practice on a number of different levels. Not only did it disrupt a finely balanced
public order, but also it challenged a long established moral order whereby notions of work were
interpreted in ways that established mutualistic relationship among members of society. Both
Frau Hesemeyer and the Labor Ministry respondent recognized a spatial dissonance on
Kurfürstendamm. Yet while Hesemeyer’s response was more ambiguous, seemingly grounded in
feelings about the treatment of war veterans, the Labor Ministry respondent reacted much more
unsympathetically. He identified a fundamental deviousness embedded in the intentions of Berlin
beggars, ultimately threatening the bourgeois respectability that reigned along Kurfürstendamm.
Despite these suspicious reactions, needy citizens had to eke out a living, and they had to
move beyond the destitute confines of working class districts in Berlin to do so. That often meant
changing outward appearances to seem more sympathetic to passers-by—for example, by
dressing as veterans or begging with children—or asserting themselves into spaces where they
allegedly did not belong, for they could not hope to find sufficient income in the margins to
which they had been pushed. As the urban housing crisis forced many citizens out of their
homes, poor Germans found themselves pushed to the margins of society both figuratively and
literally. When no apartments could be found in overcrowded tenements, many destitute
individuals and families moved out to the outskirts of town, onto plots of land and allotment
gardens, Laubenkolonien, to build make-shift shacks and lean-tos. By 1931, an estimated 30,000
Germans crowded onto camps just outside Berlin. 31 These settlements attracted all different
kinds of Germans. Many working-class Germans could be found there, metal workers, factory
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workers, tailors, and foremen, for example. Perhaps more common, however, were the
unemployed who sought cheap shelter. Vagrants, itinerants, and beggars also passed through.32
The primitive conditions of the Laubenkolonien, compounded by overcrowding, meant
that health and safety proved especially precarious for working-class and poor Germans who
lived there. In Hamburg, for example, welfare officials and charity workers worried about the
spread of disease through allotment settlements. These settlements jeopardized the health and
safety of young children and did not offer a suitable solution for homelessness, they believed.33
Crime also made allotment settlements notoriously dangerous places. Theft and assault were
rampant, and even murder was not uncommon.34 Newspaper pages were littered with stories of
crime, assault, and murder that occurred in such establishments.35
When poor citizens did not have the means to set up in the Laubenkolonien, they turned
to Herberge, or inns, which homeless and mostly single men could rely on for cheap shelter.
Often run by private institutions and subsidized by local government, these inns offered a bed
and a cup of coffee to Germans in need of a roof over their heads. In some cases, inns also
offered services to help locate jobs for the unemployed.36 Admission charges cost no more than
0.65 RM per day, and rates even lowered for longer stays.
Cities like Berlin saw a spike in new Herbergen just before 1929 and despite
considerable municipal oversight, these shelters developed poor reputations and too often
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attracted unsavory characters.37 Some, like the Männerheim der Heilsarmee, provided the needy
with clean facilities and left “a friendly impression.”38 Yet the majority of others attracted
alcoholics, criminals, and fostered an “asocial atmosphere.”39 Some homes exhibited “primitive
hygienic conditions,” not suitable for habitation. Others also served alcohol and encouraged
prostitution. Some inns, like those found on Quitzowstrasse and Rostockerstrasse in Berlin’s
Tiergarten district, would even accept welfare vouchers for alcohol.40 Local municipal demanded
that more police attention be directed toward these inns to ensure that order was maintained and
funds were allocated properly. Many homeless women in Wedding turned to the Inner Mission’s
Passantenheim on Strelitzer Straße where, for a small daily price around 0.60 marks, women
could claim a bed.41 Yet despite offering shelter and nominal meals, these destitute women often
complained of mistreatment by the Passantenheim staff. In exchange for housework, women
could earn meals throughout the day. The occupants, however, were subjected to cruel working
conditions and expected to complete extremely strenuous tasks. After demanding work in the
morning, the women might receive “two dry rolls and thin coffee.”42 Much like the
Laubenkolonien, these spaces proved dangerous for Germany’s most destitute and sat deep in
working-class districts far away from more affluent citizens.
Together, the Laubenkolonien and Herbergen constituted a portion of the imagined—if
not literal—margins to which destitute individuals were often relegated, where opportunity and
income were scarce. Health and security proved particularly precarious in these spaces as no city
regulations protected them and untold numbers of individuals passed through constantly. These
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spaces were portrayed as hotbeds for disease and crime, not to mention political unrest and leftist
agitators.
When destitute individuals could not make ends meet in their own local surroundings, the
poor made their way into more affluent parts of German cities where they might solicit a few
donations. One such neighborhood was Zehlendorf in Berlin, and a local resident, Dr. C. von
Holten, expressed his own anxieties about the growing presence of beggars. Von Holten owned a
house on the edge of the Grunewald in Zehlendorf. The nearby forest and the natural
environment he lived in enabled von Holten to lead a lifestyle not possible in other, more
industrialized districts of Berlin. He could take walks, breathe fresh air, and relax on the banks of
the Schlachtensee. In this setting, he could construct a kind of socio-moral geography with
Zehlendorf and its suburban calm at the center while the urban chaos of Berlin lurked around the
edges. Von Holten, however, could not resist Berlin’s urban growth. The opening of a new
metropolitan line at Krumme Lanke in 1929 meant that the spatial distance between him and the
city and, consequently, its moral regimes collapsed.
Von Holten detailed in a letter to the editor of the Vossische Zeitung his displeasure with
a recent influx of beggars that, from his point of view, had disrupted his idyllic lifestyle.43 The
beggars that von Holten donned the tattered garb of vagrants. They brought with them the shrill
melodies of the hurdy-gurdy, piercing the quiet rhythm of the Schlachtensee that von Holten
enjoyed so much.44 While poor Germans hoped to find some small bit of support, von Holten
greeted them as intruders into space that they did not belong.
Both Frau Hesemeyer and von Holten expressed anxieties about visible poverty at a time
when poverty was becoming a more pronounced dimension not only of German popular
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consciousness but also among social scientists, public intellectuals, activists, and investigative
journalists, who had worked to make impoverished citizens more visible to the broader public.
The prolific writer and journalist Hans Ostwald contributed to the growing visibility of poverty
through his work. His work highlighted explored the cultural world of the mobile poor and how
it contrasted with more normative German society. Despite training as a goldsmith while a young
boy, Ostwald spent time as a vagrant in his adolescent years and committed himself to
documenting in ethnographic detail his experiences with poor Germans.45 In 1906, he published
a work entitled, Rinnsteinsprache: Lexikon der Gauner-, Dirnen-, und Landstreichersprache.46
In it, he compiled a detailed compendium of vocabulary used by vagrants, beggars, and bums as
well as, what he calls, criminals, thieves, and prostitutes. Some slang words defined in his
lexicon include Aschelputz, prison or jail food; bibern, to read; Tabel, a package of stolen things;
and Tante, a homosexual prostitute.
The lexicon also includes descriptions of more cryptic languages employed by poor
travelers like Bettelzinken and Klopfsprache. The Zinken, symbols drawn on fences, walls, and
doors with pieces of coal or brick that came to constitute a kind of vagrant code, were
particularly useful for beggars because they could relay information about where to find food,
shelter, and other kinds of relief. An open hand signaled houses that gave generously to beggars.
A cross inside a circle signified where “a bum could get bread and soup.”47 Triangles signaled
the number in a traveling party. Other symbols showed travelers when women or children lived
in a house while others indicated when dogs were present. Beggars drew swords where they
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found danger, including police officers, law enforcement, or other less sympathetic characters.48
These symbols often went undetected, but easily recognized for other passersby who could read
them and follow their advice.
Instead of relying on symbols, Klopfsprache used sound, deploying knocks, taps, and hits
to denote different letters. Beggars and vagrants used buttons, coins, or sticks tap out messages
on heating pipes, glass windows, or iron bars. A short strike would denote the letter A, two short
strikes signified the letter B, and so on. Different from the Bettelzinken, Klopfsprache was
generally used in homeless shelters or jail cells to relay quick information or coordinate
movements.49 Ostwald noted that since this form of communication was hardly silent and is
easily detected by jail authorities and therefore poses more risk for those in communication.
For Ostwald, these languages represented unique cultural expressions, the dialect of
itinerancy. “Almost every occupation has its own small vocabulary,” he wrote. “From
countryside to countryside, the sound and rhythm of speech changes. Every province, almost
every city has its own dialects.”50 He even recognized the unique nature of professional language
and vocabulary, writing, “Book sellers have their own language and goldsmiths have theirs.”51
These dialects represent unique variations on the German language. The Gaunersprache of
which Bettelzinken and Klopfsprache were a part, were closely linked to rural areas throughout
Germany. Ostwald called them the languages of the ditch-sleepers [Chausseegrabentapezierer],
languages of the snow-shovellers in the summer and cherry-pickers in the winter.52 Yet even
though Bettelzinken and Klopfsprache communicated German words and phrases, Ostwald
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argued that they separated their practitioners from other Germans: “We have people among us
who speak almost a completely different language: the crooks, criminals, vagrants, bums, and
beggars.”53 These symbols, taps, and clangs represented a unique language of the poor, one
cultural dimension among many recognized by Ostwald that marked poor vagrants as “others”
and separated them from normative German society.
This kind of sociological investigation persisted throughout Ostwald’s work and
informed his most ambitious project: the Großstadt-Dokumente, a series of pamphlets and
publications that detailed various aspects of modern urban life in German-speaking lands. While
some writers primarily relied on fiction to make sense of Europe’s emerging urban landscape,
Ostwald pieced together various types of reportage not to present a holistic interpretation of
urban Germany but instead to capture diverse urban experiences.54 Ostwald presented a
symphony of voices that included journalists, physicians, artists, lawyers, and others (some of
whom wrote under pseudonyms like Assessor and Satyr) that included reports about dancing and
prostitution, police and order, single mothers, nightlife, and other topics.55 The focus was not
limited to Berlin either as Austrian journalist Max Winter reported about Viennese poverty.
Winter explored rumors that homeless people in Vienna took up residence in the sewers,
discovering a complex network of housing underneath the streets of the Austrian capital.56
Among many other accomplishments, these documents emphasized the active role that
many poor and destitute people took to make ends meet. The poor were not passive victims of
the powerful tides of modernization nor were they an anonymous mass populating Germany’s
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urban landscapes. Where von Holten and Hesemeyer failed to differentiate between poor
individuals, the authors of the Großstadt-Dokumente highlighted the complex ways by which
poor citizens asserted themselves into the new modern world to confront the challenges of
modern life. They took advantage of the new urban surfaces and spaces to communicate and find
relief. They took to the streets to find some trickle of income, regardless of the moral rules (or
national legislation) that restricted begging. To the extent they could, poor people subverted the
various social norms which worked to keep them invisible but, by doing so, directly challenged
the authority and order established by the ruling classes.
Published as small pamphlets, the Großstadt-Dokumente were available to a broad
public, and their investigative trends influenced the booming world of Weimar print journalism.
On the pages of the most popular newspapers and broadsheets, the stories, faces, and actions of
poor citizens made their way into more private spaces like homes and working, making poverty
an almost pervasive dimension of German life. Journalists went to great lengths to make visible
what had previously been hidden from the view of the public, sometimes going undercover to
“blend in” with working-class Germans. 57 Such reporting accomplished much more than simply
transmitting updates of current events to eager consumers. Indeed, it introduced Germans to their
fellow citizens and shined light onto people and places that would otherwise have gone unseen or
unnoticed.
What these essays reveal is that the growing anxieties and estrangement between poor
Germans and those better-off was not the sole product of the economic challenges faced during
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the Weimar Republic. Instead, it was the consequence of an increasing awareness of economic
inequality and cultural difference that had been recognized and researched by journalists and
commentators for decades. While the work of Ostwald and the authors of the GroßstadtDokumente was of a different order than daily newspaper reporting, they still influenced the kind
of reporting that found its way into more popular media. While some of these reports
emphasized depravity and destitution among the working classes and homeless, the most
common type of coverage detailed the less savory exploits of the poor. During moments of
relative economic stability, the liberal democratic Vossische Zeitung reported in May 1924 of
large-scale police raids across Berlin on various homeless shelters, resulting in numerous arrests
of the homeless and “work shy.”58 Articles described figures like Simon Johann, a regular
delinquent whose run-ins with the law included five counts of begging on top of convictions of
theft and fraud in August 1927. Even after the economy collapsed in 1929, readers learned of
young vagrants like Hermann Schmidt, who was arrested “broke and destitute” in a
Charlottenburg inn after robbing and assaulting a kindergarten teacher.59 With an urgent tone,
reporting like this brought together violence and poverty. The poor were not just being made
visible; they were becoming visible as violent actors.
Even just the traces of the poor proved newsworthy for their potential threat to public
order. In August 1928, for example, the Vossische Zeitung ran a report detailing discovery of
Bettelzinken on the doorways of a newly built housing block on Agricolastrasse in Berlin.60 “For
a few days, the residence from 29/34 Agricolastrasse have been alarmed by the appearance of
suspicious symbols, so called “Zinken,” painted on the doorways by strangers,” the report
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detailed. “This is no joke,” warned the reporter and continued to suggest that the symbols
indicated a thief may be soon to strike. Later in 1933, another article warned of the “secret
symbols” only understood by the “guild of the beggars.” These marks on public space
represented a perceived threat to public order. The article concluded, “In the interest of safety,
residents should immediately contact the police if they see any of these symbols.”61 It is likely
that ordinary German citizens would not have recognized these symbols as more than just
random graffiti. Nevertheless, articles like these drew public attention to them, coded them as a
threat to public order, and encouraged citizens to call the police.
Journalists wove narratives of poverty into readers’ everyday lives. Yet innovations in
photographic technology meant that poverty could become visible without encountering poor
citizens on German streets. Photography became a more common method of narration in postwar
Germany. Illustrated newspapers, photomontages, and photo essays cultivated a change in
perception and offered new ways of storytelling.62 Germans did not have to rely on their own
imagination but saw, through the photographer’s lens, the actors and environment of a story.
This new visual language inspired excitement about the developing medium. Some advocates
argued that literacy of photography would represent the literacy of the future. Written language
would fall by the way side as photographs would emerge as the lingua franca of the modern
world. Writing for Das Kunstblatt, artist Johannes Molzahn declared, “Stop reading! Look!”63
Molzahn described the tedium of writing which included, “A piece of paper, in the hand a pencil,
and on the table the object—the looking eye; otherwise, a wrist and the tedious work of many,
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many hours.” Alternatively, “One-hundredth of a second through the highly sensitive eye of your
camera and the picture of the object there on the table is captured.”64 For Molzahn, this new
visual language of photography would generate a whole new tempo to the world by which
individuals could more quickly orientate themselves to the stories and news of the modern world.
Photojournalists like Willy Römer relied on the perceived honesty of photography to
present readers with stories about the poor. Römer, who began his career as an intern for the
Berliner Illustrationsgesellschaft, started working for Walter Bernstein’s press photography
agency “Photothek” in 1920 where he stayed until it was closed by the Nazis in 1935. Römer
produced photo essays that aimed to capture street life for poor Germans from the Kaiserreich
through the Weimar Republic. Collections like Kinder auf der Strasse, Ambulantes Gewerbe,
and Gaukler, Bärenführer, Musikanten revealed the diverse ways in which destitution made itself
visible in Germany. His images show Berliners peddling old shoes, paper, bottles, and other used
and decrepit wares.65 Others repaired shoes and sharpened knives. Some Germans performed
magic tricks in front of gathering crowds. For ten pfennig, pedestrians on Alexanderplatz could
catch a small glimpse of the planet Venus through one peddler’s telescope.66 Children often
helped their parents find alternative sources of income by helping haul bricks or shine shoes.
Römer captured one especially depressing scene from 1923. In front of one of Berlin’s
Markthallen, four young boys, one without shoes, pick through a pile of garbage looking for any
fruits or vegetables that might still be edible.67 Römer hoped that photos such as these would
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help to shed light, to make visible, the realities in which some Germans lived after World War
I.68
Through another type of photography, August Sander also placed his faith in the ability
of photography to represent the lived world around him. When discussing his collection,
Menschen des 20. Jahrhunderts, at the Cologne Art Union, he remarked, “Nothing seems better
suited than photography to give an absolutely faithful historical picture of our time.”69 He
intended to “honestly tell the truth about our age and people.”70 Sander’s work stood among that
of other photographers who used their images as a kind of modern language.71 Sander himself
provided a lexicon of German faces, making them—and as a result, essential sentiments of the
contemporary age—more legible for the broader public.72 Central to this narrative was social
class, and the poor played a critical role in composing the spirit of Sander’s age.
Sander used photography to create a compendium of the human form in the 20th century.
His first collect, Antlitz der Zeit, was a small subset of sixty portraits of varying professions and
identities from his larger project. He included farmers and athletes, teachers and students, artists
and priest, revolutionaries and policemen. He included men and women, adults and children,
individuals, families, and groups, some rich and some poor. These were not candid photographs
like those snapped by Willy Römer, but nevertheless, Sander hoped to present the same kind of
authentic representation of German life. While other more abstract photographers like MoholyNagy or Albert Renger-Patzsch sought to test the boundaries of human perception, Sander hoped
to capture the spirit of an age, a specific historical mood, a people at a specific historical
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moment.73 In the introduction to the collection, Berlin novelist Alfred Döblin wrote, “We have
before us here a form of cultural history or, better, sociology of the last thirty years.”74 By
presenting images of faces, Döblin believed that photography could communicate a sense of
historical spirit that often evaded words. Within photographs resided a representation of a time
that words could not capture, and it was the goal of Sander’s portraits to capture and present that
spirit of German humanity.
Sander’s collection communicates a wide gamut of emotions, from the brooding angst of
“Revolutionäre,” to the smug innocence of “Gymnasiast.” One of the more animated subjects
can be found in “Konditor.” Posing amongst the flying flour of a dusty kitchen, a middle-aged
baker stands sturdily in a pristine white smock. He does not smile but is not unwelcoming either.
With a wooden spoon firmly planted in his mixing bowl, the baker cuts the figure of a hardworking figure.
In Sander’s compendium of humans, he included all different kinds of occupations,
cultures, and identities, as if claiming that such identities belonged in the larger order of
humanity. In this order, documented in the final section of his work entitled “The Last Men,”
Sander compiled photographs of the poor and destitute. Indeed, the final two photographs of
Antlitz der Zeit include two of the poorest individuals in the collection: “Abgebauter Seemann”
and “Arbeitslos.” While other (but not all) portraits were taken in front of a plain white
background, these two men were snapped on the streets as if caught candidly. In “Abgebauter
Seemann,” Sander photographed a sailor from Hamburg standing on a bridge in the Lindenthal
district of Cologne. The sailor shifts his weight awkwardly to his left, hands stuffed inside his
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pockets of his ill-fitting pants suggesting he is uncomfortable in front of the camera lens. He tries
to muster a smile, but the missing button on his vest belies a more difficult life.
Any sliver of optimism that “Abgebauter Seemann” tries to communicate is lost in
“Arbeitslos,” the last photograph in the collection. The photograph lacks any momentum at all.
While the Hamburg sailor stands in front of an energetic crisscrossing of bridge beams and
flowing water, the subject in “Arbeitslos” leans firmly against a brick wall tucked away down a
back alley in Cologne. He holds his hat in his crossed hands, a gesture of either good manners or
utter humility. He seems to want to shrink away into his shabby, oversized coat. Perhaps most
telling of all, the man looks away from the camera as if he is ashamed to be documented. He did
not want to be seen. He could not hide because Sander placed his photograph in his collection of
German faces, added him to the ethnographic compendium of Germans Sander built.75
Some bourgeois Germans balked at the idea of sharing their urban order with poor
Germans. Nevertheless, Sander included, for better or worse, as a part of the range of humanity
during the 20th century. Beggars, however, did not simply need to have their humanity
recognized. As Kracauer argued in his critique of Berlin’s warming halls, beggars needed to be
seen in order to have any hope of finding a few extra pfennigs. They needed to be seen by
passers-by, and to do so, they generated spectacles with music or telescopes. They changed their
appearance, removed prosthetic limbs, or even sometimes employed dancing bears to grab the
attention of potential donors. They marked urban surfaces to communicate to one another. Yet in
doing so, they traversed through public space in a way that proved not just contentious but also
morally troubling for middle-class Germans. The likes of von Holten and Frau Hesemeyer
reacted to the increasing visibility of poverty uneasily, showing responses that ranged from
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morally ambivalent to starkly outraged. For many, beggars were not expressing need but
subverting order, and as a result, they had to be controlled in order to protect the sanctity of
middle class German values at a time when many believed German values to be under siege.
The Bekämpfung and the Reestablishing of Social Order
This estrangement that resulted from material disparity contributed to an increasingly
tumultuous political and social world in the Weimar Republic. Democratic negotiations gave
way to street violence, which characterized ordinary political activity at the beginning of the
Third Reich. Violence was no longer the exclusive domain of paramilitary organizations; rankand-file party members saw it as a part of “normal” political expression.76 Despite laying claim
to the German chancellery on January 30, 1933, the Nazi struggle for power had only just
begun.77
Street fighting consumed German cities over the next few months, and chaos and disorder
became a normalized dimension of everyday life. Nazi paramilitary organizations clashed with
Communist and Socialist Democrat opponents and sought to curb the influence of other political
challengers like the Catholic Center Party.78 These tensions reached their pinnacle in the early
hours of February 28, 1933 when the German Reichstag burned. Scholars debate about the actual
events of the fire.79 The Nazis seized on the disaster, pinning the fire on Dutch Communist
Marinus van der Lubbe, to incite widespread panic and, in doing so, made real creeping
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anxieties—spread propagandistically, no doubt—about an impending Bolshevik uprising. This
attack animated new mechanisms to eliminate any opposition to Nazi power.
Hitler used the opportunity to enact the Reichstag Fire Decrees in an effort to restore
some semblance of order in a nation on the brink of disaster. With national panic at its height,
many Germans supported this move that amounted to little more than carte blanche for unbridled
Nazi violence. Civil liberties were suspended, and Nazi storm troopers ran roughshod over
political opponents. Because Social Democrats opted to work through the German political
system, they stood no real chance to resist persistent Nazi street fighting.80 Skirmishes between
Nazis and Communists became common, but Nazi force proved to be decisive. Nazi storm
troopers and police officers began using tactics of “preventive arrests” and “protective custody”
to justify the indefinite detention of political enemies.81 These new tactics allowed Nazi troops to
send tens of thousands of political opponents and “enemies of the state” to concentration camps
and leave them there without trial.82
Winning street battles against political opponents certainly played a critical role in
growing Nazi popularity. Political violence hardly addressed the growing tensions caused by
public poverty, and with Nazi energies elsewhere, a real solution seemed some way off. At the
dawn of the Third Reich, Hitler’s captivating message of national salvation and rejuvenation
remained just that: merely a message, and few solutions existed to provide sufficient relief to the
millions in need. Only a skeleton of the Weimar relief system remained after widespread
spending cuts left state welfare initiatives essentially powerless to provide needy Germans with
any support. At a time when the poor needed support the most, many welfare offices across the
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country closed their doors, cutting benefits in an attempt to save a hemorrhaging government.83
This led to irregular availability of relief throughout Germany and welfare workers seeking ways
to cut budgets.84 Moreover, Nazi fighters systematically eliminated the Communist and Socialist
voices that advocated on behalf of working-class and poor Germans. As poor relief vanished and
the political spectrum narrowed, many of Germany’s most vulnerable citizens had little or no
recourse.
With the toothless remnants of the Weimar system, needy Germans could hardly imagine
a reinvigorated nation. The Nazis themselves could not offer any real solutions either as their
own welfare apparatus, the NSV, commanded the resources and network of a local organization.
The NSV had previously existed in Berlin as a local relief organization that orchestrated material
relief drives for Party members. The NSV itself began in 1932 as a localized relief organization
in Berlin.85 Founded specifically as an organization aligned with the Nazi Party, men and women
voluntarily organized small clothes closets and soup kitchens to support Party members as the
effects of the Great Depression became even more devastating.86
Despite the intention to support all needy Party members, the NSV lacked any real reach
beyond Berlin during the Weimar Republic. Its members had little experience in poor relief and
could hardly match the reputations of the numerous political, confessional, humanitarian, or
charitable associations active in Weimar Germany’s vibrant relief environment. Organizations
like the Catholic Caritas Association, or DCV, and the Inner Mission had developed considerable
public and political reputations after World War I. They stood at the forefront not just of local
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relief initiatives and ground-level responses to poverty across Germany but also national political
debates, in particular regarding child and youth welfare.87
The NSV, contrastingly, had very little impact in these debates and could hardly make
much impact providing emergency relief. Moreover, it showed no ambition to collaborate with
other private organizations for national campaigns like the Winter Help Action.88 While private
and humanitarian organizations joined forces for national winter campaigns beginning in 1931,
Nazi officials chose to distance itself from such initiatives, lamenting the pan-confessional spirit,
among other things.89 While other private relief organizations could expect support on both
national and local levels with considerable material resources and noticeable political influence,
the NSV could barely see past its own political horizons and, as a result, did not make much of
an impact.90
The NSV itself, however, had a different perspective of its first moments. Ingeborge
Altgelt, an early administrator in the NSV before the Third Reich, wrote a history of the NSV
that described its origins as a determined, hard-working, and self-reliant organization that did not
use excuses of destitute circumstances to justify its early struggles.91 She described an
organization of humble origins, moving into its first “office” in November 1932, “a cold hallway
on Wilhelmstraße 33 with no phone, no typewriter, and only outfitted with the most basic
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furniture.”92 In these austere circumstances, Altgelt wrote that the NSV showed “the worth of our
work…the impact of our diligence…growing ever larger month by month.” Altgelt established
that, through “self-help,” the NSV was able to emerge from relative obscurity in 1932 to an
organization that, by 1935, had over four million members, “thousands upon thousands” of
volunteers, “an army of office workers,” and over 20,000 local offices and stations across
Germany.93
The national profile of the NSV changed dramatically once Hitler took power. The
organization had hardly been in existence for a year when, on May 3, 1933, Hitler named the
association the official relief organization of the NSDAP. By official decree, Hitler stated, “[The
NSV] is responsible for all questions of people’s welfare and relief.”94 At once, the NSV became
the sole authority on all matters pertaining to poverty and relief in the Third Reich. This, of
course, would be no simple undertaking considering the comparatively obscure origins from
which the NSV had so suddenly been promoted and the overwhelming challenges that poor
Germans, given the unprecedented economic and social instability brought on by the Great
Depression. Unemployment had reached unprecedented levels during the Great Depression. By
1933, more than 6 million registered as unemployed Germans while as many as one million more
remained unregistered.95 Forty percent of employed people in 1929 had lost their jobs by 1933.96
The Nazi Party faced severe social and economic challenges from the outset.
In response, Nazi officials began a dramatic reorganization of the German welfare
apparatus.97 However, this amounted merely to a superficial institutional reorganization because
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the NSV was not offering new relief opportunities to make good on the promises of national
salvation. Appointments to NSV leadership also demonstrated a similar lack of conviction,
exemplified best by the appointment of Erich Hilgenfeldt. Hilgenfeldt was named the Reich
Leader of the NSV.98 A committed right-wing activist who joined the Nazi party in 1929,
Hilgenfeldt had no formal education or training in social work or poor relief. While he did serve
for a short time as a municipal leader in the NSV during the Weimar Republic, most of his
experience came in veterans’ and paramilitary organizations—hardly the necessary qualifications
for the leader of a national relief institution. This would be a hallmark of the NSV leadership, a
matter that will be discussed at greater length below. Only seldom could Nazi welfare
administrators claim any real experience or education in social work, a feature which belied how
little thought Nazi authorities gave to welfare administration altogether.
Animating the NSV’s work was a heavy-handed ideological program influenced not by
social scientific evidence but Nazi Party rhetoric. Under the banner “Gemeinnutz geht vor
Eigennutz,” or “common good before individual good,” officers of the NSV aimed to establish a
sense of community which the Weimar Republic had seemingly ripped apart.99 Following the
Nazi Party line, NSV officials condemned the Weimar Republic’s “welfare state”—a derisive
term—to “weaken the German people” by creating “an addiction to relief.”100 Along with an
allegedly illegitimate democratic constitution and international capitulation, Nazis also
condemned the “Systemzeit” for its profligate welfare policies.101 Weimar welfare was “an
individualistic, aimless welfare program which cared indiscriminately for the sick and inferior
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[Minderwertig].”102 Nazi critics saw a relationship between the increased socialization of poor
relief and growing worries about the German moral condition. “Socially deviant” Germans took
advantage of the Weimar welfare system by hiding ulterior sources of income, by trading goods
and vouchers on the black market, and by exploiting the overall goodwill of the German people.
Nazi officials lamented that Weimar’s relief program created a society of individuals only
looking out for themselves, protecting their own wellbeing at the expense of others, without the
forethought to the condition of the broader community.103
Much of the NSV’s early work amounted simply to institutional reorganization,
streamlining what they viewed to be an overcrowded segment of associational life that might
threaten the legitimacy of Nazi social welfare schemes. This meant, first and foremost, outlawing
relief organizations from oppositional parties, including the Social Democrat’s
Arbeiterwohlfahrt. The NSV did not simply eliminate oppositional organizations, though, for it
also aimed to coordinate Nazi-sympathetic relief organizations, many of which were women’s
associations. In January 1934, Rudolf Hess requested the dispersal of women’s associations like
the Brown Sisters and the Red Swastika Sisters.104 In March, Hilgenfeldt obliged and
established a new women’s organization, the Sisterhood of the NSV, whose mission it was to
unite strong and intelligent women and advance the spirit of the NSV and the Nazi Party.105
Others were subsequently subsumed under the direction of the National Socialist Women’s
league.
In addition to coordinating Nazi-sympathetic organizations, Hilgenfeldt also absorbed
into the NSV three private confessional and humanitarian organizations. The Catholic Caritas
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Association (DCV), the Protestant Inner Mission (IM), and the German Red Cross (DRK) were
all pressed into cooperation with the Nazi welfare apparatus. These organizations commanded
tremendous political clout during the Weimar Republic with leading reformers, politicians, and
organizers at the forefront of welfare policy decisions.106 Soon after naming the NSV as the
supreme authority regarding all matters related to welfare, Nazi officials established the
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Spitzenverbände der freien Wohlfahrtspflege.107 The purpose of this
consortium was to ensure the united and planned-economic [planwirtschaftlichen] design of
welfare under the leadership of National Socialism.108 Despite guaranteeing the “autonomy and
independence” of the three organizations, the organizations operated under direct rule from the
NSV.
Beyond institutional reorganization, Nazi authorities established new endowments for
needy citizens, but rollout was slow. Several new local funds were established, but the biggest
endowments were opened on a national level. 109 The first was the Adolf-Hitler-Spende
established by Hitler himself to commemorate his birthday. The endowment relied on donations
and other special events like concerts and galas to raise funds.110 Other endowments, like the
Stiftung für Opfer der Arbeit, also boasted considerable resources. A portion of the foundation’s
funds were donated by wealthy businessmen like Fritz Thyssen, but it also drew support from
special events, including the proceeds from the championship match of the Hitler-Pokal, an
annual national soccer tournament. However, much like the holdover initiatives from the Weimar
Republic, these new endowments had their limitations. Because of their timing, they could not
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offer relief to those in need immediately. It took months before these foundations had collected
enough money to provide sufficient relief. Additionally, these opportunities primarily served
members of the Nazi Party. The Adolf-Hitler-Spende, for example, only offered benefits to
needy and “exhausted” [erholungsbedürftige] SA- and SS-men. It was not until October that the
Adolf-Hitler-Spende could begin offering support.111 And when the fund did begin paying
benefits, it subsidized short excursions to local spas and resorts, hardly a solution to acute
material destitution. These opportunities only offered limited solutions to a sliver of the suffering
German population.
Perhaps the most substantial changes in poor relief at the very beginning of the Nazi era
came from new individual plans at the local level. These plans, however, had been in
development well before Hitler’s rise to power and could not be claimed as innovations of Nazi
reformers. In 1933, the city of Hamburg, for example, established a new welfare voucher system
that enlisted ordinary citizens to help curb begging. People could purchase welfare checks, in
denominations of 5 and 10 Pfennig, and distribute them to beggars instead of cash. These
vouchers could be redeemed for a warm meal at local soup kitchens throughout Hamburg. The
rationale was that this program not only discouraged beggars from purchasing cigarettes and
alcohol, but also helped the needy to their local welfare agency where they could be evaluated to
learn about potential benefits for which they could qualify.112
The program was not without controversy. Nearby Altona considered adopting a similar
kind of program to address its own concerns about begging, yet local welfare director Herr
Baumann rejected the plan, which he saw as inherently contradictory since it was predicated on
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notions of “self-help” yet demanded that beggars depend exclusively on the goodwill of
others.113 Rather than curbing the presence of begging, Herr Baumann worried that the program
actually promoted begging by encouraging destitute Germans to solicit better-off pedestrians for
vouchers.114
The Hamburg welfare voucher system could nonetheless boast considerable success
despite such criticisms. Through the check service, a number of different people found support
from local Hamburgers and learned to claim public assistance. In a letter to Hamburg
Regierungsrat Dr. Struve, Frau Dr. Kaemmerer from the welfare check office described a
number of local success stories.115 The program proved useful for an unemployed salesman who,
after a brief assessment, became eligible for monthly state support. Another applicant received
medical support for his child who had contracted spinal tuberculosis. An unemployed clerk was
able to borrow a suit for a job interview thanks to an assessment by local welfare officials.116
Nazi authorities showed little endeavor for social policy that might ease material
destitution. Their responses to poverty had no real unifying mission or ambition during the first
few months in power when economic destitution was most acute. Yet following the Enabling
Acts, a decisive swing in national ambition occurred which encouraged Nazi authorities to focus
more directly on the relationship between public order and poor relief, a concern that, since the
Weimar Republic, had strong moral implications. In June 1933, Prussian Minister of the Interior
Hermann Göring issued a directive to all local police offices in Berlin in which he expressed a
growing concern about public begging in Germany,117 which he identified as a “serious danger to
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public order.”118 Göring described urban scenes whereby public streets, plazas, and corners have
been overrun by beggars, hawkers, and buskers asking passers-by for donations. No longer could
people feel safe because of the growing influence that beggars had on public space. Additionally,
Göring argued that beggars violated countless laws and statutes that had been on German books
for some time, specifically the §361, article 4 of the German Penal Code which outlawed
begging outright as well as a number of different German commerce and trade regulations that
restricted unlicensed hawking. 119 He concluded, “In the interest of the German people, this state
of affairs can no longer be tolerated.”120 As a result, he set about organizing an offensive that
would stop the perceived encroachment of German society by beggars.
Göring would be the first of a number of high-ranking Nazi officials to identify and
condemn public begging as a growing threat to Germany’s already fragile stability. Yet while
Göring’s critique of begging remained largely a legal one, focused on the various laws and
precepts that beggars violated, others expressed deeper concerns about the threat that beggars
posed. Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels cast beggars as morally corrupt, dishonest
swindlers who preyed on the kind hearts and goodwill of the German people. 121 He condemned
the “excessive and growing begging nuisance”122 Calling beggars the “most unworthy elements”
of society, Goebbels highlighted how beggars relied on tricks and schemes to make higher
incomes than many hard-working people, harkening back to war profiteers during World War I.
Rather than simply breaking German legal code, then, beggars exploited the goodwill of others
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and directly harmed others through their actions. Indeed, Goebbels evoked a language of moral
vulnerability that resonated with middle-class anxieties at the end of the Weimar Republic.
The social deviance of beggars was exacerbated by a perception from Nazi officials that
the nation was vulnerable and fragile, increasingly susceptible to the tricks and cons of shifty
vagrants. Reich Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick, too, expressed his concern. In a letter to
Minster of the Interior for Prussia Hermann Göring, he wrote, “I see as an especially important
part of the Bekämpfung des Bettelunwesens the education of the public about their conduct
toward beggars.”123 Too many citizens, he lamented, obliged beggars and donated directly to
them on the streets and by doing so, encouraged these “volksschädlich,” or harmful to the Volk,
activities. “When the charitable donors disappear,” Frick proclaimed, “so too will the beggars”124
Germans were encouraged, quite forcefully, to give to “proper institutions,” like the NSV and
other Nazi-sanctioned organizations.125 If Germans gave directly to beggars, they simply
perpetuated the problem, encouraging the amoral and deviant behavior. Such “thoughtless”
actions only encouraged beggars to continue their “criminal” activity.126 It became the “duty of
every comrade” to do their part to stop the “intolerable and rampant beggars.”127 Combatting
begging became a collective effort. It became about more than just cleaning up urban centers but
about instilling “proper” values in German citizens.
These condemnations gave substance to the fears and anxieties expressed by bourgeois
commentators like von Holten at the end of the Republic. Yet begging was a complex concern
for Nazi officials. Beggars supposedly fostered a corrosive and amoral lifestyle by depending on
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the goodwill of hardworking people, and such hardworking people did not even fully understand
the threat beggars posed. Poverty was a material, moral, political, and aesthetic problem. As Nazi
officials organized the Bekämpfung, they hoped to eliminate not just a negative influence in
German society but also to fundamentally reshape how Germans related to one another. They
hoped to foster new types of relationships and social awareness between Germans and redefine
what it meant to be a “good neighbor.” The Bekämpfung, as a result, developed a much more
nuanced approach centered on both the elimination of the “enemy” as well as the cultivation of
the community.
In the hopes that such ideas would filter down to ordinary Germans of all classes and
political persuasions, Nazi organizers developed a media campaign through which they hoped to
educate citizens about the dangers posed by beggars. Popular media painted beggars as morally
corrupting.128 Such depictions departed from the conversation about beggars during the Weimar
Republic which, for the most part, cast them as a social nuisance and focused specifically on the
ways in which beggars exploited ordinary Germans. Of course, the Völkischer Beobachter, the
official organ of the NSDAP, made such images of the beggar accessible to Germans. Articles
claimed that beggars were “con-men” looking to prey on the hard work of innocent Germans,
seemingly confirming fears that middle-class citizens expressed throughout the Weimar
Republic.129 Not only were the behaviors and practices of beggars dangerous for the German
nation, but also they betrayed a fundamentally weak moral character about which the Völkischer
Beobachter concluded, it was “a condition unworthy of such a productive and creative Volk.”130
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Even the Vossische Zeitung, one of Germany’s best-known liberal newspapers, also published
articles that described beggars as a serious threat—though one must be skeptical of the
newspaper’s journalistic independence by this point. Coverage in other publications described
beggars as a “plague” and vilified them as unproductive exploiters of hard-working Germans. By
placing it in popular periodicals, Nazi officials made the violent rhetoric against beggars much
more accessible to the broader German public. Citizens were portrayed as victims of the schemes
and corruption of deviant beggars all across Germany, and this rhetoric framed the mood of the
Bekämpfung and served as a rallying cry for all those involved.131
Concerns about predatory beggars and moral vulnerability animated the Bekämpfung des
Bettelunwesens from an institutional perspective. They inspired the likes of Goebbels, Göring,
and Frick to call on the strength of local police officers to sweep city streets in search of beggars.
Göring enlisted the help of Nazi organizations like the Sturmabteilung (SA), the Schutzstaffel
(SS), and even the Stahlhelm paramilitary units, notorious for their very pubic and very violent
confrontations with political opponents over the course of the Weimar Republic. This operation,
it was hoped, would help promote “a sense of relief and stabilization when the working
population is rid of the obnoxious and intrusive ways of those who flaunt their poverty.”132 So
long as such degenerative moral characters existed in the Third Reich, Goebbels and others
worried about the moral integrity of the generations to come. To protect the future of the German
national community, Nazi officials organized the operation against beggars to be largest police
operations in German history to date, all to suppress fears about destitute individuals.133
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Goebbels and other officials encouraged private organizations to collaborate, and indeed,
the stated goal of the operation was to create a unified response to the threat of begging.134
Goebbels commented, “An effective execution of the planned action is not possible without the
intensive collaboration with charitable organizations.”135 Groups like the Catholic Caritas
Association, the German Red Cross, and the Protestant Inner Mission were asked to lend their
support. However, many of the private organizations put forth less-than-enthusiastic response to
the call for cooperation. Hardly calling for a resounding turnout of support by its members,
Caritas, the official organ of the Catholic charity organization, the German Caritas Association,
or DCV, simply mentioned in the September 1933 issue that readers would soon notice an
increase of police forces and SA men canvassing the German streets. The two-sentence notice
went on to state, “Donation benefactors who are identified as truly needy people will be
transferred to the care of public or private welfare agencies.”136 These passive statements made
by the DCV refused to take a committed role in the upcoming Bekämpfung against beggars.
Nevertheless, law enforcement officers swept streets, alleyways, “homeless shelters, hostels,
wild bars, and the like” in search of destitute Germans panhandling and soliciting donations.137
If private organizations could not muster the enthusiasm to support the Bekämpfung
wholeheartedly, local police forces had no trouble making arrests. From September 18-23, police
forces all over Germany canvassed local streets and arrested beggars en masse. Historians’
estimations vary, but the total number of arrests range anywhere from tens of thousands to over a
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hundred thousand arrests made during what colloquially became known as “Beggar Week.”138
With the occasional help from private organizations like the DCV and the IM, they raided
“homeless shelters, hostiles, wild bars, and the like.”139 Authorities arrested 4,818 beggars in
Württemberg and around 1,400 in Hamburg. Press outlets reported the arrest of over 200 beggars
in Heidelberg. All told, the Bekämpfung resulted in the arrest of tens of thousands of beggars
across Germany.140 This would go down as the largest police operation to-date on German soil.
All organized around the violent repression of beggars. All orchestrated as a response to the
crippling destitution wrought by the Great Depression. All of these dimensions made the
Bekämpfung a unique and distinctive response to poverty.
After the Bekämpfung and the Case of Wilhelm Schuster
In the weeks and months following the Bekämpfung, local officials declared the operation
an unmitigated success. The German Gemeindetag, the national congress comprised of
municipal representatives, announced, “The measures of the Bekämpfung des Bettelunwesens,
have managed to stop begging almost completely in many cities.”141 Officials from Liegnitz, a
modest municipality in Lower Silesia, reported, “Begging in our district is completely gone.”142
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Similarly in Mainz, where “the problem of begging was in full bloom, has noticeably decreased
and has almost been entirely eliminated.”143 Welfare officials in Erfurt too wholly approved of
the operation, announcing that “begging and soliciting from house-to-house has obviously
decreased.”144 This consensus was confirmed in newspapers throughout the country. Newspaper
outlets, no doubt under pressure from Nazi officials, joined these municipal officials in
celebrating the success of the Bekämpfung. In the Staatsanzeiger Württemberg, an article praised
the operation for “fixing the problem of begging with severity.”145 One newspaper in Berlin even
levied the harrowing assessment that, “Berlin had become a city without beggars.”146
Official language about the fate of beggars in Germany was stark, and the harrowing
foreshadowing of notions of “judenfrei” cannot be ignored. The purpose of this chapter,
however, is not to map a direct line from the earliest social relief policies of the Third Reich and
the Holocaust. For it becomes quite clear that Germany was, in no way, “beggar free” following
the action in September 1933. Indeed, by looking closer to the ground, scholars get a much more
complex picture of the activities of beggars. The case of Wilhelm Schuster helps to clarify this
image a bit more than official rhetoric might allow. Little is known about the personal history of
Schuster, and what we do know comes from his police record. While no doubt these kinds of
records come with their fair share of limitations, they can offer a brief glimpse into the life that
Schuster led and can help to understand the broader implications of the Bekämpfung and the
ambitions of early Nazi welfare. Born in 1890 in Lossow, a district in Frankfurt an der Oder,
Schuster moved to north to Hamburg sometime before 1931. Soon after, Schuster had his first
run-in with local police and was arrested for begging on June 12, 1931 for which he spent one
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week in jail.147 He would be arrested twice more that same year, in November and December,
and serve a three-week and a ten-day jail sentence respectively.148
The next year proved to be much more stable for Schuster. From December 1931 until
the spring of 1933, Schuster avoided the attention of the police and was not arrested once. He
would, however, fall on hard times once again beginning in April 1933. This arrest, again for
begging, set off another series off arrests in quick succession. After serving a four-week jail
sentence in April, he would be picked up again almost immediately in May, for which he would
spend six weeks in jail. One final time police arrested Schuster in 1933. In September, he was
arrested by local authorities in Hamburg as a part of the Bekämpfung des Bettelunwesens.149
In spite of the widespread show of force and the strong rhetoric against beggars,
Schuster’s actual punishment was relatively light. He spent only a few days, from September 2125 in a Hamburg jail, and a short stay, a sentence that would not have been atypical for others
arrested during the Bekämpfung. While the exact rationale for Schuster’s own release is unclear,
police officials simply released many of those arrested because local precincts could not
accommodate the sudden influx of new charges. For example in Hamburg, the Kriminalpolizei
reported that police officers arrested around 1,400 beggars in just the first week of the
Bekämpfung. Of those, only 108 remained in some form of custody after five days.150 Others
faced more severe consequences, facing long sentences in work camps or perhaps worse.151 In
October 1933, the Völkischer Beobachter announced the opening of a new concentration camp in
Meseritz built exclusively for beggars.152 However, according to the overburdened local courts
147
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that dealt with these new charges, Schuster’s previous arrest record did not warrant any further
action. He was released back onto the streets after Hamburg police gave him written instruction
warning him that begging was forbidden and additional convictions could result in stiffer
penalties.153
If the Bekämpfung was meant to discourage and eliminate begging, it certainly did not in
the case of Schuster. Not one month later, Schuster stood outside a local Hamburg restaurant, the
Stadtschänke. With his cap outstretched, he humbly asked for donations as patrons left the
restaurant. He surely had only accumulated no more than two or three Reichmarks before
Hamburg police arrested him and took him to jail for the fourth time in 1933. This should come
as no surprise. For if we review Schuster’s irregular arrest record, his begging derives almost
certainly out of need rather than choice. No doubt some vagrants chose a life on the road or the
streets, yet this cannot be said of Schuster.154 Not only does his arrest record indicate occasional
begging, but also he identified himself as employed. Under occupation, Schuster described
himself as a Marktarbeiter. At a time when other Germans described themselves as
“unemployed” after becoming increasingly discouraged with the lack of job availability,
Schuster had not reached this point and still recognized himself as an employed citizen.155
Our record of Schuster ends here. While we only get a limited look into Schuster’s
experience, he leaves behind enough detail to allow historians a unique glimpse into the lives of
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destitute people during this time. Schuster’s account reveals how little, at least initially, the
experience of begging in Germany actually changed at the onset of the Third Reich. His sporadic
run-ins with the law after January 1933 resemble those he experienced in 1931. His short-term
jail sentences were certainly nothing new either. This almost endless begging-to-jail cycle was
one that many individuals experienced both before and after the Third Reich.
The reflections of Anton S. help to illustrate this. Anton found himself serving a sentence
in a workhouse in Breitenau after being convicted of begging on July 7, 1934 by the district court
of Fulda. The only glimpse into Anton’s life comes from a short letter he wrote to his mother
after being placed in a workhouse. Like Schuster, Anton begged—though it is unclear how
regularly. What is clear is that Anton had been arrested multiple times. “I want to share with you
that I find myself at this time once again in a work institution,” he wrote.156 Despite his best
intentions, Anton told his mother that he could not find work and was thus labeled “workshy” by
police officers and district judges. He lamented being “drug around from house to house … like
a dog.”157 The only hope he had to escape this “justice,” as he called it sarcastically, was to rely
on his own willpower. He could not rely on “the men of power” for help, but instead could only
rely on himself to rearrange his life. He ended his letter with a flourish of hope, “I will collect
myself once again. I hope that when I leave this hose, I will get work again. Then I will finally
give up this life as a vagrant and end this dog’s life.”158 While we do not get the same insights
from Schuster, we can assume that they shared similar sentiments about the hopelessness
perpetuated by the system in which they found themselves.
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The parallels here with the Ackerstraße shelter described by Kracauer cannot be ignored.
Once again, poor Germans found themselves in a cycle of monotony, this time perpetuated by
Nazi violence. Instead of shuffling from one shelter to another, beggars were thrown into one jail
after another. What changed was the severity of the crime and the broader implications for social
foundations. Schuster was no longer a nuisance but a threat. His subversive forays into middleclass space threatened the very foundations of German community. This perception was no
longer a part of the localized anxieties of a few affluent Germans but instead the animating force
behind the social policy of the Nazi state. Violent persecution followed in the interest of shaping
the moral rules of society.
Conclusions
As Schuster awaited sentencing following his arrest in October, the legal debate took on a
completely different tone. Where his previous offensives had been levied according to the
German Penal Code, now Schuster was judged according to the new Reichstag Fire Decrees of
February 1933. These decrees, issued in the wake of the Reichstag Fire of February 27, 1933,
gave license to repress any activities that might be detrimental to the Hitler’s government. When
placed in such a context, the implications of begging took on entirely new ramifications, much
more in line with the fears expressed by Goebbels, Göring, and Frick prior to the Bekämpfung.
Hamburg district judge Blötz deliberated at some length assessing the severity of
Schuster’s crime. While begging had always been outlawed, the restriction of personal
freedom—in this case, one’s freedom to pursue begging—which had been declared by §1 of the
Reichstag Fire Decree became even more essential to the stability of the German people. In this
case, the judge concluded that Schuster had, indeed, violated the new statutes set forth by the
Reichstag Fire Decree through his begging. Moreover his previous violations of begging, this
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being his seventh offense, meant that he presented a disposition that could pose a considerable
threat to the German nation. “Due to his past convictions and displaying an unwillingness to
change his ways,” the judge decided, “the accused will spend six weeks in jail.”159
By invoking the Reichstag Fire Decrees of February 1933, the judge in Schuster’s case
elevated the crime of begging from a simple offense to a much more severe crime with dire legal
consequences. Schuster, for reasons unknown, would only spend one month in jail, despite being
given a six-week sentence. 160 Yet had had been labeled a criminal in the same way that
Communists and Social Democrats had been labeled criminals in the months before the
Bekämpfung. He was seen by the state as not just a criminal but also an enemy of the German
government and the Nazi party.
The Reichstag Fire Decrees and the Enabling Acts gave Nazi authorities a monopoly over
public order. Any threats to that order had to be met with swift and violent responses. The
Bekämpfung represented a critical approach to securing German public order at a time when the
nation teetered on the brink of disaster. Nazi officials seized on public anxieties about visible
poverty and took action. Without clear ideas about how to address poverty, the developing Nazi
state responded to popular sentiments of anxiety and fear that permeated German society that had
been incited by the growing presence of poverty in German popular consciousness.
The Bekämpfung des Bettelunwesens represented a defining moment for the Third Reich
in terms of social welfare because of its moral implications. The Nazis themselves had little
understand and little care for the profession of social work or the activities of poor relief. This is
evidenced not only by the limited amount of poor relief they themselves offered before Hitler’s
rise to power but also by the piecemeal and superficial reorganization of state welfare after 1933.
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Once in power, Nazi authorities responded to poverty not as a social issue but a moral one driven
by the feelings of estrangement and disorder that had grown so acute over the course of the
Weimar Republic. Göring, Goebbels, and Frick largely cast the Bekämpfung as a matter of public
welfare and order. But not just any order. The Bekämpfung advanced a particular understanding
of bourgeois order where poverty was increasingly less visible, and beggars could not disturb the
spaces of the ruling classes. While Nazis promoted political violence at the beginning of the
Third Reich to safeguard the party from Communists and Social Democrats, the violence of the
Bekämpfung was meant to safeguard the German public from the creeping moral threat of
material destitution, ultimately an effort to protect the social wellbeing of the German people. In
this light, the Bekämpfung can be seen as the first of its kind.
Perhaps more immediately related to public welfare, purpose of the operation was to
eliminate begging not simply for the sake of it but rather as a necessary prelude to the upcoming
collection drive, the Winterhilfswerk (WHW). The WHW had previously been organized as a
nationwide relief effort during the Weimar Republic, and Nazi organizers adopted the initiative
in October 1933. Since the collection drive began on October 1, Nazi officials hoped to clean the
streets in time to guarantee a successful collection. In order to prepare the Volksgemeinschaft for
such an endeavor, Göring argued, the Bekämpfung had to happen.161 Frick, too, demanded that
“in order to guarantee the success of the WHW for the German people in 1933/4, a special
operation against beggars must be conducted.”162 To ensure that the sufficient funds found their
way to the right places, the Bekämpfung had to happen.163
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The question remains then about what to make of all this. First and foremost, we cannot
ignore the discourse of poverty in which high-ranking Nazi officials engaged at the beginning of
the Third Reich. As Goebbels lambasted beggars and Frick worried for the stability of German
society, these views did not exist in an ahistorical National Socialist context. Especially relevant
during a time when so many Germans suffered from sudden and complete destitution, it is
important to contextualize these claims and understand the moral values within them. For some
Germans, beggars embodied severe moral failings while for others, they were simply a nuisance.
They constituted a significant feature of Germany’s urban (and less so rural) landscape over the
course of the 1920s and 30s. By declaring a war on begging, Nazi officials invoked all of these
morally and socially charged issues and organized them to play out on the Germany’s streets in
the form of police sweeps and countless arrests.
Second, Nazi authorities did not themselves create the “enemy” of the beggar. Anxieties
about the potential harm that begging could cause was shared in many corners of German
society, concerns made more acute by the material devastation of the Weimar Republic but by no
means unique to event he modern period. However, anxieties about beggars were not universally
shared, and the decision to attack beggars was a public expression of support by the Nazis for
those classes with precarious feelings toward beggars. The Bekämpfung, then, represents Nazi
support for a particular type of bourgeois order and morality, according to which visible poverty
should be hidden. The operations that allegedly made Berlin “beggar free” were borne from a
shared fear among Germany’s middle classes that the visible presence of poverty threatened the
moral order of German society.164 The earliest Nazi social policy did not seek to revolutionize
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German society at all but instead to protect and uphold a long-standing worldview. This would
not be unique to the Bekämpfung and would be a central theme to the Nazi charity apparatus that
developed over the course of the Third Reich.
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CHAPTER TWO
Community and Belonging: Collection Drives under Nazi Rule, 1933-1939
Despite the dreary weather, Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels and other members of
the Nazi high command greeted the 8th of December 1934 with great anticipation. This would be
the first “Day of National Solidarity,” one of the many flourishes in the symphony of poor relief
orchestrated as a part of the Winter Help Drive. While other drives included citywide canvassing,
mass parades, or other public demonstrations, this drive was meant to be the exemplary
expression of German community. High ranking Nazi officials, included Hitler himself,
celebrities, athletes, and many other famous Germans would join ordinary individuals on the
streets of Berlin to express together their support for the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft project.
Goebbels recalled a tangible sense of excitement. He and Reich Minister of the Interior
Hermann Göring began the morning collecting in front of the famed Adlon Hotel on Unter den
Linden. Goebbels anticipated a sizeable crowd, and the reality exceeded his expectations. The
crowds so overwhelmed the pair that, on several occasions, Goebbels and Göring were forced to
seek refuge inside the hotel. Emotions swirled around the plaza, as members of the crowd and
Goebbels himself were moved to tears.1 Later, the Propaganda Minister joined boxer Max
Schmeling and actor Willi Fritsch around Gesundbrunnen, and a similar atmosphere filled with
excitement ensued. “Indescribable scenes of enthusiasm,” Goebbels remembered.2
In these moments, some of Germany’s most famous figures met with ordinary people
across Berlin. Hitler, Goebbels, Göring, numerous movie stars and athletes communed with tens
of thousands of Germans who flooded the streets, plazas, and sidewalks and produced emotional
memories that transcended even the expectations of the collection’s planners. Memories were
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made and bonds were formed that signaled a coalescing of the German nation that had been
wounded by a lost world war and unprecedented economic crisis.
Nazi officials hoped that moments like these would not only show the world the strength
of the German people but also build inside Germany itself a strong and united community.
Scholars have long scrutinized these themes of belonging and community, especially in relation
to the Third Reich. Questions over the fundamental character of a Volksgemeinschaft and the
realities of its bonds continue to motivate scholarly inquiry into various aspects of German life
under Nazi rule. Michael Wildt highlights the seminal role that violence played in forging a
united national community. Yearning for a strong and united community, Germans relied on
violence against racial outsiders as expressions of “self-empowerment.”3 Violence provided the
tool by which Germans themselves could rectify the social and cultural fabric that had been rent
asunder by extraordinary economic and international circumstances.
Violence persists as a touchstone for understanding the Volksgemeinschaft in the Third
Reich. Others, including Thomas Kühne, take this interpretation even further focusing even more
specifically the crime of genocide as the foundational experience which bound the
Volksgemeinschaft. “When Germans carried out genocidal war against the Jews and other
‘undesirables’ in order to realize the utopia of a purified nation, they did more than destroy what
they considered to be dirty and dangerous,” Kühne argues. “They experienced togetherness,
cohesion, and belonging.”4 For Kühne, Germans stitched together their social relationships as
they participated collectively in genocide.
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Of course, such interpretations have not gone uncontested. In particular, Jill Stephenson
questions the depths to which Nazi racist values actually penetrated German society, focusing
specifically on Württemburg. Responding directly to Wildt, Stephenson argues that rural,
southern Germans were not “in tune” with Nazi prejudices and, as a result, did not fit easily into
the parameters of a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft.5 Stephenson challenges Wildt by arguing that local
NSDAP officials, not ordinary Germans, orchestrated much of the antisemitic violence
experienced in the German countryside. Not an organic construct then, for Stephenson the racist
Nazi Volksgemeinschaft depended on institutional pressure from above.
Perhaps most critical is Ian Kershaw, who questions altogether the analytical value of
Volksgemeinschaft.6 The idea that the Volksgemeinschaft constituted a lived reality, according to
Kershaw, too often obscures the complexities of German society under Nazi rule. Moreover, it
has often served as an explanation unto itself for why atrocities occurred. Of more utility,
Kershaw argues, is conceptualizing Volksgemeinschaft not as a real community but rather a set
of ideals toward which Germans strove. This “promise,” as Kershaw calls it, proved critical to
mobilizing Germans toward national unity.7
Despite the apparent conflicts between these scholarly poles, they do share some
common ground. In particular, there is an assumption, whether real or imagined, that belonging
only existed as a product of something called a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft, a concept which existed
as a seemingly singular, coherent construct. This idea could be transmitted, understood, and

5

Stephenson directly addresses Wildt’s arguments here: “The Volksgemeinschaft and the Problems of
Permeability: The Persistence of Traditional Attitudes in Württemberg Villages.” German History, vol. 34, no. 1,
pp. 49-69. She expands on this critique and the experiences of Württembergers much further in her book. Hitler’s
Home Front: Württemberg under the Nazis. London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006.
6
Ian Kershaw, “Volksgemeinschaft: Potential and Limitations of the Concept,” in Visions of Community in
Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives. Ed. Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014, pp. 29-42.
7
Ibid.

89

replicated (or, consequently, rejected) by individuals, and the emergence of Volksgemeinschaft
depended on an ideologically agreeable population or an efficient propaganda machine. This has
profound implications for notions of belonging under the Third Reich. Germans could either join
(or pretend to join) the Volksgemeinschaft or remain isolated.
Charity has an important role to play in this story, as scholars have often turned to the
Nazi relief initiatives, the WHW in particular, to explore the bonds of community that Germans
forged under Nazi rule. Scholars have relied on private charity and poor relief in general to
investigate across the 19th and 20th centuries the civic relationships between individuals and the
state as well as the ways in which state authorities sought to condition particular kinds of civicmindedness within various populations.8 Similar kinds of analyses have been offered when
discussing the WHW and Nazi relief more broadly. For many, the WHW represents a tool for
social conditioning, through which Nazi officials could manipulate the masses and to instill new
moral values.9 When viewed in this way, as a driving force for moral development, this
interpretation perpetuates the narrative that a singular and coherent idea of Volksgemeinschaft
actually existed. Others regarded the WHW as a critical revenue source for the Nazi government,
one that proved an especially annoying burden on the German people.10 Again while these
interpretations might diverge, they both privilege the ambitions of the Nazi state to impose
community over the abilities of ordinary Germans to form relationships on their own.
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There is no denying that the WHW and relief campaigns mobilized Germans in favor of
the Nazi government. After hearing the messages offered by Hitler, Goebbels, and others, many
Germans did feel compelled to act. Each year for six months, from October to April, Germans
mobilized to give donations several times a month to street collectors. A rhythm emerged over
the course of six months to which the entire German nation became attuned, a rhythm marked by
radio addresses, public parades, and kitschy trinkets. As they participated, Germans did not just
donate, they sacrificed. Giving was less a Spende (donation) and more an Opfer (sacrifice).
Hundreds and thousands of participants came out to show their support for the WHW and offer
aid to those in need. Volunteers, organizers, and donors took part in parades, collections and
demonstration. They carried with them copper collection tins and waved bright flags. They stood
on street corners and canvassed sidewalks all across Germany. They wore on their clothes the
symbols of the WHW, whether small plastic trinkets dangling from coat buttons or tin pins
fastened to shirt collars. Storefronts displayed encouraging slogans. Walls and Litfaßsäulen all
donned placards and posters that promoted the mission of the WHW. Not just in public but in
private too, Germans expressed gestures of belonging closely associated with the WHW and
created connections between private, everyday activities with the public, shared imaginings of
the German nation.
There should be no denying, too, that coercion constituted a very real part of the WHW.
SS men demanded donations. German workers had wages garnished. These kinds of strong-arm
tactics produced among the German population annoyance, resentment, and anger which, until
now, have remained largely atomized in a historiographical sense. While some scholars have
argued that these kinds of emotions alienated Germans from the Nazi state, it is these same
emotions, among others, that served as the foundations for belonging in the Third Reich. Just as
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the emotional euphoria of the Day of National Solidarity could provide the foundations for
belonging, so too could resentment.
This chapter explores how Germans found expressions of belonging through charity. It
argues that Germans established ulterior communities under Nazi rule by either reappropriating
experiences of the WHW or by reasserting preexisting networks of belonging. As a result,
Germans could feel a sense of belonging without adhering to the narrow strictures of a Nazi
Volksgemeinschaft. This is not to suggest that these alternate communities were necessarily antiNazi, resistant to the Volksgemeinschaft, or a fundamental threat to the Third Reich—for some
Germans sought to realize a more restrictive Volksgemeinschaft than Nazi law indicated.
Scholars like Peter Fritzsche and Andrew Bergerson have examined the ways Germans have
tactically deployed conviviality, primarily through the Hitlergruß, to negotiate objectionable
dimensions of Nazi Volksgemeinschaft.11 Rather than engendering feelings of belonging,
however, many Germans merely pretended to belong without establishing any real sense of
camaraderie. So that when Fritzsche argues that Germans could “try on new political and racial
identities,” he suggests that Germans could only achieve a sense of belonging by mimicking, to
various degrees, the tenets of Volksgemeinschaft.12
Rather than simply faking membership in the Volksgemeinschaft, this chapter
demonstrates that Germans found alternative ways to forge a sense of community. It begins by
exploring the message of Volksgemeinschaft promoted through the WHW. It focuses on the
rhetoric promoted by Hitler, Goebbels, Hilgenfeldt, and others to define what community was
and how it was meant to be achieved through charity. A diverse array of slogans, images, and

11
Andrew Bergerson, Ordinary Germans in Extraordinary Times: The Nazi Revolution in Hildesheim.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 14-44; Peter Fritzsche, Life and Death in the Third Reich.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 19-25.
12
Fritzsche, Life and Death, p. 23.

92

gestures all helped to promote an image of Nazi Volksgemeinschaft that, if not incoherent,
proved exceedingly complicated and nuanced by combining seemingly contradictory values.
Rather than a focused and clear framework of Volksgemeinschaft, then, the WHW presented a
much more contested and problematic community ideal. Next, this chapter explores the ways in
which Germans themselves experienced collection drives. How did Germans react to the
onslaught of Volksgemeinschaft propaganda that was disseminated in association with the
collection drives? How did other efforts fit into the Third Reich alongside the WHW? Germans
reacted to public charity in ways that did not necessarily align with Nazi intentions. These
gestures provided Germans with the tools to draw their own boundaries of belonging that were
not necessarily aligned toward a Nazi-constructed Volksgemeinschaft.
This research has implications for understanding the ways in which Germans associated
with one another. Germans could feel belonging in the Third Reich without following, or
pretending to follow, the complex ideas of the Volksgemeinschaft. By examining the gestures of
belonging that developed through charity, this chapter captures the patchwork nature of German
society under Nazi rule. Moreover, scholars are eager to point toward moments of social
incongruity that often occurred in rural or less-populated areas, areas at the peripheries of Nazi
centers of power.13 This chapter returns to urban spaces, primarily Hamburg, Munich, and
Berlin, to identify the communities that Germans formed for themselves under Nazi rule. By
creating these ulterior boundaries, Germans did not necessarily contest the dynamics of a Nazi
Volksgemeinschaft but rather provided grounds for Germans to feel belonging alongside a more
exclusive model of community. Neither complicity nor cooperation, these relationships helped
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Germans to feel a sense of acceptance and camaraderie and integrate into a broader community
of violence and exclusion.
Imagining Community through Charity
The WHW’s roots extend back to March 1929 to Hamburg, an initiative that began as a
locally-minded emergency relief program. As the Hamburg Mayor Carl Wilhelm Petersen called
on support from fellow citizens, he stressed not only the outstanding suffering that the previous
winter had brought but also the civic obligation all Hamburgers had to act.14 This did not amount
to a national problem but a municipal problem that Hamburgers themselves had to address.
While he did appeal to a broader “human duty” to help, his frame of reference never expanded
beyond the frame of his own city. Nevertheless, Mayor Petersen implored his fellow citizens to
act on their “staatsbürgerliche Pflicht” to support those in need by donating to Hamburg’s
Winter Help action.15
Not until 1930 did Germans reap the benefits of a nationally-organized winter relief
campaign.16 Rather than a government-led initiative, a consortium of (mostly confessional)
private relief institutions organized and carried out the winter action. The Catholic Caritas
Association, the Protestant Inner Mission, the German Red Cross, and a number of other private
organizations within the Deutsche Liga der Freien Wohlfahrtspflege managed to collect around
91 million marks during the 1931/32 winter.17 Despite their relative success and efforts to
establish a pan-confessional atmosphere of “goodwill,” the Liga could not overcome its internal
political and theological differences to provide stable and consistent relief for those in need. This
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was, in many ways, emblematic of the broader challenges that faces Weimar’s welfare system.18
As the Weimar Republic crashed to the ground, down with it came the winter action.19
Even as Germans came together to show support for their fellow citizens in need, the
Nazis proved reluctant to take part. They demonstrated a general unwillingness to support the
pan-confessionalism of the Weimar campaign.20 Other politicized relief groups, like the Social
Democrat Arbeiterwohlfahrt, also proved hesitant to take part in the campaign. The Nazi
reluctance to take part suggests that it was not inevitable, or perhaps even likely, that the Nazi
regime would institute any kind of winter relief initiative, much less one with roots deep in the
Weimar Republic.21 Therefore, when Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels began planning the
first Nazi-led WHW campaign, he insisted on creating an entirely new campaign. 22 This would
not be “charity” as it was practiced during the Weimar Republic. This would not resemble the
pan-confessionalism that typified the Winter Help of the WHW. Instead, this was meant to be a
wholly different project underpinned with new values and new practices.
Despite insisting that this WHW would be a completely new campaign, the Nazi program
that Goebbels developed shared much with its Weimar predecessor. Since economic conditions
had hardly improved, the program still sought to provide emergency assistance to individuals and
families suffering from the Great Depression. Nazi officials enlisted the help of many of the
confessional and humanitarian organizations who led the Weimar initiative. Indeed, the Catholic
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Caritas Association, the Inner Mission, and the German Red Cross had been essentially
compelled to lend their assistance since they had recently been drafted into the new relief
consortium, the Reich Community of Private Welfare.23 Even the name, Winterhilfswerk, only
departed slightly from the Winterhilfe-Aktion held during the Weimar Republic.
These similarities might have suggested to the German public that the Nazis had simply
inherited the relief effort launched during the Weimar Republic. Nevertheless, Nazi officials
insisted that the 1933/34 WHW constituted a wholly new initiative and instituted a number of
different changes—mostly at a rhetorical level—that rebranded the operation. One subtle yet
profound change surrounded the campaign’s motto. Nazi officials jettisoned the Weimar slogan,
“Wir helfen uns!” in favor of “Kampf gegen Hunger und Kälte.” The change suggested a
completely different kind of collective effort than its Weimar predecessor, invoking the Nazi
notion of Kampf, or struggle, to change the propagandistic face of the drive. Kampf, with its clear
connections with Hitler’s Mein Kampf along with numerous other Nazi slogans, evoked a deeper
sense of existential struggle in which the future of the German people was at stake. No longer a
pan-confessional expression of goodwill, the WHW became the effort of a community under
siege.24 Deprivation threatened German stability. Goebbels’ new motto demanded a sense of
vigilance and militancy, Germans binding together in a Notgemeinschaft, or community of
emergency. With the horrors of total war still fresh in popular consciousness, total mobilization
to secure Germany against yet another vulnerability seemed an appropriate response.25
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From the beginning, the WHW seemed poised to usher in a heightened sense of vigilance
and vulnerability among the German people. As previously discussed, Göring and Goebbels
orchestrated the Bekämpfung des Bettelunwesens largely to pave the way for a successful WHW.
Along with widespread police action associated with that, Goebbels and Hitler now spoke in
passionate terms about a “Kampf gegen Hunger und Kälte,” or “struggle against hunger and
cold,” the terms of which remained relatively vague. Hitler invoked the struggle in his address to
open the inaugural Nazi WHW and gestured toward what he called “international Marxist
solidarity,” which he lambasted as “the enemy of true national” community. 26 The threat of
Marxism prevented the true German nation from emerging, and the WHW would help to animate
the German national spirit.
In his speech, Hitler established a firm connection between the economic plight of the
German people and the disjointed condition of German society. However, this was not simply a
battle for the material wellbeing of German citizens. Instead, by directly evoking Marxism,
Hitler cast the struggle over the direction of poor relief as a political battle. For Hitler, the war
against hunger and cold could not be won with coal, clothes, and shelter. Collection drives like
the WHW were not valuable for the material goods they could collect but rather the community
bonds they could forge. These actions were meant to reorient the political and moral disposition
of German society to eliminate the “specter of Marxism” as an influence on the German people.
Consequently, Hitler saw these gestures of relief as “not just a lessening of material emergency,
but something much more tremendous will emerge.”27 The sole purpose of the WHW was not to
solve poverty. Instead, Hitler imagined it would animate the “living Volksgemeinschaft” and
build community bonds to erase oppositional political ideologies from German society. He
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declared, “This great operation against hunger and cold must stand under this motto: we have
destroyed the international solidarity of the proletariat so that we can build up the living national
solidarity of the German Volk!”28 This speech made it clear that poverty was not a material
concern but a moral one that targeted not poverty but oppositional political ideology.
Just two weeks before the opening of the WHW, Goebbels delivered a radio address that
echoed many of the themes of community and sacrifice. He declared that the upcoming initiative
would represent an express of “our will of the entire German people for togetherness.”29
Goebbels expected that the WHW would be “the most spectacular social action of the year,” and
that no other nation could accomplish anything similar. It all depended, however, on German
willingness to act. This would not be a community of “empty phrases and weak theories,” but
instead a community of action “that embraced the entire nation.”30 Both Hitler and Goebbels
stressed the establishment of a new kind of community, one that depended on collective action.
By focusing on sacrifice and giving, these speeches instructed Germans to act. Belonging meant
participating and, more importantly, sacrificing, and sacrificing was critical in the war to be
waged on hunger and cold.
While Hitler and Goebbels began to define the terms of this war against hunger and cold,
the tactics of it still remained relatively ambiguous. Hitler made it clear that the main focus of the
WHW was to rebuild community bonds, but he did not prescribe any means to achieve this.
However when the action opened on October 1, 1933, NSV officials ushered in a host of new
initiatives, gestures, and symbols through which the message of national solidarity could be
spread. Among the most pervasive and iconic symbols of the WHW would be the collection
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badges. With the WHW came the production of a whole host of trinkets, pins, and knickknacks,
all varieties of ephemera emerged to promote the operation. Plastic toys, tin badges, small
placards, and cigarette cards became a unique way in which WHW slogans and symbols came
into Germans’ lives. These were often distributed during collection drives, handed out as
individuals gave donations. Some came along with various consumer goods. Cigarette
companies like Bulgaria and Jasmatzi in Dresden produced thousands of colorful cigarette cards
and included them in the packaging of various tobacco products. During the Weimar Republic
these same companies produced similar collectible cards featuring German film and sports stars,
making these cigarette cards a recognizable part of ordinary life. Some of the early cards featured
simple designs.
Cigarette cards had been a fixture of German consumer culture since the before World
War I. First devised as small cardboard backs to support cigarette packs, they quickly became a
selling point to attract not just more consumers, but specifically women and young people.
Attracted to new forms of visual media, Nazis quickly adopted the cigarette card as a tool in its
propaganda arsenal just as they had adopted colorful posters and extravagant films. In doing so,
they transformed a seemingly ephemeral dimension of German material culture into a means of
projecting Nazi ideals into the broader public with the intentions of targeting and educating
German youth.31 Some of the earliest cigarette cards distributed during the 1933/34 WHW
featured simple designs. One just included the text “Wir helfen gegen Hunger und Kälte” inside
a bright yellow circle.32 Another featured a blue circle with three wheat stalks and the words,
“Wir opfern für das tägliche Brot.”33 Yet another featured a small boy eating a slice of bread and
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a caption that read, “Opfert für den Kampf gegen Hunger und Kälte.” While simple, these cards
proclaimed the messages of the WHW, bringing into Germans’ homes tangible, material
reminders of the what a united national community looked like. Through these plain and simple
images, NSV officials helped to weave notions of Kampf into ordinary German society—a
struggle against not just poverty or destitution, but against Nazi political opposition as well.
The messages and images on these cards were no doubt important, but the backs of the
cards also offer a telling glimpse into how WHW cigarette cards became a part of ordinary life.
The back of each card included series and image numbers. One card, “Werbeplakat für das
Eintopfgericht,” was series II image 227. By identifying the series and image numbers, Germans
could work to collecting full sets. They could swap and trade cards with friends to find rare
cards. Once complete, collectors could paste their cards into card albums. One such album, Der
Staat der Arbeit und des Friedens, included over a hundred slots for cigarette cards while also
celebrating the first year of Hitler’s reign. These books, published by the thousands, were more
than just collectors’ items. The vibrantly colored cards shared pages with essays written by Nazi
SA men and photographs, mostly captured by Heinrich Hoffmann, heralding the successes of the
Third Reich’s first year.34 These articles celebrated Nazi progress, especially in relief work and
job creation.35 Branded “the largest voluntary collection drive the world has ever seen,” the
WHW was “evidence of the deep connection between the entire nation.”36 By collecting cigarette
cards, Germans became familiar with the strong connections between relief and community.
Expressions of charity were meant to build connections and, ultimately, create an unbreakable
national community.
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Along with cigarette cards, the WHW produced small trinkets, badges, books, and
countless other material objects in such vast quantities that provided an economic boost to the
Nazi toy industry.37 Together, these trinkets created a kind of language of the WHW, a
vocabulary that expressed not just that Germans should build community but also that a
particular type of community should emerge. Sometimes such values were expressed through
simple graphic designs and words while others were much more elaborate images, almost small
pieces of art. Whether worn on clothes, tacked to doorframes, or pasted onto walls, participating
Germans took these material objects and projected the values of the WHW into German streets,
workplaces, and their own homes. Perhaps more importantly, they created an exclusive language
that valued particular types, ideas, and values. They projected through German society a “Nazi
ideal,” a carefully curated standard of existence that could be seen by everyone. As a result, these
trinkets emphasized not just the importance of Volksgemeinschaft but also a uniquely Nazi
Volksgemeinschaft.
In some ways, these trinkets helped Germans to become more familiar with the Third
Reich itself. Perhaps one of the most popular objects distributed during the 1937 WHW included
a series of booklets, handed out by the German Labor Front. Those who contributed to
collections held on October 16 and 17 could receive one of five tiny booklets that featured
different elements of Adolf Hitler’s life. Titles included “Der Führer und die Jugend,” “Der
Führer und der Arbeiter,” or “Der Führer und die Bewegung.”38 Over 20 million of these tiny
books were produced, one for every three Germans. Each booklet included a series of themed
photographs taken by Hitler’s personal photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann. “Der Führer in den
Bergen,” for example, features 27 different, some seemingly candid (though likely staged),
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photographs of Hitler spending time in the Harz, Obersaltzburg, and a number of other mountain
regions across the German Reich.39 These booklets produced a nearly contradictory effect. By
capturing Hitler’s ordinary actions, Hitler could be knowable and relatable. These booklets
seemed to demystify Hitler and contribute to a larger myth of the Führer that made his image
appealing and accessible to large portions of the German population.40 Nevertheless, singling
him out made him not ordinary but extraordinary and made obvious a strict sense of hierarchy
that structured the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft and ultimately challenged the promises that an
egalitarian society would emerge through the WHW.41
Despite the popularity of these booklets, Hitler actually featured seldom in WHW
material culture. Instead of relying on the image of the Führer to communicate, the WHW relied
on a number of different images and symbols to weave motifs into the material culture it
produced. One of the most prominent themes within this language of material culture was
nationalism. Trinkets and badges cultivated a unique sense of German identity by constructing
historical and cultural narratives. For instance, one collection of badges included images of
soldiers from past German wars, beginning in 1510 through World War I.42 Another series of
badges featured prominent historical figures like Friedrich the Great.43 Badges like these
narrowed historical memory to a specific set of conflicts, moments, and figures and gave the
Volksgemeinschaft a history.
These badges defined Germany’s pivotal historical moments and characters. Others
focused more on Germany’s folkloric past. One collection of trinkets included eight iconic
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figures from popular Grimm fairy tales. In December 1937, the Hitler Youth distributed wood
figurines that included the Pied Piper, Cinderella, and Little Red Riding Hood. Almost 20
million of these literary figures were produced, no doubt many of them finding their way onto
the branches of German Christmas trees, as they were meant to be displayed.44 Other collections
included more mythological figures like dwarves and trolls, making connections with the
German saga, the Niebelungenlied. In this way, the NSV played its role in manufacturing a Nazi
past by laying claim to elements of German culture and tradition and redirecting toward National
Socialist objectives.
These objects projected a particular narrative of German history with carefully selected
moments, themes, and figures. The WHW drew connections with the German Wars of
Unification. Emblazoned on the Friedrich the Great placard, distributed during a January 1936
collection, were the dates 1756-1936, suggesting that a direct link between the wars fought under
the Prussian King and the collection efforts of the Third Reich. More than establishing a
historical link to Friedrich the Great, these badges crafted a more exclusive history for the
Volksgemeinschaft, one to which only a select group of Germans could lay claim. As a result,
these badges relied on history to narrow the scope of belonging that the WHW could express.
While some of these trinkets and badges spoke to historical-nationalist themes, others
offered more gendered language. Indeed, recurring themes over the course of the 1930s
promoted particular conceptions of valued gender roles. Mothers featured prominently in the
material language of the WHW, adding another distinct and critical face to the battle against
hunger and cold. Collectors during a national drive in February 1935 distributed small plastic
badges which depicted a mother rocking a baby in a cradle, of which over 9 million were
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produced. 45 Underneath the caption simply read, “Kämpf gegen die Not.” Another included a
yellow placard with red text that read, “Des Führers und des Volkes Sorge.” In the middle, a
mother lays her child to sleep in a crib. Other scenes emphasized motherly roles for women
through depictions of the family. Only large families featured in WHW placards. One placard
produced for a collection during a January 1938 collection drive depicted a comparatively small
family. A husband and wife sat by the hearth. The mother, sitting behind a baby in a cradle,
rocked another child in her arms while a young daughter clung to the arm of her father. Another
placard showed a family gathered together enjoying Eintopfsonntag, or one-pot Sunday. The
text, “Joy through the WHW,” stood below a dinner table that included a presiding mother, a
father, and five children.
While stressing the importance of the mother role, WHW material culture also focused
heavily on domesticity to support a focus on traditional family life. One produced in 1933
featured a cooking pot on a fire encircled by the words “Wir helfen gegen Hunger und Kälte.”
Another produced during the 1934/35 WHW portrayed included a cooking pot warming on a
brick stove with the caption, “Gegen Hunger und Kälte für Treue und Volksgemeinschaft.”
Along with imagery from the kitchen, placards also featured prominent symbols of motherhood.
These symbols placed women, in particular mothers of large families, at the heart of the
struggle to establish a strong and united Volksgemeinschaft but, simultaneously, these badges
reflect the “overt misogyny” of Nazi society by restricting women’s roles to that of domestic
caretaker and committed mother.46 Poor housekeeping was deemed fundamentally un-German
and associated with criminality and Communism.47 In addition, weak family ties and infidelity
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suggested “inferior” moral stock and even Jewishness.48 By advocating motherhood and large
family size, these WHW badges supported Nazi pronatalist strategies as such policies failed to
resonate broadly with Nazi women.49 Badges advocated traditional gender roles for women, and
as participants pinned these images to their chests or tacked them to doorframes, they too helped
to limit the roles of women in Nazi society.
While the figure of the father was not completely absent from WHW material culture,
more pervasive among the badges and trinkets was instead an emphasis on occupation and
vocation as propaganda captured a hyper-masculine culture of men as strong workers or fierce
soldiers. One placard for the 1936/7 WHW campaign depicted the striking face of a strong young
man, as if chiseled from stone. He stood in front of autumn farm land as his “wind swept hair”
blew across his face. The caption simply read, “Der Kampf beginnt.”50 Another featured the
muscular silhouette of a man hammering an anvil with the text, “Hard times, harder will.”
Trinkets featuring soldiers were common and cast the image of a strong, masculine nation. Yet
many of the representations of masculinity were premodern and mythic in nature. A statuesque
Viking stood on the bow of a long ship above the text, “With full sails toward the battle for the
WHW.” Men, in the visual language of the WHW, were portrayed not just as strong, capable
providers but also compared to the champions of Germany’s mythical past.
This gendered discrepancy can best be illustrated in a collection of porcelain pins
produced for a nationwide street collection in March 1937. This collection featured ten figurines,
six women and four men. Each of the four men could be identified by their occupation. The
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Handbuch der WHW Abzeichen identified a farmer, a fisher, and a brewer, yet the figurines
themselves make this obvious.51 The women’s identities, however are much more ambiguous.
Each of them wore elaborate and colorful dresses. Some had bows tied in their hair, others wore
bonnets covering their heads. Rather than occupational identities, these women had regional
identities, one hailing from Silesia, another from Berchtesgaden, and another from the Black
Forest. The woman featured here had no other occupation, for their responsibilities remain
limited to minding the home and raising the children. With such distinctly separate and different
gender roles illustrated by the WHW’s imagery, one can hardly imagine a Volksgemeinschaft
that represented a classless, egalitarian community.
When taken together, these badges and placards added nuance to the rhetoric of the battle
against hunger and cold described by Hitler and Goebbels. These badges began to add faces,
histories, and symbols to the official rhetoric conjured by Nazi officials. It is perhaps easy to
overlook and discard the language of these WHW badges because so many Germans themselves
most likely would have. These were cheap trinkets of which hundreds of millions were produced.
Yet the sheer scale by which they were produced makes them historically relevant. Not to
mention, these were pervasive signifiers of morals and values that Germans carried with them
into public space. Yet these badges could hardly muster a unified message about the nature of the
Volksgemeinschaft. Instead, they presented Germans with a number of different message and
demanded seemingly contradictory mindsets that could barely be corralled under one idea of
Volksgemeinschaft.
These badges were only one part of a much larger and more active campaign to build
community among Germans under the Third Reich. Hitler and Goebbels were most insistent
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about establishing a community of action, and as a result, the WHW featured countless collection
drives, demonstrations, and events that brought badge-clad collectors and donors onto German
streets in cities and villages throughout the country. One of the earliest collections practiced
during the WHW was Eintopfsonntag, or one-pot Sunday. Every first Sunday of the month,
every German was encouraged to limit their dinner to a single dish—as opposed to the threecourse meals to which many Germans were accustomed. The savings gained from preparing a
more austere meal were supposed to be then donated to the WHW. This was meant not just for
individuals and families in their own homes, but inns, hotels, and kiosks near public
transportation. The money saved by preparing such a sparse meal would then be donated to the
WHW through street collections organized every month.52
Eintopfsonntag was meant to inspire not just action and sacrifice but collective action and
sacrifice. It represented a synchronized mobilization of Germans across the country in pursuit of
a shared cause. On a specific day and specific time, Germans communed together in a single,
shared action. Housewife Anna Katterfeld described her experience of participating in the
initiative: “For me it is as if all members of the German Volk sat around the same table on this
day.”53 These moments generated what one historian has called a Tischgemeinschaft, as Germans
found peace with one another around the family table. These moments became tangible
expressions of the images of domesticity captured by the WHW material culture and brought to
life the domestic housekeeper as a central figure in the cultivation of a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft.
For Germans like Katterfeld, the intimate space of the home became at once a conduit to the
entire nation.
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The common act of dinner became a significant gesture to the nation, one shared by
ordinary Germans and Nazi officials alike. Hitler demanded the Nazi high command observe this
new ritual, something that Minister Goebbels carefully noted in his journal. One moment in
particular proved especially memorable. While partaking in a one-pot meal hosted by Reich
Minister of Food and Agriculture Richard Darré, Goebbels remarked on Hitler’s rage after the
host completely ignored the spirit of the initiative. Rather than a meager meal, Darré served,
among other things, lobster and roast duck to the Führer. In his diary, Goebbels stated, “Darré
has greatly sinned against the poor.”54 Perhaps more importantly, Darré’s disregard Hitler’s
expectations reveals a deeper disillusionment among high-ranking Nazi officials about the
egalitarian nature of Nazi community.
These one-pot Sundays also reveal another complicated dimension of the early moments
of the WHW. Alongside the vigilance and militancy of the Notgemeinschaft, conjured by
rhetoric regarding the battle against hunger and cold, the WHW also came to embody a more
domestic Tischgemeinschaft. The peacefulness and security of scenes inside the home seem
almost at odds with the vulnerability instilled by the omnipresent and ambiguous battle against
hunger and cold. Compounding the complexities of the WHW visual language, collections like
Eintopfsonntag promoted a sense of domesticity that seemed directly at odds with the
Notgemeinschaft conjured by the rhetoric of struggle and conflict.
Of course, Eintopfsonntag was not the only event meant to mobilize Germans in
collective action and collective sacrifice. The entire German calendar from October through
March was saturated with local and national collection drives. Many of these were large,
elaborate productions, namely collections like the “Day of National Solidarity” and the “Day of
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German Police.” These became akin to national holidays. Others were more localized events
only observed in various Länder, cities, or villages. Nevertheless, over the colder seasons, WHW
planners laid a liturgical calendar of collections, whereby Germans were expected to show their
devotion with a number of coordinated rituals and gestures. Public spaces were teemed with Nazi
propaganda that portrayed, often in bright colors and bold statements, the ideals of
Volksgemeinschaft. Radio broadcasts celebrated the works of the WHW and encouraged
Germans to donate. Germans began pinning badges to their clothes. All of these gestures
signaled the beginning of the arrival of the WHW.
Over the course of a month, Germans could be expected to donate, in some cases, at least
three times a month to different initiatives. In November and December 1934, more than 22
different collections had been scheduled throughout Germany, not including the regularly-held
Eintopfsonntag collections at the beginning of each month. With the introduction of the “Day of
German Police” in 1934, a family in Hamburg, for example, would endure four separate WHW
collections in the month of December. 55 The lead-up to Christmas proved to be the busiest time
of year. Much of the WHW propaganda promised a happy Christmas for even the most
destitute.56 Indeed many of the trinkets and badges advertised Christmas themes. Small tin
badges featured snow covered trees and houses with the text, “Christmas in every home!”
Another series of wooden figures included a Christmas angel, Santa Claus with a sack of toys
over his shoulder, and a Christmas tree decorated with colorful ornaments. In order to ensure all
Germans could enjoy Christmas, a busy December awaited.
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Not only did Nazi charity drives saturate the German calendar, but also they proved to be
a burdensome daily obligation as well. Some Germans were expected to begin collecting early in
the morning, continuing for days on end, much of this service being obligatory. In a report from
East Saxony submitted to the Sopade, the Social Democratic Party operating in exile during the
Third Reich, an observer detailed the strict expectations placed on children to collect. “All school
children from the age of 8 on were required to go collecting for 8 days,” the report read. In
addition, they were obliged to collect from as early as 5 in the morning on Sundays, gathering “at
the train station and the streets of Zittau to hold the collection box under the noses of passersby.”57
WHW collection drives were often complicated and extravagant affairs. Indeed, they
demanded the attention of entire communities to stage and execute. Collections like the “Day of
German Police” were among the most elaborate collections staged by Nazi organizers. The
collection was initially established to strengthen bonds between the Nazi police force and the
public they protected.58 First celebrated in 1934, the event lasted two days and called on citizens
across Germany not just to show solidarity with police but also to demonstrate support for their
destitute comrades. Joseph Goebbels mobilized a strong propaganda campaign in the days
leading up to the event, plastering streets with signs and placards and flooding radio with
speeches and programs. Public space was inundated with symbols and bodies, all united in a
chorus of solidarity and sacrifice.
During celebrations like the Day of German Police, Germans participated in grand
parades down some of the country’s busiest thoroughfares. Spectators watched columns of police
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march side by side with ordinary Germans donning their WHW badges. In these spaces and
moments, the complexities of their Volksgemeinschaft become apparent. Detailed in his
chronicle of the first Day of German Police, Chief of the Landespolizei Kurt Daluege described
in vivid detail, relying on the words of other Nazi officials and Nazi-affiliated newspapers, the
celebrations and demonstrations in which Germans partook throughout the country. Some of the
Nazi Party’s highest-ranking members delivered messages of solidarity and camaraderie across
German airwaves before the first Day of German Police. State Secretary Ulrich Grauert declared
the celebration an opportunity for the police to “build a commitment to belonging
[Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl] between the leaders and the led.”59 Reich Leader of the SS
Heinrich Himmler described the police as “the best friend and helper of the German Volk.”60
Messages like these emphasized the need for a strong and healthy relationship between police
and citizen.
Daluege portrayed both through reports and photographs the excitement and action of the
Day of German Police. Many of these scenes proved especially light-hearted and jovial,
capturing the propagandistic goal of police and civilian working together to create a strong
German community. German police, often accompanied by their service dogs, canvassed cities
and towns in search of small donations from passers-by. Children featured regularly in the pages
of Daluege’s book, petting dogs and riding horses. Many cities marked the occasion with parades
and concerts organized by local police bands. Indeed, the Berlin celebration culminated when a
choir from the Landespolizei serenaded Hitler from the street while he and other members of the
Nazi Party listened from his office window.61 Other towns featured more elaborate gestures. In
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the small town of Emden, a parade through the city center included not just police officers but
Santa Claus riding a horse. Even more extravagant, one Magdeburg police officer rode an
elephant through town, saddled with signs that read, “Give to the WHW!”62 Amid the festival
and fanfare, the first Day of German police reported collecting just over 1 million RM.63
These demonstrations created narratives of inclusion and goodwill in the busiest streets of
Germany’s most populous cities. The subtext of these narratives, however cannot be avoided: a
pervasive and inescapable police presence. These gestures of goodwill were inconceivable
without the presence of German police. The pervasive weight of the German police is perhaps
best captured in a photograph of a Prussian woman interacting with local police. She stands next
to the roadside as three police officers surround her, bringing her a “Christmas surprise.”64 Next
to her feet sits a large basket filled with packages, on top of which lays some kind of dead
animal. While the caption indicates that the three police officers have given the woman “a
welcome Christmas roast to put on the table for her needy family,” the woman’s facial
expression makes it unclear whether the men have given her a gift or a citation. This photograph
conjures conflicting interpretations. On one hand, there can be no doubt that German police
saturated local communities with expressions of relief. On the other hand, popular reception to
these gestures remains ambiguous at best.
The photographs and reports published in Daluege’s book were meant to capture the
candid and genuine moments of a strong Volksgemeinschaft working together. But these
moments of goodwill cannot be separated from an omnipresent police force. Their complete
saturation of German society conjures up images of a Notgemeinschaft perpetuated by the war
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against hunger and cold and the militaristic and hyper-masculine imagery of WHW badges and
placards. Nevertheless, in the pages of Daluege’s work, police officers find themselves
performing ordinary and, often, domestic tasks, including delivering groceries, serving children,
and cooking meals. Even images of police officers draping Christmas garland across the Leipzig
police headquarters draws parallels with the importance of an orderly household.65 These were
the same police officers who had, very recently, been invested with the sweeping and
intimidating powers of “protective custody” which enabled them to levy concentration camp
sentences without trial. These same police officers had been charged with setting the mood of
Nazi law in order, defined by the slogan “the fist comes down.”66 These same police officers
found themselves performing the tasks prescribed by WHW rhetoric to good German women
and, as a result, subverted the strict gender roles portrayed in WHW imagery. These more
domestic tasks reveal the extent to which the WHW became an awkward amalgam of
Tischgemeinschaft and Notgemeinschaft.
The Day of German Police only became more elaborate over time. In 1937, the WHW
celebration engulfed the entire city of Berlin. From morning until night, commemorations,
parades, and collections took place all over the city attracting hundreds of thousands of
spectators. The day began at 10AM in Charlottenburg where Germans gathered to commemorate
the lives of police officer Josef Zauritz who, along with SA Officer Hans Maikowski, were
murdered in January 1933 by Communists.67 Commemorations like these tied the early struggles
of the Nazi Party to German collective wellbeing, once again adding historical weight to the
WHW’s community-building project. While these memorials mimicked the historical references
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in WHW imagery or even the historical parades often seen in local demonstrations, they
narrowed the history of Volksgemeinschaft even further by commemorating the Nazi violence of
the Weimar Republic, remembering violence and loss only meaningful to a Nazi-sympathetic
perspective.68
Crisscrossing town, Berliners rode the U-Bahn back and forth to the city’s boroughs to
take part in the different events. In Köpenick, children could ride fair rides for a small donation
to the WHW. Alongside civilians, police marched down Unter den Linden in the shadows of the
Brandenburg Gate playing drums, hoisting banners, and wearing smiles. In Mitte at PrinzFriedrich-Karl-Straße, police officers cooked meals for poor young girls and boys. Theaters in
Prenzlauer Berg showed films in the afternoon celebrating the collection drive. Police and
firemen coordinated demonstrations down Belle-Alliance-Straße in Kreuzberg.69 While different
events occurred across Berlin, everywhere stood signs of the WHW. On every man, woman, and
child hung badges and trinkets, often multiple. On some as many as ten different badges dangled
from every button, hook, and fastener. Scenes like these, while not identical, occurred all across
Germany. Not just in Berlin but in Hamburg, Munich, Hannover, Leipzig, and everywhere else,
demonstrations unfolded in streets and plazas all under the name of the WHW. The
inconsistencies and contradictions of the WHW did not seem to matter, or register, with the
broader German public. Instead, the notions of community expressed by the WHW were not
defined by rhetoric or propaganda but, rather, the actions and rituals inspired by the ideals. This,
as a result, ultimately democratized the kinds of communities the participants in the WHW could
create.
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In the face of improving economic conditions over the course of the 1930s, the WHW
continued to draw increasing revenue—though this does not speak to sustained popular
commitment to the NSV’s cause. These collections continued to saturate German time and public
space. Organizers demanded action, and Germans responded. By participating in shared rituals
of collecting, donating, and celebrating, Germans, both in public and in private, spread a
message about German Volksgemeinschaft. But that message, the actual meaning of community,
lacked any real consistency within the ideological framework of the WHW. Perhaps most glaring
was the distinct absence from the complex rhetoric and public demonstrations of the poor
themselves. Not even an integral part to Hitler’s initial opening of the collection in 1933, the
destitute faded from the WHW in favor of a celebration of German community through history
and culture. The WHW developed an emergency relief program whose emergency was not
poverty. Instead, it became an opportunity for Germans to flood streets, to engage with one
another, and to forge bonds with one another.
In addition to the absence of the poor from a poor relief campaign, the symbolic language
of the WHW contained within it considerable dissonance if not outright contradiction. It sought
to describe the contours of a Notgemeinschaft characterized by national vulnerability and
persistent vigilance while fighting the ambiguously-defined enemies of the Kampf gegen Hunger
und Kälte. Simultaneously, it encouraged Germans to commune in a wholesome and domestic
Tischgemeinschaft that united the German nation not through a persistent sense of threat but
rather a shared gesture of solidarity. The WHW demanded Germans at once embody both a siege
mentality and a wholesome domesticity.
While the WHW was intended to inspire moments of collective solidarity, it was by no
means inclusive, nor did it try to be. Commemorations and parades celebrated historical
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moments that gestured to a specific German heritage with which only certain individuals could
claim. The nuanced language of WHW material culture too put forth specific ideals about
namely gender expectations. Explicitly racialized language was absent from the WHW. Yet this
material culture and celebrated history made it known that Jews were not welcome in the
community established through the WHW. These expectations only became more pronounced as
Nazis spread these symbols throughout society by wearing them proudly, sharing them, trading
them and collecting them. While the language and gestures of the WHW might have presented a
specific message about community, that did not mean those messages were automatically
realized. Indeed, Germans found ways to alter and invert the gestures of the WHW and other
collection drives to take more direct ownership of the boundaries of community under Nazi rule.
Making and Remaking Identity through Collections
On January 28, 1939, the main streets and public squares of Hamburg resonated with the
pervasive sounds of jangling coins and festive commotion. This Sunday, the Day of German
Police, marked one of the busiest collection days of the Winter Help Drive calendar. Collectors
from the SS, local Hamburg police offices, and the Hitler Youth carried iconic red Winter Help
Work (WHW) tins and packed Hamburg’s busiest spaces to solicit donations both from eager
donors and countless other individuals simply making their way around town.
Many found themselves rapt with the spectacle of the day, as parades, bands, and other
public demonstrations saturated the city with displays of Nazi camaraderie. Wilhelm Stauber,
contrastingly, plodded across the halls of the Hamburg Hauptbahnhof, pushing his way through
the crowds, oblivious to the commemorations and celebrations unfolding around him. Stauber
had fallen on hard times after a failed stint in the hotel business in the United States. Since
returning to Germany, Stauber first sought work in his hometown of Plattling before moving
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from the mild Bavarian winter north to the harsh port squalls of Hamburg where he could only
find short stints of employment through temporary work programs. He had no job, had no home,
and was forced to store what few belongings he still had in a small travel locker at the Hamburg
train station.70 On this particular day, Stauber sought to retrieve his identification papers from his
locker so that he could confirm a new employment opportunity with his local work office.
Stauber’s frustrated march through the train station took an unceremonious turn
downward when he confronted SS-Rottenführer Harry Lehmbecker, one of the dozens of SS men
in the train station collecting donations for the WHW that day. It is difficult to ascertain what
actually transpired between Lehmbecker and Stauber since each party offered different accounts.
While historical evidence does not exist that could help clarify the veracity of these accounts,
they help to illustrate the broader contradictions that the WHW embodied. In testimony offered
to a Hamburg district court, Stauber described Lehmbecker as predatory and aggressive. While
examining a local map, Stauber was approached by Lehmbecker. Due to the noise and
commotion in the lobby, Stauber did not understand Lehmbecker’s initial question, but soon
realized he was under interrogation. Lehmbecker asked about his nationality, demanded to see
his identification papers, then accused Stauber of calling his partner, SS-Scharführer Edward
Grube, a beggar. Stauber vehemently denied the accusation and recalled he had no money to
offer to the collectors. He insisted on his innocence but nevertheless ended the day in a Hamburg
jail.71 Lehmbecker, contrastingly, portrayed a much more agitated Stauber. He asked Stauber to
make a donation to the WHW, and Stauber acerbically refused. According to Lehmbecker, he
lashed out, “What do you want? Leave me in peace, you beggar!” 72 Lehmbecker insisted in his
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testimony that he would not tolerate such a response and, after a series of questions, arrested
Stauber. 73
The case against Stauber represents more than just the account of an alleged crime. It was
the scaffolding on which the Nazi state built asocial personalities. Lehmbecker’s account
includes hallmark features to cast Stauber as a disruptive, non-conforming, subversive person
lurking around the edges of normative German society. He was a jobless, homeless individual
who could seemingly offer nothing more than unbridled contempt for Nazi authority.
Lehmbecker’s accusations put in Stauber’s mouth a vicious slander against the Nazi state by
invoking the label “beggar”—an “enemy” of the state against whom Nazi authorities had already
waged war. Moreover, he could not even find the means to offer a small contribution to support
the WHW. By allegedly declining to engage in these normative expectations of civic behavior,
Stauber not only disrupted the spirit of camaraderie but also challenged the very bonds of
community that the WHW was intended to create.
Stauber’s case was ultimately resolved by a Hamburg district court on March 8, 1939,
and Hamburg District Judge Fedder levied a much more restrained ruling on Stauber’s actions
and, consequently, his threat to civic order under Nazi rule—at least yet. He charged Stauber
with defamation [Beleidigung] and set against him a fine of 30 RM, or six days in jail, a relative
lenient punishment for such an (alleged) outburst against the state. While Judge Fedder
recognized that defamation “must be punished with a substantial prison sentence,” he justified
his lenience by arguing that Stauber had been abroad for nearly 15 years, and the customs and
values of Nazi society “were still something new to the defendant.”74 Judge Fedder wrote, “For
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the defendant, these things remain relatively strange, and he must be allowed certain time for
settling in.”75 The matter ended once Stauber promptly paid his fine just days after sentencing.
The Stauber case unveils a cauldron of contradictions that surrounded the WHW. At
once, the charity drive incited joy and dread. It promoted community and alienation. It triggered
passion and ambivalence. This grand program to promote good will and collective cohesion
simultaneously instigated social tension. Even among state actors—the overly zealous
Lehmbecker in contrast with almost empathetic Fedder—no consensus could be reached over
precisely how insubordination over the collection should be evaluated. Despite its pervasive and
heavy-handed propaganda that celebrated traditional bourgeois family values, the WHW, as a
lived experience, constituted multiple and conflicting experiences for those who took part.
In light of all of its contradictions, it should come as no surprise that the WHW itself
precipitated conflict between state and society, and the Stauber incident is just one example
among countless others that reveal the finely nuanced cracks that existed between the Nazi
regime and its subjects. There can be no doubt that millions of Germans enthusiastically
participated in collection drives over the course of the Third Reich, for whom these collective
acts represented a genuine expression of community. For others, however, the “battle against
hunger and cold”—as the WHW was propagandistically known—constituted a source of
annoyance, discomfort, and even fear. It constituted an exploitative state-run practice to extract
revenue from captive subjects. In fact, the anxieties instigated by the WHW and its collection
tactics created new points of contact that Germans could use to develop new bonds with one
another, to build a new sense of community not through Nazi relief practices, but in spite of Nazi
relief practices. This is not to suggest that these modes of ulterior sociability represented some

75

Ibid.

119

kind of conscious subversion or resistance aimed at toppling the Third Reich. Instead, they
demonstrate the breadth of social imagination that still existed within German communities and
the critical role that charity practices played in shaping and, ultimately, revealing them.
Certainly, Stauber was not the only individual to feel aggrieved by the actions and tactics
of WHW collectors. Reports compiled by the German Social Democratic Party in exile (Sopade)
captured a widespread sense of disillusionment, anxiety, and frustration inspired by the
inevitable knocking of the SS officers who canvassed German homes.76 Even from the very first
winter help collections organized by Hitler’s government in October 1933, Germans complained
about the intrusive tactics deployed by WHW collectors. Germans bristled at the pervasive
advertisements promoting the collection drive; trinkets, posters, and placards saturated German
spaces so that the propaganda of Nazi charity was inescapable. 77 Collectors, too, became more
and more pervasive. A report from Berlin lamented the increased solicitations for donations,
likening the to “intrusive begging.”78 These sentiments persisted over the course of the Third
Reich.
A brief word must be said about these Sopade reports. Since these reports were gathered
by the German Social Democrats in exile, it is easy to identify an overly negative National
Socialist bias. The SPD and NSDAP remained bitter rivals, and the Sopade had a vested interest
in sowing seeds of discontent that might startle and disrupt Nazi operations. There can be no
doubt that Sopade officials happily highlighted dissonance and distrust between the German
population and the Nazi government. However, these sources also describe moments of
satisfaction and approval of Hitler’s regime. Even with regard to Nazi charity tactics, Sopade
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reports did not suppress moments that commended the WHW and its efforts. Sopade reports
regularly included the millions of Reichmarks collected on behalf of the WHW and also noted
instances when relief benefits improved from year to year. Consequently, while scholars
recognize the biases in these pages and the intentions behind them, this does not disqualify the
Sopade reports as a valuable lens into everyday life in the Third Reich.
Collection tactics only became more intrusive over the course of the Third Reich. Despite
insisting that contributions to the WHW were voluntary, many local communities began to
publicize the names of those individuals and families who did not donate to the collection. A
local newspaper in Oldenburg, for example, the Bauernzeitung, began publishing a regular
section in its paper entitled “Winter Help Refusers!” that featured the “names of delinquent
donors.”79 Beginning in December 1935, collectors in Sachsen began carrying lists of names and
addresses of people who had yet to donate.80 In some instances, collectors would leave marks on
the front doors of people’s homes. For those who refused to donate, a collector left a strip of tape
that read, “Collection refuser.” If someone was not home, a collector left a strip of tape that read,
“Was not home.”81 Reports from Rheinland-Westfalen indicated that by October 1936, “The
WHW collectors were becoming much unfriendlier and colder in the way they treated the
population. The collectors no longer restricted themselves to the sidewalks but now went house
to house knocking on doors.”82
Perhaps no incident epitomizes the aggressive tactics of WHW collectors than one
reported by Sopade from Berlin in January 1938. A group of friends met in a small Berlin café
for coffee. Soon, two SA men approached the table to ask for a donation to the WHW. The men
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stood by the table, demanding a donation for 15 minutes, despite having been told by the café
patrons that they had already donated, some of them even wearing the iconic WHW badges one
received after giving a donation. These badges seemed to mean nothing, for the SA men
continued to insist that the group donate to the WHW until the they finally capitulated and gave
the SA men a few coins.83 These kinds of exchanges, reported both by Sopade and the Nazi
Sicherheitsdienst, not only illustrate the degree of compulsion many Germans faced but also the
pressure to donate beyond the bare minimum, ultimately perpetuating a cycle of continuous
demand and constant pressure.84 This pressure to donate had increased to the point that by 1938,
Sopade reported, “The Winter Help donations have practically become a compulsory tax.”85
While there was little doubt that WHW donations were effectively obligatory before
1938, this blatant recognition pulled down the last tatters of propaganda that veiled the WHW’s
true objectives. It confirmed perceptions within some corners of the German population that the
WHW was no initiative of goodwill but rather a much more exploitative tactic of revenuegeneration meant to serve the will of the Nazi state—which included swift rearmament and
imperial ambition. People would mock the WHW, suggesting, “The Winter Help Work is
actually Weapon Help Work [Waffenhilfswerk] or Canon Help Work [Kanonenhilfswerk].”86
The rhetoric of collective action and cohesive community only served to disguise, in the eyes of
Sopade reporters, the predatory inclinations of Nazi charity not to promote the wellbeing of
German citizens.
All of this is to say nothing about the actual effectiveness of the WHW to relieve material
suffering. While statistics about the distribution of WHW goods or representations of the poor
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might not be readily available, this did not mean that the poor completely vanished from the
experience of the WHW altogether. Indeed, Sopade ensured that. Sopade collected reports from
various regions of Germany gauging the mood of needy Germans in response to the WHW and,
on the whole, responses were not positive. The WHW failed to live up to the promises that
Hitler had made about material security and economic recovery. From northern Bavaria in June
1934, one Sopade report acknowledged, “Many believed that the change of regime [in 1933]
would bring an economic revolution, relief to our destitution.”87 Instead of economic relief,
Germans received a “new drain” on their income in the shape of “the Winter help … and other
kinds of begging.”88 This sentiment was echoed by factory workers in Augsburg who, despite
being promised new weekly wages, suffered “voluntary” donations to the WHW, ultimately
resulting in lower monthly income and a standard of living worse than before the Third Reich.89
These burdens were compounded by the organizational and logistical problems that
hampered distribution. A report from Zwickau in Sachsen indicated, “The WHW creates much
unhappiness.” No suitable system existed to distribute effectively food and goods to the needy.
“People in Zwickau-West,” the report continued, “must wait in front of the distribution post for
four hours before goods were distributed. People must stand in the cold, on the street, they must
stand in the wind and weather and freeze. And then you receive one pound of flour and one
Erbswurst.”90 Reports from across Germany reported similar logistical failures to ensure that
material goods reached those in need.
In many instances, destitute Germans simply did not receive the basic staples that they
needed from the WHW but were instead given luxury items or irrelevant goods. Over the
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Christmas holiday, needy people from Patschkau in Schlesien received baskets that included
three spools of yarn, two gingerbread cookies, four chocolates, and two apples. According to
local reports, “the unemployed were very disappointed” with the kinds of goods they received.91
Further, one couple in Bavaria asked for a pair of shoes from their local welfare office during the
WHW. The man and woman, both unemployed, had no suitable shoes to take job interviews,
much less to work in. In response to their request, the couple received a pair of children’s soles,
which proved completely worthless to the young couple. Still some provisions could not even be
eaten. Reporting from southwest Germany in March 1935, one respondent described corn meal
that was “full of worms.” The rotten meal was accompanied with a delivery of potatoes “that was
so spoilt that two-thirds of them had to be thrown out.”92 A simple question posed by a reporter
from Westfalen in October 1936 summed up these feelings of distress, “Who can be supported
by the WHW?”93
This kind of institutional incompetence—or willful antagonism—only served to
exacerbate tensions between the Nazi state and working-class and needy Germans, many of
whom had allegiances to leftist parties like the Communist Party and Social Democrats. These
accounts also point to a more surprising disconnect between WHW donors and beneficiaries—
though, given the compulsory nature of WHW contributions, these two categories were not
mutually exclusive. In the Sopade reports, donors themselves showed little concern for the
wellbeing of destitute Germans. Their anxieties stemmed largely from their own inconveniences
and anxieties, not the ineffectiveness or inability of material relief to reach needy individuals.
Middle-class Germans seemed to have forgotten the plight of their more downtrodden neighbors,
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much in the same way that needy Germans had largely disappeared from Nazi welfare
propaganda after 1933. Even though poverty had become a central fixture for public rhetoric in
the Third Reich, the poor themselves appeared to be vanishing from popular consciousness
altogether.
Ultimately, however, Germans could do very little about the inconvenience, intimidation,
and destitution they experienced as a result of Nazi-led collection drives. Together they had to
suffer the pressure and pervasiveness of the collection drives, and this gave way to subtle coping
mechanisms, avenues through which annoyed Germans could, if only briefly, escape the
unpleasantness that came from Nazi charity. As a response, Germans turned to jokes. Humor
represented an important outlet through which Germans could not only express their frustrations
but also commiserate with one another. Indeed, scholars have shown that humor has served as a
medium to building a sense of community and belonging, especially in authoritarian regimes.94
People passed around jokes that openly criticized the WHW while also sending their own faint
signals about their imagined ideals of German community. It must be noted, though, that while
humor might have helped middle-class Germans cope, it still could not put bread in the hands of
the hungry and, ultimately, could offer no relief to destitute Germans who suffered the
inadequacies of the collection drives.
Much of this humor focused on the ineffectiveness of the charity campaigns. Germans
mocked the WHW slogan, “No one should go hungry or freeze,” by suggesting, “No one has to
go hungry without freezing, too!”95 Other jokes highlighted the collection’s overwhelming
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unpopularity. One police officer joked that the easiest way to break up an unruly crowd was to
turn his hat upside down and start collecting for the WHW. When the first Volkswagen cars hit
the roads, consumers worried its stripped-down design would not include the proper signals or
indicators. One joke suggested hanging WHW collection boxes out either window and
pedestrians would instantly clear a path.96 These jokes did more than strike satirical blows at the
very mission of the WHW. They also undermined the credibility of the regime by questioning
the validity of WHW statistics which showed an annual spike in popular participation. Far from
uniting German citizens in collective civic action, the WHW, instead, seemingly discouraged
people from volunteering and participating at all.
The true potential for such humor to disrupt the status quo remains debatable. While
some people felt comfortable sharing such humor openly, others worried about reception by the
Nazi state, as they insisted on “whispering” such critical jokes. This has led some scholars to
identify humor as a source of everyday resistance while other historians remain unconvinced that
popular humor actually contained any potential to affect the Nazi state. 97 There can be no doubt,
however, that Nazi officials were sensitive to jokes told about the WHW. The Gestapo regularly
monitored the spread of critical humor throughout German society while comedians and
humorists were quite measured in their critique of the Nazi state. 98 In fact, court records contain
examples of instances of comedians prosecuted for telling jokes against the Nazi state. In some
cases, offenders received only light sentences. Others, like prominent satirists Werner Finck,
received internments in concentration camps for the criticism they levied against the regime.99
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It was this sensitivity to critical humor that motivated the Nazi high command to consult
beloved comedic actor and noted Nazi sympathizer Weiß Ferdl about the popular German mood
toward the WHW. Hitler, Goebbels, and Göring worried about the low state of opinion
surrounding the drive and encouraged Ferdl to offer his take. Ferdl, in his typical style, relied on
humor to oblige them:
“So [Weiss Ferdl] comes along and asks Goebbels to give him a collecting box.
He then approaches one after another of these prominent Nazis with his box,
asking them to donate generously for the WHW, the Red Cross and so on. At first
the Prominente donated freely, but when Weiss Ferdl returns again and again
Göring objects, ‘When are you going to stop begging?’ to which Weiss Ferdl
replies, ‘That’s what all the other people say!”100
Certainly, Göring was never arrested for equating a WHW collector to begging—if only
hypothetically—as Stauber had been in Hamburg. It is still unclear what Stauber actually said,
but nevertheless, this humorous anecdote demonstrates that the state-as-beggar trope circulated
widely throughout German society as a result of the WHW. This is particularly striking
considering the amount of energy invested by Nazi authorities in “eradicating” begging from
German cities in September 1933 and subsequent vilification of beggars as dangerous “asocials”
by welfare agents. The Nazi state, according to such humor, resembled the very parasitic and
“degenerate” values that it hoped to eliminate through charity programs and police offensives.
Humor contained within it subtle signals about the realities of the Third Reich, about the
contradictions of Nazi society. It became a medium through which citizens could speak to one
another, cloaked in satire, about their own perceptions of the conditions of their communities. It
offered people a way to subvert the state, to critique their leaders, and to draw boundaries
without the fear or danger that came with direct political confrontation. Humor portrayed
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German police, SS officers, and high-ranking Nazi officials not as agents of community cohesion
but as social outsiders and community pariahs who contributed to social dissent. 101
In this way, if only rhetorically, humor offered citizens a shared, common satirical
language to challenge the Nazi monopoly on power and, consequently, establish new
relationships outside the Nazi imaginings of Volksgemeinschaft projected through the WHW.
Humor is inherently social. Jokes were meant to be told out loud and shared among neighbors.
As a result, frustration with the WHW did not remain atomized. One way that Germans
expressed their anger and disappointment with the Nazi initiative was through humor, and by
passing these jokes around, Germans found camaraderie with one another. They could
commiserate with one another, share their sentiments, and, by doing so, create alternative
gestures of belonging through the WHW. While moments of the WHW no doubt brought
Germans together along the lines that Nazi authorities expected, various initiatives of the
collection drive produced different effects. Indeed, the WHW at times brought individuals
together in their collective animosity toward the state and generated imaginings of community
that did not automatically align with idealized Nazi communities.
Humor might have helped some Germans to cope with the anxieties and stresses of a
pervasive and oppressive charity initiative while simultaneously providing a new medium for
sociability under authoritarian rule. In addition to these rhetorical tactics, they also found more
public means of expressing their imaginings of community during the Third Reich. In particular,
non-Nazi collection drives offered Germans an opportunity to demonstrate publicly their
allegiances and, as a result, begin to share gestures of belonging accordingly. These private
collections were almost exclusively organized by confessional relief organizations working
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under the authority of the National Socialist Welfare Association, or the NSV, headed by Reich
Minister Erich Hilgenfeldt. Collection drives led by private organizations were monitored closely
by Nazi authorities—and most were forcibly shut down by 1935. But this did not mean that all
drives had been eliminated by Nazi coordination, and those that remained used their public
demonstrations, however limited, to cultivate a sense of identity under Nazi rule.
One especially active organization was the Catholic Caritas Association, or the DCV.
Scholars have painted a dynamic and contentious relationship between Catholic Germans and the
Nazi Party. Prior to 1933, Catholics were often seen as openly hostile to the NSDAP. Many
Catholic bishops discouraged their congregations from joining the Nazi Party.102 Catholic
women in particular regularly voted on behalf of the Catholic Center Party and rarely voiced
their support for Hitler.103 More recently, scholars have begun to revise the picture for the period
after 1933. While some still view Catholics and Nazis as diametrically opposed, others identify
shared characteristics that made collaboration possible.104 Indeed, some core aspects of Catholic
theology and the unique reformed perspective of Bavarian Catholics created opportunities for
Nazism and Catholicism to overlap following Hitler’s rise to power.105
In many ways, the world of social relief and public welfare serves as a microcosm for the
relationship between Catholic Germans and Nazis. Private confessional organizations like the
DCV and the Protestant Inner Mission increasingly viewed the public welfare schemes of the
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Weimar government as both encroachment on their field of expertise and state sanctioned
secularization of German society. Some of these relief circles welcomed Nazi rule as a means to
preserve their own influence in the world of social relief.106 Ultimately, despite the political and
social tensions that existed during the Weimar Republic, Nazis and Catholics formed at the dawn
of the Third Reich a working relationship that included, among other things, collaboration on
relief programs.
This working relationship, however, did not mean sweeping compliance by Catholics or
even other Christians with Nazi relief initiatives. Early SD reports from 1934 highlight the
“tension” between members of the DCV and the NSV.107 Gestapo officers reported from Munich
sentiments like, “Those in the Caritas Association do not need the NS-People’s Welfare
Association,” which points towards the strong bonds among members of the DCV and a
reluctance to expand their community to include the NSV. Some Catholics demonstrated a
general unwillingness to participate in state-led initiatives like the WHW, which Gestapo officers
grounded in a broader distaste by Catholic communities for a Nazi future.108 In isolated
incidents, priests even discouraged their congregations from participating in WHW collections.
Gestapo reports highlighted a sense of Catholic solidarity that seemed especially resistant to
participate in Nazi-led relief initiatives.
These fragile relationships in many ways exemplified the environment in which the
Munich branch of the DCV organized its annual Caritas-Tag collection drive on May 18, 1935.
Around 9:30 in the morning, men, women, and children took to the streets with collection boxes
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in hand to solicit donations on behalf of the DCV. They made their ways to some of Munich’s
busiest squares, streets, and landmarks, from Odeonsplatz and Leopoldstraße to the
Hauptbahnhof and Sendlinger Tor. Everyone from high-ranking clerics and priests to shop
keepers and metal workers, all sorts of Germans came out to support the cause. They wore small
silver badges pinned to their lapels, jackets, and shirts that simply read: “Do good to all,” the
motto of the DCV. The proceeds from the collection drive constituted one of the biggest sources
of revenue for the myriad of operations—hospitals, shelters, and kitchens, for example—that the
DCV organized and, since the beginning of the Third Reich, were responsible for funding
themselves.
This collection drive paralleled countless WHW collection drives that had already been
staged in Munich in previous winters. It sought to impart a festive atmosphere around the streets
of Munich through collective action. Yet Catholic participants encountered a much more
tumultuous scene than what typically unfolded during winter drives. Nazi student groups and SA
men came out in large number to protest the Catholic collection. Scattered throughout the city,
mobs of young men and women, some numbering between 50 and 60, marched through the
streets chanting anti-Catholic slogans. “This is a fraud!” some chanted. “Out with the clerics!
Jews and clerics work together!” shouted others. “Throw your money in the Isar, not the
collection boxes!” cried more.109 Too often these chants were accompanied by violent encounters
between Catholic collectors and participants and unruly protestors. Scuffles, fights, and brawls
were common scenes on the streets that day. Many collectors left with torn clothes, bloodied lips,
and broken bones.
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The Caritas-Tag was no anti-Nazi or protest charity drive. The DCV was a recognized
member of the relief consortium of private charities coordinated by the NSV. Many of the same
collectors and volunteers who organized the Caritas-Tag would likely have worked with and
participated in the WHW. Moreover, this initiative was not any spontaneous action organized in
opposition to the WHW or the Nazi state at all. The drive had been approved—as all collection
drives were required—by Nazi municipal and welfare authorities. A Caritas officer, identified as
Herr Fritz, even called the local Munich police office on the eve of the drive to ensure that all
measures had been approved.110 They had been. And the drive was to proceed as planned.
Nevertheless, Catholic collectors met considerable opposition, at times quite violent, to their
charity efforts.
Reports of protests and violence that unfolded on that day were recorded by the Offices
of the Archdiocese of Munich and Freising and later submitted to the Reich Chancellery in
Berlin. Intimidation and violence were hallmarks of these accounts. Catholic participants
reported being physically intimidated and attacked by Nazi protestors, some of them in uniform
and others in street clothes.111 A scuffle between a collector and three students broke into a
fistfight after which the Caritas collector was left on the ground bleeding.112 A young woman
collecting near Marienplatz was struck in the face by a male student.113 Another man
participating in the street collections near Neuhauserstraße and Karplatz was attacked by a small
group of students. Shouts came from the mob like, “Beat this dog to death!” as the students set
upon him, “punched him in the face and all over,” leaving his “coat torn up.”
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This violence ultimately reveals an imagined hierarchy of identity. This was not simply a
clash between two homogenous crowds: Nazis against Catholics. Protestors and collectors
claimed allegiances to both Catholicism and Nazism. As one report noted, a student chased a
collection participant shouting, “I’m a Catholic but not brainwashed like you!”114 Similarly,
participants in the DCV collection identified themselves to be Nazis. One man collecting near
Neuhauserstraße on that morning was provoked by a group of agitated students. He revealed to
them that he was an SA-Man, “a proper German and a National Socialist.”115 This language
hardly mattered to the angry mob, from which someone yelled, “Beat this guy dead!”116 Other
collectors participating in the Caritas-Tag in Berlin—an event not disrupted with violent
protests—demonstrated how her Nazi and Catholic identity could coexist. The woman asked
countless passers-by for a small donation and continually heard, “No.” One woman declined to
save money to care for her dog. In response to this, the Catholic collector lamented, “The Führer
must hear of this! What would Hitler say?”117 By invoking the Führer, this collector revealed her
imagined world in which Catholics constituted an integral part in realizing a homogenous
community under Hitler’s leadership. For the student mobs in Munich, however, this coexistence
could not be tolerated. Collecting for a Catholic charity represented a betrayal of National
Socialism. Nazism, in their minds, must come before Catholicism, and by participating in the
Caritas-Tag, even a staunch SA-Man had tarnished his Nazi credentials and ultimately
jeopardized the integrity of a German community.
The violent student mobs left no room for nuance among the identities of the Catholic
collectors that day in Munich. They believed that collection participants revealed something
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radical about their Catholic convictions that superseded any allegiance to National Socialism.
Much like the self-policing of neighborly denunciations, these student mobs took into their own
hands the suppression of ulterior communities that might challenge the authority of the Third
Reich. Nevertheless, these acts of violence were expressly different from local acts of
denunciation. Scholars have noted how such acts were often inspired by personal careerism or
personal antagonisms.118 Indeed, the student mobs in Munich actually sought to narrow even
further the boundaries of German Volksgemeinschaft beyond those set by Nazi policies. While
historical tension existed between National Socialists and the Centre Party, the NSV had
established a formal working relationship with the DCV, essentially institutionalizing Catholic
relief into the Nazi government. Even the DCV collection drive had been formally approved by
local Nazi authorities. This violence, then, was not about careerism but a much more deeply-held
conviction that moved these protestors beyond the expressed will of the Nazi state. Despite these
formal relationships between Catholics and Nazis—and the fact that these identities, as the
crowds have shown, were not mutually exclusive—the student mobs expressed publicly their
will to expel Catholics from their own community and eliminate traces of Catholic expression
from public view.
Violent protestors sought to wipe from Munich’s public spaces not just the Catholic
collectors but also the Caritas symbols. Beyond the pervasive violence of these episodes,
Catholic victims regularly reported that their assailants tore off or destroyed their Caritas
collection badges. These were small and cheap silver badges, often made of aluminum, that
collectors could attach to their lapel, shirt, or coat that signified their solidarity with the DCV.
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The participants in the Caritas-Tag drive wore very simple badges, a small silver hexagon with
the words “Tuet Gutes Allen,” or “Do good to all,” written in Fraktur script. These, along with
trinkets and posters, constituted a unique Catholic iteration of a language of charity that
resembled the WHW’s own material culture.
While quite small and lackluster, this badge featured in nearly every account of the
collection drive. One man collecting on Neuhauserstraße reported that three students confronted
him, yelling “Get rid of your badge!” After a brief scuffle, the boys had stolen the badge and
ripped the lapel from his jacket.119 Another witness watched as a group of students beat a
collector, leaving him bloodied and badgeless. The same group attacked a 16-year-old girl who
tried to help the man.120 The protestors then set on a young woman who wanted to buy a Caritas
pin. She, like many other collectors and participants that day, was left bleeding.121 Reports even
emerged of a 75-year-old war veteran being beaten because he wore his badge.122
More was at stake than isolated violence from spontaneous student protests. Looming in
the background were the oppressive mechanisms of Nazi persecution, and some collectors feared
they might even land in a concentration camp. One man reported stepping between a woman and
her assailants who were described as “four or five non-uniformed teenagers on bicycles” intent
on stealing the woman’s Caritas badge. After chasing her for a block, the woman took cover in a
store where she pleaded to a man to help. The man, identifying himself as a Catholic German,
stepped in to protect the woman from the student mob. When faced with resistance from the
man, the members of the student mob claimed to be plain-clothes agents of the Nazi Secret
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Police.123 The man’s courage quickly vanished as he reflected on his personal stakes. He
reported, “My young boy was by my side, and I worried about [being sent to] Dachau since I am
the sole provider of a large family with many children. Under protest, I gave up my [Caritas]
badge.”124
For the protestors, the Caritas badges represented a source of dissonance disturbing an
otherwise harmonious German community. Violent attacks against Catholic collectors sought not
just to disperse any troublesome Catholic crowds but also to destroy the symbols that promoted
their cause. In this case, the Catholic badges read as outward reflections of one’s Catholic
allegiance.125 This proved especially problematic for protestors who saw these badges as a sign
of compromised allegiance and a subversion of National Socialist identity. The violent rending
of badges from collectors’ clothes represented a public reconfiguration of identity to fit with the
values of Nazi community—in a way that paralleled Lehmbecker’s arrest of Stauber. It
constituted an effort to assert a public order guided by Nazi values to which all other identities
were subordinated.
The attacks on the Caritas-Tag also reveal the important place that collection drives held
in the popular imagination of Nazi society. To incite spontaneous and violent response to a
collection drive suggests that programs like these, and the WHW, played a critical role in both
forming and revealing social identity and moral conviction. Just as the WHW could unite, these
alternative or incongruent drives could also challenge Nazi authority and divide a growing
community. Prior to the 1935 Caritas-Tag, NSV director Erich Hilgenfeldt had already placed
restrictions on some non-Nazi organized collection drives, forcing them to hold their events
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during the summer to pose no conflict with the WHW. After the Caritas-Tag event, private
organizations like the DCV were banned from holding their own separate collection drives
altogether. This restricted the kinds of public demonstrations that could unfold within the Third
Reich and dictated further how space could be inscribed under Nazi rule.
Charity collections, ultimately, proved fertile ground where identity under Nazi rule was
forged, negotiated, and reshaped. Individuals responded to public charity in passionate ways—
whether with compassion, violence, indifference, or anxiety. Jokes about the WHW, borne of
frustration and exhaustion, served as subtle expressions of belonging through which ordinary
Germans might build camaraderie with one another and, if only rhetorically, subvert the power
structures of Nazi charity. Collectors and participants, too, associated with the DCV did not
necessarily cast themselves as adversaries of the Third Reich but instead saw themselves as
working within the context of National Socialism—a compromise that evoked violent reaction.
Violent student protestors worked to narrow the boundaries of German community. By violently
attacking Catholic collectors, student protestors expressed their unwillingness to tolerate this
degree of Catholic conviction. Glaringly absent from the making and remaking of identity
through charity were the poor themselves continued to endure insufficient relief services. They
could only watch on while middle-class Germans fought over the shape of German society
without them.
Collections and Race
Until now, these expressions of belonging broke along cultural and political lines.
Christian convictions which moved Germans to participate in or fight against public Catholic
practices suggested that belonging was a largely cultural gesture among Germans. Jokes too
drew lines along particular conceptions of cultural norms and social expectations. In fact, overt
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expressions of race remained largely absent from the rhetoric of the WHW. Race could certainly
be inferred from the narrow historical narratives and the undeniably “Aryan” families who
populated WHW imagery. Moreover, student protestors to the DCV collection drew parallels
between Jews and Catholics, but their violence did not emerge from racially-driven motivations.
The passage of the Nuremberg Laws, however, made exceedingly obvious any latent
racism that might have been somehow hidden from public view. While populist violence, local
boycotts, and virulent propaganda cast Jews as outsiders, the Nuremberg Laws institutionalized
new “scientific” regulations that defined what “Jewishness” was in Nazi society. New legislation
resulted in the codification of a class of “untouchables” in Nazi society who were forced out of
jobs, homes, and communities. While the Nuremberg Laws themselves did not prevent those
with “Jewish blood” from accessing Nazi relief altogether, they did inspire edits to WHW
regulations.126
In October 1935, Erich Hilgenfeldt issued a circular on behalf of the WHW that restricted
Jews from the Nazi collection program.127 In Anordnung Nr. 39, Hilgenfeldt stated clearly,
“Jews will not be supported through the WHW. The support for needy Jews will be transferred to
the Central Welfare offices of German Jews and their associated offices.”128 He also restricted
Jews from donating on behalf of the WHW too. This order was to be instituted immediately and
by all levels of Nazi administration.
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Members of the Christian Paulus-Bund129 strongly contested this new order from
Hilgenfeldt and the WHW. Members of the Paulus-Bund identified themselves as non-Aryan
Christians. Members represented many different Christian denominations and had been baptized
as Christian early in life. For any number of reasons, however, they chose not to identify with
any Jewish religious heritage in their family. Paulus-Bund Chairman Richard Wolff insisted on
the commitment of the Paulus-Bund to the “German Fatherland.” 130 Despite feeling “loyalty to
… Jewish fellow citizens,” Wolff claimed that it was “utterly impossible … to ever find our way
back to Judaism.”131 They did not deny what Jewish heritage they might have, but members of
the Paulus-Bund expressed an unequivocal connection to Germany.
In the Third Reich, these non-Aryan Christians found themselves in a proverbial noman’s land. Paulus-Bund members had been active participants in the first two Nazi-led WHW.
Yet since they could not claim “pure” German heritage after the Nuremberg Laws, they lost
access to most benefits that the Nazi state offered. The official recognition of various forms of
“Mischlinge” helped, but for the most part, non-Aryan Christians were denied support from Nazi
organizations. Additionally, they had renounced—though not attacked or disparaged—their
Jewish heritage and could not claim any benefits that might be offered through local Jewish
relief initiatives.132 With nowhere to turn, officials from the Paulus-Bund pled with Hilgenfeldt
to allow the group access to the WHW.
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Through various conversations and circulars, members of the Paulus-Bund contended
with Hilgenfeldt and other officials of the WHW that the new regulations were impossible to
uphold.133 On a cultural level, the Paulus-Bund contended that they shared cultural values with
the Nazi state that their Jewish comrades did not. Their shared religious convictions, in the eyes
of the Paulus-Bund, should be enough to earn them recognition.134 When these appeals failed,
they insisted logistical complications. Door-to-door collectors could not differentiate between
non-Aryan Christians and Nazi comrades, thus rendering the policy ineffective. Hilgenfeldt
refused to concede any of these points and upheld the restriction of Jews and, along with them,
non-Aryan Christians from the WHW.
In much the same way that Wilhelm Stauber was apprehended for his unconventional and
“incongruent” outburst at the Hamburg train station in 1939, these examples demonstrate the
ways in which Nazis policed the places they had claimed on behalf of the WHW and, by
extension, National Socialism itself. The violence of the Caritas-Tag represents popular policing
in which Nazi protestors recognized incursion on Nazi places and Nazi values. By denying the
Paulus-Bund access to the WHW, Hilgenfeldt dictated precisely who could and could not
participate in the collection drives. He drew lines between the Nazi “community” and Jewish
people, fundamentally altering the ways in which those participating in the WHW could
manipulate the places that they inhabited. These moments highlighted the increasingly exclusive
community that WHW participants crafted and ensured that it developed an expressly racial
character.
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Conclusions
The WHW sought to transform society. Led by Hitler and supported by Goebbels and
Hilgenfeldt, Nazi organizers of the WHW unleashed a pervasive propaganda campaign to teach
Germans how to be a member of the Volksgemeinschaft. This message, while captivating for
some, proved exceedingly nuanced and ambiguous. It promoted values that nearly contradicted
one another, creating a community that was at once constantly vulnerable as well as domestically
wholesome. The demands of the WHW transformed local police from intimidating brutes into
charitable donors. Perhaps most confounding of all, the WHW ultimately became an emergency
relief drive without the poor. It shed any real pretense for poor relief for the goal of supporting
and promoting a unified national community.
Even as WHW propaganda itself incorporated several complex, if not seemingly
contradictory, images of community, Germans found ways to forge their own bonds using the
pretext of charity. Germans like Wilhelm Schuster expressed publicly the frustration with the
WHW that many Germans felt internally. However, these feelings did not remain atomized or
isolated, Germans subverted the symbols of the collection drive itself to establish a shared sense
of belonging. Other collection drives could serve as touchstones for inclusion or inspiration for
violence. Nevertheless, public charity drives under Nazi rule played a critical role for how
Germans expressed belonging and imagined community.
Scholars have rightly recognized that Nazi Volksgemeinschaft meant different things to
different individuals. Yet this assumption also confirms that a singular idea of Nazi
Volksgemeinschaft existed to be interpreted differently. This chapter demonstrates that the WHW
projection of Volksgemeinschaft had no singular idea, for it embodied within it variations of
community to which Germans could be drawn. Not only were there discrepancies within the
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ideology of Volksgemeinschaft, but Germans found their own ways to express belonging by
relying on Nazi symbols, subverting those symbols, or radicalizing Nazi ideas.
The Nuremberg Laws injected racism into rhetoric and practice. Yet how to follow the
guidelines set forth by the law was complicated by overlapping identities, as we saw in the case
of non-Aryan Christians.
This is not to suggest, by any means, that the “community” under construction in the
Third Reich represented any kind of wide-ranging, inclusive, and progressive thinking. Indeed,
as scholars have noted, violence, in many ways, typified Nazi society. Nor should these
communities be read, necessarily, as resistance to the Nazi regime, for they themselves did not
largely see themselves that way. Rather, Germans could feel belonging under the Third Reich
outside of the boundaries of Nazi ideas of community. Ulterior communities existed not just in
German imaginations during the Third Reich, but they existed in practice, in public. Through
various gestures, Germans forged small communities in which they could share emotions.
Ultimately, these feelings of belonging did not create considerable resistance to Nazi objectives
but were instead subsumed under the Third Reich and enabled sweeping policies of exclusion to
develop.
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CHAPTER THREE
Defining Poverty: Ideology and Practices of German Social Work, 1932-1939
Reich Leader of the National Socialist Welfare Association (NSV) Erich Hilgenfeldt
declared of his organization, “In our work, we see the realization of a divine order.”1 The NSV
animated the “power of the Volk” through the services it provided. Social workers, many of
them women, fought “the battle of social and economic poverty, against physical and mental
distress, and could, in front of everyone, fulfill their highest responsibility: to lead the people.”2
Hardly could a loftier tone be established. Indeed, Hilgenfeldt and his associates in the NSV
portrayed social work as the stalwart vanguard against the existential enemies that threatened the
well-being of the German nation. This kind of language ignored wholly concerns about material
conditions and shifted the focus onto the integrity of the entire German Volk, a threat to the
customs, traditions, and values of the German people, whose protection seemingly depended on
the work carried out by German social workers.
No matter how mythically or divinely social work might have been described by Nazi
officials, it happened in very real places, in spaces where people lived their lives and did their
work. Social work happened mothers’ homes and kindergartens, street corners and homeless
shelters, across office desks and relief petitions. They were responding to cases suffering from
unemployment, homelessness, tuberculosis, alcoholism, and countless other socio-economic
problems that emerged as a result of life in the modern world. Along with addressing the
challenges faced by needy petitioners, social workers also managed and maintained their own
work relationships. They navigated the ordinary challenges of office work, planning logistics,
and meeting potential Empfänger while simultaneously adapting to ever-changing expectations

1

Erich Hilgenfeldt, Aufgaben der nationalsozialistischen Wohlfahrtspflege. Berlin: Zentralverlag der NSDAP,

1937.

2

Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrtspflege. P. 38

143

of their superiors and often avoiding suspicion about their Party credentials. Consequently, the
crusade of social work against German “enemies” was not always a clearly delineated war with
obvious enemies and homogenous sides. Instead, it emerges as a series of complex conflicts
between state and subject as well as among institutional workers themselves acting from their
own interpretations of social wellbeing.
What was at stake was much more than the material wellbeing of an individual. Indeed,
as will be shown, Nazis reinterpreted concepts of poverty to have political and moral
implications, not material ones. Social workers were not addressing material problems. Instead,
in the minds of Nazi administrators, they were waging war to weed out “international Marxism”
and what they viewed as “moral deficiencies.” This, ultimately, would allow Nazi relief
administrators to cast destitute individuals as “enemies” of the Nazi state for any number of
reasons since poverty, in the minds of many welfare administrators, was an outward signal of
irreconcilable individual flaws.
Hilgenfeldt’s sweeping rhetoric too often typifies scholars’ image of the NSV. The
institution appears in scholarly literature as a homogenous branch of the Nazi Party, actively
promoting racial ideas through various support programs.3 Scholars often include the NSV as
anecdotal evidence to highlight broader trends of Nazi coordination rather than a distinct
organization worthy of examination on its own. In many ways, this interpretation is unavoidable,
for Nazi policies no doubt dictated the dynamics of social work in the Third Reich. Notorious
legislation like the Nuremberg Laws, for example, established bureaucratic, legal norms of race
3
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as the crucial factor for inclusion or exclusion from social benefits, determining who could
receive relief and administer it. Moreover, flagship programs pursued decidedly racialized aims.
Programs like Mutter und Kind protected “Aryan” mothers, promoted motherhood, and guided
childrearing all with the distinct purpose of curating the population according to specific racial
ideals.4 While portraying the NSV as a simple conduit for Nazi racism might seem inevitable, it
overlooks the subtler effects that the institution had on German society more broadly. This
chapter offers a more nuanced picture of what was, after all, the second-largest party
organization in Nazi Germany, behind only the German Labor Front. It examines both the
ideological framework and institutional procedures that constituted German social work under
the Third Reich. Consequently, this chapter reveals a different image of the NSV that has
previously been presented by scholars.
At the beginning of the Third Reich, the NSV’s position within the broader Nazi
institutional apparatus seemed ambiguous. The institution itself emerged from relatively obscure
origins as a localized group in Berlin that had little influence on matters of relief and welfare
during the Weimar Republic. Even after being thrust into national prominence following Hitler’s
ascent of power, the NSV’s role seemed relatively small and, indeed, played next to no part in
efforts to restore Germany’s economy. Instead, Nazi officials relied on large-scale work creation
programs aimed to reduce the number of welfare claimants and put Germans back to work. Often
portrayed as rearmament efforts, scholars disagree whether or not Nazi could rightfully claim
responsibility for pulling the country out of the Great Depression.5 Nevertheless, poverty never
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factored into the equation of remaking the German economy. Unemployment numbers might
have shrunk, but this did not equate into living wages for workers, and many remained destitute.6
These work creation programs revealed an overarching ambivalence toward material
poverty and left the NSV to address millions of suffering Germans. While work creation
programs might have failed the material needs of German workers, the NSV worked to remake
notions of poverty altogether. By infusing Nazi ideas of Volk and national solidarity into the
practices of social welfare, the NSV promoted a program that turned away from concerns about
material well-being and instead focused more directly on the moral integrity of the German
people. Ideologically, NSV officials ignored social scientific trends to explain material
destitution through systemic factors and relied on their own National Socialist worldview to
interpret economic and material disparities in German society. This ultimately shaped the
organization and goals of flagship programs like the Winterhilfswerk, WHW, and Mutter und
Kind, initiatives designed to offer only limited emergency relief and selective care to “good
Germans.” These programs approached poverty not as a socio-economic obstacle but rather as a
mark of moral vulnerability that jeopardized both the foundations of a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft
and the integrity of future generations. Hilgenfeldt and other NSV leaders demonstrated an open
disdain for what they called “social theory,” arguing that true welfare work came from “the
heart.” As a result, the NSV dislodged poverty from any socio-economic concerns, recognizing
poverty not as a complex “social problem” but rather a political-racial signifier that could
determine the fundamental contours of German society under Nazi rule.
This had implications beyond simply the ideological conceptions of poverty that
motivated the programs of the NSV. It changed altogether how Nazi officials expected the agents
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of the NSV to approach “poverty.” By tying the fight against poverty to Party ideals, the NSV
became an institution for protecting Nazi ideals. Consequently, the charity organization
developed into landing spot for many Party members with no social work background at all.
Indeed, Hilgenfeldt himself, including a number of other high-ranking NSV officials, lacked any
training or experience at all in social services but rather proved to be loyal Party members. As
social work shifted to align more closely with Party ideals, social workers’ party loyalty became
an important prerequisite. This created tension with more experienced social workers, some of
whom had conflicting political allegiances prior to the Third Reich—not to mention the private
and confessional organizations who lamented the NSV’s swift seizure of power. Newly raciallycharged ideas of poverty fundamentally changed the ordinary activities of social workers—from
office hours to home visits and petition evaluations. Social work changed under Nazi rule.
The Nazification of poverty and social work had dramatic implications for poor relief and
welfare because it coded the way that relief workers understood their cases. By applying racial
and volkisch ideology to welfare, the Nazi Party worked to eliminate material destitution as a
legitimate social concern. This meant that illness, disability, old age, inadequate education, and
any number of explanations for unemployment or poverty could be seen as a mark of political
susceptibility or even moral vulnerability, a value judgment, an indictment of one’s character. It
shifted the ways in which the NSV itself functioned, since welfare was not simply an ideological
exercise. This, in turn, changed the ways that social workers fulfilled their obligations not just to
their cases but also their colleagues. It redefined the relationship between desk workers, needy
parents, neighborhood doctors, school teachers, and legal counsel. By shifting attitudes on both
and ideological and a practical level, the NSV propagated an interpretation of welfare that helped
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shape the boundaries of a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft and ultimately contributed to an environment
in which exclusion became a fundamental part of German society.
This chapter begins by exploring the early stages of the NSV and the Nazi Party’s general
ambivalence toward poverty. It establishes the point that for Nazi officials, any urgency to
address matters of poverty or material destitution ultimately sprung from ambitions to
reinvigorate the German economy and take steps toward overturning the Versailles Treaty. Nazi
officials could not think about poor relief beyond the horizons of their own political ideology,
and what resulted was a narrow understanding of destitution guided strictly by the racial and
political tenets of National Socialism. Next, this chapter explores how this narrow reading of
poverty shaped dynamics among social workers and administrators themselves. It demonstrates
how the NSV became a repository for Nazi Party men, most of whom had no experience in
social work. While this might have bolstered the NSV’s potential to instruct ideological integrity,
it created considerable friction with the professionally trained social workers staffing local relief
offices as well as sparked widespread corruption throughout the institution. Finally, this chapter
investigates how these ideals and tensions ultimately emerged from the administration and
distribution of charity itself. It investigates the goals and challenges of one of the NSV’s
hallmark programs: the Mutter und Kind program meant to serve expecting and new mothers.
Here, this chapter demonstrates the regime’s lack of interest in providing workable solutions to
material destitution but instead offered only temporary and emergency fixes. This resulted in
tensions between caseworkers overseen by their Nazi administrators and petitioners who hoped
to find the material security promised by Hitler himself.
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From Social Work to Party Work: the Nazification of Poverty
From the very beginning, the Nazi Party expressed little interest in directly addressing
issues that constituted material poverty in the Third Reich. Adolf Hitler turned toward sweeping
public works projects not to address destitution, but to revitalize Germany’s labor market with
the intention of ultimately rearming Germany against the wishes of the Versailles Treaty. Wages
remained low, many of the scars of Weimar’s deep-seated poverty persisted, and working-class
Germans continued to express their dissatisfaction because of Nazi promises not kept. The
welfare provisions that were organized to offer some emergency relief had their roots in the
tenets of Nazi ideology—in particular, the salvation of the German Volk. The result was
downplaying, even ignoring, the relationship between material destitution and individual
wellbeing. The existence of poverty, instead, represented a signal of moral vulnerability still
present in German society that ultimately could not be resolved through charity measures.
Consequently, Nazi charity emerged as an exercise of self-preservation, to protect the ‘worthy’
comrades.
Despite the lofty propaganda draped upon the NSV by Hitler and Hilgenfeldt, it quickly
became clear that the NSV would not play a leading role in reinvigorating the Nazi economy, nor
would it stand in the vanguard of the Nazi fight to offer material security for the working classes.
Instead, Nazi officials pursued a number of different work-creation programs to alleviate these
economic woes. These projects aimed to move Germans off unemployment rolls and into jobs
quickly. Many of these programs began during the Weimar Republic and indeed much of the
funding that Hitler ultimately used to support work volunteer programs had been set aside by
Chancellor von Schleicher before Hitler assumed power.7 These funds helped Hitler’s
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government to institute huge civil engineering projects to rebuild Germany’s infrastructure.
Along with civil work initiatives, Nazis relied on temporary and voluntary work projects like
Landhilfe that placed young men and women with various employers throughout the country.
Much of this work consisted of physical labor, often aiding farm hands or helping with land
improvement projects like digging ditches or draining land.8 Oftentimes youth organizations like
the Hitler Youth and the Association of German Girls contributed to these initiatives as well.9
Additionally, local employment offices often diverted unemployment insurance grants to support
temporary work schemes that would ultimately employ hundreds of thousands of individuals. 10
Overall, Nazi work creation programs received mixed reviews. In some cases, these
programs boasted immediate success. Rural areas in Eastern Prussia, for example, claimed full
employment just months after Hitler took office. While these programs quickly placed Germans
into jobs, most amounted to little more than labor conscription, Germans pressed into manual
labor jobs carrying out back-breaking land cultivation.11 Moreover, many programs focused on
rural and agricultural labor, some of the urban areas hit hardest by the Depression, cities like
Berlin and Hamburg, were slow to see any benefits. Volunteer programs like Landhilfe were
largely unpopular. Laborers were often overworked and many, especially those sent to work as
farmhands, seemed uninterested or poorly suited for the physical challenge they met.
Contractors, foremen, and farmers, too, often complained that workers were inefficient for the
tasks they were assigned. Moreover, seldom did workers receive anything beyond food—
payment was uncommon.12 Nevertheless, the Nazi Party’s work creation programs and labor
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policies succeeded in sending Germans back to work and propelled Germany into full
employment in 1938.
Dropping unemployment numbers translated into a soaring labor force that Hitler could,
among other things, divert toward national rearmament during the latter years of the 1930s. It
also translated into increasingly high approval numbers and broadening support for the Nazi
Party. By returning to work, middle-class Germans gained more and more confidence in the
National Socialist regime.13 Opinion from the working class, however, remained divided, and
workers hoped to see more direct response the poverty that persisted from the Great
Depression.14
Going back to work might have bolstered Hitler’s popularity among some groups of
Germans, but full employment did not translate into increased wages. Numbers demonstrate that
Germans did, in fact, return to work and, in some cases, industry was stymied by labor shortages.
However, many laborers could barely earn a wage comparable to unemployment insurance.
Indeed, Sopade reports reveal that working-class discontent rose after Hitler failed to make good
on promises to increase wages. Workers at the Mechanische Baumwollespinnerei und Weberei
AG in Augsburg, for example, complained that wages were actually lower since Hitler took
power since new fees for the WHW, the German Labor Front, and numerous other deductions
were removed from their paychecks.15 The heavy reliance on temporary schemes, too, meant that
Germans only remained employed for a short time. In some instances, even wages were
intentionally kept low in order to make labor cheaper for employers, further highlighting the
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interest in raising employment with no concerns about the material benefits for workers.16
Despite a whole barrage of employment schemes, the Nazi Party largely only accomplished one
single goal: reducing unemployment numbers rather than creating permanent employment.
Material poverty created by the Great Depression still lingered. Many working-class Germans
still found it difficult to make ends meet. These efforts at economic recovery reveal that concerns
about systemic poverty played no role in motivating the work creation schemes of the early
Third Reich.
This was the political and economic world in which the NSV took charge of welfare, one
in which the NSV itself was not meant to be a leading solution to the Third Reich’s economic
problems. Yet work creation schemes hardly made things better. Insufficient wages and salaries
meant that many individuals still suffered from severe destitution and required support to get
back on their feet. What resulted, ultimately, were large numbers of working Germans who
needed support from somewhere. They continued to make demands of their local welfare offices
to help make ends meet, and the NSV was meant to address these cases. While Hitler himself
had placed the organization in charge of all matters relating to welfare and relief, the NSV hardly
boasted any kind of policy plan to address even short-term poverty.
Instead of a clearly devised set of policies, the NSV operated under a guiding set of
ideological principles, principles that did not account for the following the social scientific work
done before the Third Reich. In fact, NSV leaders, despite grounding their own worldview in a
contemporary understanding of “scientific inquiry” into race and eugenics, expressed an
overwhelming disdain for “social theory” or “social science” that had proved so influential
during the Weimar Republic. Alice Salomon, and others like her, was one such critical figure in
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the early development of social science and conducted systematic research investigating poor
families in Weimar Germany.17 She and Marie Baum, along with their colleagues at the German
Academy for Social and Pedagogical Women’s Work conducted field research to record the
biographies of needy German families, exploring family living conditions, relationships,
education, employment, and histories. The academy, founded in the 19th century as a center for
studying child-rearing practices, also researched the lives and behaviors of separated women and
the impact of the Great Depression on marital relationships.18 Salomon used this research to
identify variables which made some families more vulnerable than others to poverty, which then
fueled debates over social welfare policy during the Weimar Republic.19
NSV organizers rejected this kind of research for its alleged “practical” failings, but
antisemitic reasons cannot be ignored. NSV Reich Leader Hilgenfeldt criticized social work
experts for being narrow-minded, indicted them for failing to see beyond their specialty.
“Technical knowledge is not the answer, but ideological integrity,” he claimed, gesturing toward
the intellectual framework he intended to build for the NSV. However, what truly underpinned
these aversions was antisemitism. Nazi relief administrators had contempt for scholars like Alice
Salomon for her Jewish heritage. In fact, Nazi officials condemned social scientific research—
outside of their own racial “science”—for its allegedly “Jewish” roots.20 Salomon, for example,
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was expelled from her academic positions and experienced perpetual harassment and hostility
due to her Jewish heritage.21 Ultimately she was forced to leave Germany in 1937 and relocated
to the United States.22
Instead, NSV Reich Leader Hilgenfeldt turned to a seemingly unbridled antiintellectualism to spell out the ideological framework for the work of the NSV. Hilgenfeldt
argued, “Over the past thousand years, many social theories have been offered yet none have
been able been able to rid of our social problems.”23 He cast the work of the NSV in grand,
almost metaphysical terms, speaking broadly about the Volk, about blood and soil, about culture
and community.24 “The Volk,” he declared, “charges us with duty!”25 This duty Hilgenfeldt only
described in ambiguous terms by referencing an obligation to protect German blood, and this
obligation could not be fulfilled through “the dogma of some theory.” He continued, “The
guidelines of our work come solely from our strong heart.”26 He continued to deride social
theory as derisive, divided along social or confessional lines that pitted communities against one
other. The approach of the NSV, he claimed, would unite Germans where overly-technical,
social-scientific solutions had only divided them.
Hermann Althaus, the leader of the welfare and youth divisions of the Nazi Office for
Welfare and Hilgenfeldt’s right-hand man, supported these approaches by challenging the trends
of social scientific research from the early 20th century. Proclaiming that, “Environmental
conditions were not decisive in determining the development of an individual,” Althaus
professed the importance of hereditary stock and took a decidedly, and unsurprising, eugenic
21
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position.27 This statement directly challenged the academic research that many social scientists
conducted over the course of the Weimar Republic. He continued to criticize the “welfare of
liberalism and Marxism” harshly for relying too much on structural factors to explain individual
wellbeing.28 These approaches, for Althaus, encouraged “hopeless” care for those deemed
hereditarily weak or unproductive.
Statements like these were not reserved simply for the most zealous of Nazi relief
leaders. They became important touchstones for interpreting and understanding social
differences for emerging scholars in German universities under Nazi rule. Dissertations, like the
one produced by Gerhard Groot, also reflected the anti-intellectual approach to social relief that
Nazis championed. Around the same time that Jews were being expelled from the University of
Cologne, Groot, a student in the Economic and Social Sciences faculty there, defended his
dissertation on new approaches to welfare, entitled, “Wesen und Aufgaben der neuen
Fürsorge.”29
In it, Groot offered a further glimpse into the National Socialist interpretations of poverty
and relief. “Wesen und Aufgaben der neuen Fürsorge,” identified the new obligations that
welfare now carried in the Third Reich.30 Where poor relief of past generations had focused on
alleviating the plight of individuals, Groot argued that new relief must orient itself to
strengthening the German Volk, a central tenet of National Socialist ideology. This new focus of
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relief would no longer address the material concerns of individuals but instead work to
strengthen the moral convictions of Germans.
Groot critiqued directly the social scientific scholarship of the Weimar Republic.
Prominent social reformers like Salomon and Gertrude Bäumer found their way into Groot’s
bibliography, yet his references to them were quick and lacked real engagement. He critiqued
Salomon’s “humanitarian welfare” as grounded too firmly in the Enlightenment and challenged
the usefulness of reason for explaining welfare. “Reason, science, and sociology,” he argued,
“are not enough to explain welfare work.”31 Rather than exploring her work or referencing her
findings, he lamented that her “humanitarian” initiatives ultimately professed the innate natural
worth of humans. This kind of humanistic individualism clashed directly with the values of
National Socialist welfare and had no place in a new program of relief in the Third Reich.32
Groot turned elsewhere for answers, relying more on figures like noted Catholic
eugenicist Hermann Muckermann, Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, Reich Minister of
Agriculture Walther Darré, Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick, and Walter Buch.33 He drew
liberally as well from Nazi publications like the Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte and the
Nationalsozialistische Volksdienst. It should come as no surprise that Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf
too played an influential role in Groot’s work. From these works, Groot drew ideas about the
Volk, among many other Nazi ideas, as the primary direction toward which welfare should be
oriented. “For National Socialism, the Volk stands at the center of all considerations. The
German Volk, as it has developed over the centuries, should be united in character, language,
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and culture,” he declared.34 Groot interpreted the state as the caretaker of the Volk and, as a
result, had a responsibility to organize and execute programs to protect and promote its
development. Welfare, for Groot, was one such program.35
Groot identified poverty as the result of individual and personal “deficiencies” that
ultimately caused fractures within the German Volk. These “deficiencies” included illness, old
age, psychological and hereditary conditions, and insufficient child rearing and inhibited
individuals from serving the “community as a whole.” Consequently, poverty emerges from
Groot’s interpretation as an individual problem, not one informed by the broader trends
identified and studied by social scientists for decades. 36
Where Groot might have identified many different causes to poverty, he provided one
single solution. Groot heralded work as an essential path to escape poverty. As a result, work
creation programs proved critically important for any welfare scheme—but not for the income
that employment afforded individuals. He did not view work as an opportunity to offset the
material burdens that illness or disability might place on an individual or a family. This,
according to Groot, was too individualistic. Instead, he argued, “The worth of work for workers
is never material.” Indeed, wage work focused solely on income perpetuated a kind of egoism
that corrupted Germans during the Weimar era.37 Instead, Groot viewed work as a moral
endeavor. “No one works alone for himself, for his personal benefit. All work is for the
community of the Volk.”38 Work, according to Groot, cultivated a productive moral disposition
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by reminding workers of their obligation to a broader community. The point of work was not to
build an income or establish material security. It was to develop values.
By denying the material value of work, Groot infused morality deeply into the fibers of
poverty. He emphasized that the solution to destitution lay not in material relief but in moral
realignment. This has especially resounding consequences when considering Groot’s stated
causes of poverty. It meant that illness, disabilities, and any number of reasons for joblessness
were not simply the consequences of life in a modern world but were, instead, outward signals of
immorality. According to Groot, those who could not work evinced a deep-seated moral
deficiency.
Groot’s dissertation affirmed many of the same ideas that Hilgenfeldt and Althaus used to
form the ideological scaffolding for the NSV, for Nazi ideology read poverty as an individual
problem that signaled one’s moral condition, not material vulnerability, and this had resounding
implications for the nature of poor relief in the Third Reich. As has already been suggested
above, poverty as a material concern was not a part of the public message. Dislodging poverty
from its socio-economic framework meant that Nazis could manipulate the “social question” to
accomplish their own political goals. Nazi officials could now identify a new group of
outsiders—the poor—who could destroy the very fabric of German society if left unchecked.
With the integrity of a German Volksgemeinschaft at stake, relief authorities could now make
decisions about who to include according to new criteria.
Social Workers in Nazi Germany
Understanding the contours of welfare workers and relief administrators helps to unveil
precisely how decisions about inclusion and exclusion were made. Many NSV administrators
had no background in social relief and received their positions for their commitment to the Nazi
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Party. This makes sense for two reasons. First, as demonstrated earlier, Nazi authorities did not
expect the NSV to play a leading role in improving the Third Reich’s economic conditions.
Consequently, little would be at stake by appointing unqualified administrators to unsuitable
positions. Second, considering the critical role that Nazi ideology played in shaping the platform
of the NSV, staffing it with committed Nazis would only serve to advance its mission. These
decisions were not without consequence, however. Professional and educated social workers still
populated much of the staff of NSV relief offices, and their expectations for how charity should
be distributed often clashed with Nazified approaches to poverty. These challenges and concerns
ultimately shaped how relief unfolded during the Third Reich.
Defining poverty along party-political lines effected the institutional shape of the NSV
itself, not just the ideological tenor of the organization. The NSV was comprised of actual
individuals charged with implementing policies and carrying out procedures to actually make
Nazi relief work. To support those who could not make ends meet required social workers who
received, read, and evaluated petitions, who met with and spoke with individuals in need. These
social workers and administrators did not constitute a singular, homogenous group. These were
men and women, young and old, formally trained and inexperienced. They themselves came
from varying social circumstances, claimed different political backgrounds. These differences in
education background and Party history often sparked animosity within welfare offices,
generating suspicion among relief agents themselves and instigating complicated working
situations. All of these factors together helped to generate the new and perpetually evolving face
of Nazi welfare work.
Education and experience varied dramatically across the NSV. Erich Hilgenfeldt had no
social work experience prior to his appointment as Reich Leader of the organization. Instead, he
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became a Party member early in 1931 and was rewarded for his loyalty once Hitler came to
power. Hilgenfeldt’s quick rise to power was in no way unique for individuals in the NSV. Much
like Hilgenfeldt, Karl Spiewok lacked any formal training or education in social work.
Nevertheless in 1933, he found himself leading the welfare offices of Gau Berlin. Born in
Lorraine in 1892, Spiewok attended a local middle school in Metz for only four years. He would
never return to school to earn his Abitur, return to any technical school to learn a trade, or ever
enroll in a university. He eventually began an apprenticeship when he was 18 and for two years
in the office of an electricity utility company until 1921. Afterward, Spiewok moved to France to
continue similar work. He enlisted in the German Army on August 4, 1914 where he served on
the front where he earned various recognitions for his service. Upon completing his service in
December 1918, worked different odd jobs. On one occasion he sold specialty groceries,
tobacco, and liquor. Another he managed and oversaw the building of sport playing fields in
Pasewalk, a small village in northern Germany. Still another he worked as a bookkeeper for a
supply store that sold, among other things, construction equipment, tools, and electric
appliances.39 None of this work suggested any kind of preparedness for a spell working in poor
relief and social services.
Despite his lack of professional qualifications, Spiewok became the Gauamtleiter of the
Office of Welfare for Berlin in October 1933. This put him in charge of overseeing the hundreds
of welfare offices in the entire administrative district of Berlin. His responsibilities were largely
administrative, meaning he issued directives, guidelines, and circulars for how relief in Berlin
would be conducted. Along with making critical decisions about how relief would function, he
also evaluated and monitored the performance and attitudes of Berlin’s social workers. This did
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not mean, however, that he was disconnected in any way from Germans who petitioned for
relief. In fact, Spiewok himself fielded numerous inquiries about NSV programs, working
directly with Germans in need.40
Even more rank-and-file agents found their way into NSV work without any kind of
considerable social work experience. Take Alfred Widzgowski, for example. In many ways,
Widzgowski represented an ideal Nazi. Born in 1899 to two parents of “Aryan heritage,”
Widzgowski served in the German army during World War I. He joined the Nazi Party in March
1932 and two months later became a member of the SA. After Hitler took power, Widzgowski
applied for membership to other Nazi organizations, among them the NSV, the German
Workers’ Front, and the Reich Air Defense League. To add to his Party credentials, Widzgowski
had a young, growing family. He and his wife Charlotte had three children, Ingelore, Fredheinz,
and Sigrid, putting the family in good graces with the expectations to build large German
families.41
Widzgowski’s Party credentials might have been pristine, yet he could hardly boast much
qualification for his professional position of welfare inspector. Widzgowski had no formal
education in any kind of social work. Indeed, Widzgowski left school at the age of 14 and
afterward trained as a railroad apprentice. He worked for the rail company Mitropa for a short
time before finding himself unemployed for much of the early 1930s.42 Despite lacking any
credentials to qualify him for a job in social work, Widzgowski nevertheless began working for a
local Berlin welfare office in July 1933.43 Later in 1935, he would be transferred to the
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Schwarzarbeitkontrolle of the Landeswohlfahrt, investigating any potential fraud committed by
those drawing welfare benefits.
His lack of education did not necessarily mean that Widzgowski was wholly unqualified
to perform the tasks he was assigned. His supervisors at the welfare office in Prenzlauer Berg
regarded his work as “appropriate” and “impeccable.”44 In dealing with his cases, “he
demonstrated tact and skillfulness.”45 In fact, his Party loyalty made him especially qualified to
serve the NSV as poverty found new interpretation under the Third Reich. The new politics of
poverty meant that social work experience and education had little relevance. By aligning
conceptions of poverty more closely with Party ideals, loyalty and commitment became
critical—if not the most important—prerequisite for social work in the Third Reich.
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these administrators to evaluate whether or not
they were completely unqualified for the positions that they held. Yet what is clear is a pattern of
corruption and malfeasance among NSV officials. From the very beginning, incidents of
embezzlement, theft, and fraud—among other crimes—pockmarked the relief institution whose
mission it was to build community among Germans. Sopade reports regularly detailed the extent
of crimes committed by Nazi officials related to social work. In the town of Meissen near
Dresden, for example, a local Kreisleiter of the WHW was convicted of embezzling 30,000
Reichmarks from funds collected during the very first WHW organized under Nazi rule. Sopade
reports did not include the sentence he received because the man committed suicide shortly after
his indictment.46
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Of course, this was not an isolated incident. Countless other NSV officials too stole
money from the coffers of the NSV and the WHW to line their own pockets and those close to
them. All ranks skimmed from Nazi charities, like local NSV office manager Peter Knopp from
Wiesbaden who, in 1935 received a sentence of two years in prison for 10 counts of fraud against
the WHW.47 An NSV caseworker, Josef Stracke, from Rheinland-Westfalen was found guilty of
embezzlement in 1935 and was sentenced to 15 months prison. It was not even uncommon for
ordinary volunteer WHW collectors to simply pocket the money he or she collected on the day.48
Punishments for such crimes varied wildly. On some occasions, no punishment was
handed down at all, as Nazi leadership stepped in to protect individuals or prevent police
authorities from investigating further.49 In other instances, embezzlers lost their jobs, received
fines, and some even spent time in jail. For example, two NSV station managers from Bottrop
received a sentence of one-and-a-half years in prison for stealing 8,000RM from the WHW. It is
unclear from the Sopade reports, however, how much of these sentences were actually served.
Welfare administrators did not simply steal money and goods but also found other ways
exploit needy individuals. Often, officials demanded sex—commonly referred to in Sopade
reports as “immoral misconduct [unsittlicher Verfehlungen]”—in exchange for the preferential
treatment of needy women, which regularly came in the form of NSV vouchers.50
Others hatched their own schemes to take advantage of a captive donor pool. The
Kreisleiterin of the WHW in southern Baden, Frau Bürgle, established a local program for the
WHW 1934/34 where she encouraged local women’s organizations to sell postcards to raise
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money for the winter collection. Instead of donating the proceeds to the drive, Frau Bürgle kept
all of the donations for herself.51
Corruption in Nazi relief initiatives was not limited to the welfare authorities themselves.
Others found ways to skim funds off of the relief initiatives with little to no consequences at all.
For example, one prominent SA leader named Günthum owned several drinking establishments
in Perlach near Munich. Like all restaurants and bars, he took up a collection for the WHW and
also developed a fund for Eintopfsonntag collections. Rather than donating the proceeds to the
local NSV offices, Günthum kept the funds for himself. After his fraud had been uncovered, he
apologized to local Nazi authorities. He was sentenced to one day in jail. No reports indicated
whether or not he returned the stolen money, and newspapers did not report on the matter at all.52
These incidents of corruption further confirm the ambivalent nature of the NSV within
the broader landscape of a Nazi worldview. Despite outwardly projecting a message of unity and
cohesion through NSV programs, administrators and employees undercut the credibility of their
actions by stealing and embezzling the proceeds they collected. They either ignored their own
propaganda or simply did not care, for they, in no way, saw the NSV as a tool to alleviate
material suffering. Instead, it existed as a superficial front for raising revenue, further reinforcing
the point that the target of the NSV was not the destitute at all, but the potential donors who
could give money to the Nazi cause that could, subsequently, be embezzled by its employees.
Of course, not all NSV employees and relief workers in the Third Reich were Nazi Party
members who had been given sinecures. Many were well-educated and long-serving social
workers with roots back even before the Weimar Republic. In fact, the NSV had relative
stringent regulations for individuals seeking positions in various relief institutions. In most

51
52

Sopade 1935, p. 90
Sopade 1934, p. 520

164

closed institutions, the NSV stipulated that its workers pass state exams and adhere to, at times,
rigorous education prerequisites. To work as a supervisor in an NSV kindergarten—charged with
the “supporting and advancing adolescent generations both physically and mentally at a critical
time in their lives”—women had to complete a two-year training program and pass a state
exam.53 Aspiring young women even had to pass prerequisites to be accepted into apprenticeship
homes. Potential Kindergärtnerinnen had to be at least 18 years old and completed the equivalent
of a secondary-school education as well as previous experience with domestic management.
Only after three years of related work could a Kindergärtnerin become eligible to become a
Jugendleiterin, a position in which she would plan and implement curricula and programs for
youth homes, mothers’ homes, and day shelters.54 Along with this practical experience, potential
Jugendleiterin must demonstrate theoretical and pedagogical expertise and proficiency teaching
and leading not just the charges in her home but also young apprentices.55
Other social workers earned their social work education and experience before the Third
Reich and, for some, this created considerable problems. Indeed, Erich Grzywatz was one such
worker, a stark contrast from Widzogwski. Born five years later, Grzywatz did not serve in
World War I nor could he claim the same party connections that Widzgowski could. Instead, he
evinced a deep commitment to social work. He recalled, “My aspirations to see the social
problems of our times solved,” and this animated a career in social work. His experience with
social work began at an early age. He joined the Reicharbeitgemeinschaft der Kinderfreude in
1927 which he described as an opportunity for “building a new solidarity among humanity.”56
Soon after, he found employment at the local youth welfare administration in Prenzlauer Berg.
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By participating in such organizations, Grzywatz thrust himself into one of Weimar’s most
highly charged political debates: youth welfare, an area that Social Democrats became
increasingly interested after World War I.57 There he gained experience both in the complex
debates about youth welfare but also familiarized himself with the practices and approaches to
protecting vulnerable young people.
While Grzywatz might have been an active participant in Weimar’s dynamic social
welfare scene, he was also a committed Social Democrat. Grzywatz joined the Social
Democratic Party when he was 14 years old. He admitted to joining the ranks of the
Arbeiterjugend movement in 1920, a Social Democratic youth organization. Moreover, despite
describing the Kinderfreude program as “apolitical,” the education program evinced decidedly
Social Democratic leanings. It was only after Hitler took power that Grzywatz left the
Kinderfreude movement as well as the SPD.
Grzywatz’s political past proved especially contentious throughout the Third Reich. From
his first days working under the Third Reich, his colleagues questioned his commitment to
National Socialism. As early as June 1933, co-workers Ida Wendt and Elisabeth Gleichauf aimed
to discredit Grzywatz’s reputation as a social worker. Together the pair accused Grzywatz of
harboring subversive inclinations, often relying on his distant past to substantiate their claims.
Frau Gleichauf reported a meeting in 1916 between herself and Grzywatz in church. Grzywatz,
who would have been twelve years old at the time, allegedly mocked Gleichauf after her two
sons had been killed in World War I.58 In other instances, for which the women “could provide
no exact date,” Wendt and Gleichauf accused Grzywatz of spreading his alleged socialist
convictions to young people. Welfare officials deemed Wendt’s claims to worth investigating
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since she had a credible reputation as a leader of the women’s relief division of the Red Cross
while they could not similarly confirm Gleichauf’s integrity.59
Claims levied by Wendt and Gleichauf ultimately resulted in a formal investigation of his
political background potentially in violation of section 4 of the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des
Berufsbeamtentums, a law which policed the political and cultural heritage of civil servants in
Germany.60 While Grzywatz never commented on the specific claims leveled against him by
Wendt and Gleichauf, he openly admitted his past membership in the SPD. In a statement made
to authorities from the Bezirksbürgermeister of the Verwaltungsbezirks Prenzlauer Berg,
however, Grzywatz described his commitment to the SPD quite carefully. Indeed, he claimed
that, “since I joined the SPD in 1918, I was only 14 years old and my connection to the national
party was not especially strong.”61 As he cast doubt on the strength of his own connections to the
SPD, he also highlighted a strong connection with his German heritage. He claimed, “I have
always felt German, and only German,” suggesting that his political associations in no way
jeopardized his national identity. He even went as far as to align his the two, arguing that, “For
many years, I believed that this party truly worked in the interest of the German Volk.”62
Grzywatz was sure to cast his political commitments in terms of national well-being.
Rather than praising specific SPD policies, he clearly communicated his concerns about the fate
of the German Volk. While such language might have resonated with a Nazi audience, his past
relationship with the SPD meant Grzywatz remained a constant target of suspicion from
supervisors who regularly evaluated his allegiance to the Party. Reports by welfare administers
regularly commented on the relationship between his professional conduct and his political
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disposition. His division supervisor commented in May 1935, “It is difficult to judge Grzywatz
because of his withdrawn character.”63 He continued that, “I am unable to confirm with any
certainty that Grzywatz proves an unmitigated threat to the Nazi state because of his history as a
Marxist youth.”64
Evaluations like this persisted throughout Grzywatz’s career. On several occasions in
1935, Grzywatz was asked to account for his political past. In April 1936, a supervisor judged
him to be a “a diligent and knowledgeable officer,” making no further comment on his past
political history.65 Later in September, his supervisor came to similar conclusions about his
professional performance while adding, “I can find no fault with his political disposition since
the National Socialist capture of power.”66 Evaluations like these continued throughout the
1930s, with Gauamtleiter Spiewok himself adding his own positive assessment to Grzywatz’s
files. Despite his persistent professed commitment to the Party, Grzywatz perpetually found
himself under the watchful eye of his Nazi supervisors.
The administration of Nazi welfare was not a uniform, cohesive, or straight-forward
process. Despite its propagandistic trappings, the NSV was riddled with contradictions.
Ultimately, from an administrative perspective, the NSV had very little guiding direction. It was
an amalgam of Nazi Party members and educated social workers, a Venn diagram with very little
overlap between the two groups. The institution was teeming with corruption that both undercut
the NSV credibility as a relief organization both from the public’s perspective while
simultaneously reinforcing the propagandistic hollowness among NSV administrators. Moreover,
the abundance of Party administrators who landed at the NSV ultimately interfered with social
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work on the ground, as many trained welfare workers, albeit with seemingly “dubious”
backgrounds” as potential political opponents, dealt with constant suspicion about their loyalties.
Consequently, these contradictions meant that the NSV failed to provide adequate relief to
anyone but could hardly achieve its Party mission to protect any imagined semblance of
ideological integrity either.
Charity on the Ground: Organizing and Implementing Nazi Relief
These were the administrative inconsistencies that ultimately governed the programming
of the NSV, programming that was organized and grounded in the narrow, Nazified
understanding of poverty. The NSV set about rewriting Germany’s welfare landscape through
two of its most prominent programs: the WHW and Mutter und Kind. While the WHW has been
discussed at considerable length previously, it is worth noting the overwhelming emphasis
placed on giving. Concerns about the wellbeing of the poor largely vanished from WHW
rhetoric. Indeed trinkets, badges, and placards—along with the vibrant and complex language of
collection drives in the Third Reich—seldom mention the plight of the poor. Instead, the WHW
promoted a message of collective action. Photographs of crowded street corners, images of large
families, and messages of German unity all typified the rhetoric surrounding the WHW’s popular
collection days. These tactics took the emphasis away from the plight of the poor and placed the
focus squarely on the practices of donors. While images and rhetoric stressed giving, so too did
the more strong-armed tactics to “encourage” Germans to donate. The trope of roving SS men
knocking on doors, demanding donations—coupled with wage garnishment—meant that goal of
the WHW was compel Germans to give to charity, not to alleviate poverty. WHW statistics, too,
demonstrate a clear focus on donors and not the needy. Statistics reveal everything from the
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various types of goods that Germans gave to the days on which those goods were given.67 Yet
statistics for those who benefited from such donations prove especially difficult to find.
All of this suggests that the poor themselves played a very small role in the message that
the NSV hoped to project through the WHW. No doubt the WHW constituted an emergency
relief collection drive, but its focus was not on those in need. WHW officials hoped, by
collecting money, food, clothes, and fuel, to inspire collective action and build community
bonds, not to solve material poverty. Instead, by shifting focus away from the poor and placing it
squarely on the donors, NSV officials emphasized a different set of ideals altogether. Social
work and charity—as typified through the WHW—served as a measure of party commitment
and loyalty. Those willing to respond to the call signaled their commitment to the Nazi cause,
helping to define the parameters of social inclusion.
Similarly, the Hilfswerk Mutter und Kind worked to alter perceptions of poverty. Upon
the founding of the Hilfswerk Mutter und Kind on February 28, 1934, Joseph Goebbels declared,
“The program Mutter und Kind is the pledge to the immortality of the Volk.”68 Because German
families stood at the center of a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft project, mothers occupied a unique
position there. The program served mothers-to-be, those with many children, and widowed,
divorced, or otherwise single mothers and their children, providing support and education during
the early stages of motherhood. In order to be eligible for the program, women had to complete
both a medical examination as well as a survey about their economic situation.69 Even from the
outset, social workers paid particular attention to qualities described as “socially adverse” or
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“hereditarily inferior.”70 Mutter und Kind sought to reclaim needy mothers from the grips of
poverty, but the program only extended help to a select group of women who had the potential to
guarantee a “healthy” German nation.
Much like the ambitions of Nazi work creation programs or even the WHW, Mutter und
Kind did not address poverty directly. It recognized that some Germans suffered economically
more than others and sought to recover some mothers from that state. Despite falling under the
umbrella of the NSV, however, this program did not intend to resolve matters of poverty at all.
Mutter und Kind discouraged economic support and indeed only a fraction of women who
sought assistance from the program received such support.71 Ultimately, economic help was not
the goal of the Mutter und Kind program. While women could request cash support, officials
encouraged needy mothers to seek out help from relatives or other networks of support. Instead,
mothers—if deemed eligible—could find support with jobs (mainly helping fathers find and keep
steady work) and apartment help.
Primarily, Mutter und Kind provided educational opportunities for young mothers at local
help centers. Help centers sprung up across Germany where mothers could seek advice about
nutrition, hygiene, and other dimensions of childrearing. By visiting relief offices, young women
could meet with social workers and receive one-on-one instruction about childrearing. In many
cases, this amounted to detailed instruction about baby and infant nutrition. Mutter und Kind
programs stressed, for example, the nutritional benefits of breastfeeding, arguing that breast-fed
children survive at a rate 4-5 times greater than babies who are bottle fed. Pamphlets even
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provided detailed instructions on how long each breastfeeding session should last.72 “Multiple
cases suggest that the mental and personal traits are transferred from the mother to the child
through breast milk,” claimed one Mutter und Kind pamphlet. These kinds of educational
pamphlets begin to emphasize the ambitions of the Mutter und Kind: to guarantee healthy
generations of Germans.
The Mutter und Kind initiatives blossomed over the course of the 1930s, spreading ideas
about motherhood across the Reich, yet not in the most efficient manner. In 1935, Mutter und
Kind reported over 25,000 help centers—despite not breaking over 7,000 skilled employees,
resulting in dramatically understaffed institutions.73 By 1939, the number of professional
employees—including social workers, home leaders, and medical doctors—had grown to over
32,000.74 Membership was not just open to those in need. Germans from all social strata were
encouraged to join in the same way they joined any one of the Nazi Party’s special-interest
associations. Similarly, the number of help centers had grown steadily as well, and women
continued to visit these centers more frequently. By growing these centers across Germany,
Mutter und Kind spread a message of poverty as a moral threat to future generations of German
children. Without proper education, without proper guidance, poor mothers could succumb to
poverty which ultimately inhibited the nourishing and rearing of strong German generations.
Ultimately, however, these programs were not organized to relieve long-term poverty,
nor were they especially equipped to address adequately issues of short-term poverty either—
despite the WHW’s emergency relief initiative. Programs like Mutter und Kind and the WHW
might have supported needy mothers and families, but solving poverty was hardly the goal.
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Instead, Mutter und Kind established strict guidelines about which mothers “merited” relief,
which women were “worth” the sustained investment from the Nazi state. In this way, the
programs of the NSV aimed to represent much more than just a response the economic
devastation of the Great Depression. Ideally—or perhaps propagandistically—these programs
were meant to craft a unifying, shared ideal that would guide collective imaginings about
community bonds and social relationships. The NSV, through the Mutter und Kind program
helped to shape and protect an ideal of domesticity, of motherhood, and womanhood that would
set the standard for conceptions of femininity for the Third Reich. In this way, the NSV deployed
programs to define the boundaries of a Nazi social ideal, to clarify community expectations, and
to pave, what was meant to be, a road to salvation for the German people.
Of course, as has been demonstrated with the composition of the NSV administration, the
NSV ideals and ambitions did not come to fruition in the organization of the institution at all. In
fact, the administrators themselves served as a source that discredited the NSV’s goals.
Similarly, the goals of the NSV’s programs did not align with the way they unfolded in lived
reality. What is important to capture here is the way in which these two things did not align. The
ideological and institutional dynamics did not remain separate from the ordinary lives and,
perhaps more importantly, very real destitution that Germans experienced under the Third Reich.
This was brought to bear in the daily obligations and tasks that social workers completed in their
daily work routines. A typical day began for Anna Brande, a social worker in Hamburg, when
she arrived to her office before 8AM where she prepared for a morning full of meetings and
counselling. First, she met for informational debriefing with an NSV supervisor. Then she
reviewed and updated cases files in her current load. She made phone calls, researched
backgrounds, and reviewed files to prepare for visits to local youth shelters later that day. She
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also worked in time to have a brief conversation with the local Nazi Blockleiter. All of these
tasks she completed before 10AM.
After her early morning responsibilities had been fulfilled, Brande set off through the city
on her bicycle for a round of home visits. Brande’s welfare office post number XII served around
9,000 individuals in neighborhoods in Barmbeck-Nord, a borough in northern Hamburg. It was a
borough Brande described as “neighborhood with a modern layout with ample green space and
new buildings.”75 In summer 1937, this district office handled around 253 different cases, though
Brande noted that the office was regularly understaffed and could not provide sufficient support
as “a number of files fell through our hands.” This number of cases was relatively low compared
to more industrialized areas of Hamburg. Barmbeck-Nord did not include many of Hamburg’s
most destitute cases and in fact many cases had recently moved into Brande’s district away from
the working-class areas of town. While there was work to be done and needy individuals to
support, Brande’s work did not take her into the most destitute areas of Hamburg.
Brande valued her field work, for she believed good social workers invested themselves
in their local communities, learn about the neighborhood, meet the population, and “build the
trust of the public.”76 On typical trip, she could visit as many as ten different cases before the
early afternoon. She had to be prepared to prepare for all different cases, from infants,
adolescents, young adults, and families. Along with her individual visits, she also visited schools
and shelters to check on clients there and making stops at other neighborhood welfare offices and
youth shelters. Brande described her school visits as more “intensive” than others along her
route. Most children in the area attended the Doppelschule on Graudenzerweg, a school for over
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1,200 children. Here she regularly met with the two school principals to discuss students with
potential learning disabilities and the causes, whether they were a result of “relationships at
home” or a deeper “hereditary disposition.” She worked closely with the school doctors to
monitor young children who had just started school. She also developed relationships with the
students themselves, referring any potentially at-risk cases back to her welfare office. Brande
also advised school administrators on preventive relief measures, providing suggestions about
how to improve basic health and sanitation measures around the school.77
Along with providing social services support to local schools in her district, Brande also
made regular home visits. On these trips she monitored closely and intimately the living
conditions and family relationships for many of her cases, including infants, children,
adolescents, and adults. Home visits could be hit or miss when clients could be out or, in some
cases, attempting to avoid Brande altogether. A typical day often concluded back at the office.
Any number of afternoon tasks occupied Brande’s time. Some afternoons Brande held office
hours during which individuals seeking rent assistance could petition for relief. Other afternoons
Brande completed paperwork. On others still, she traveled to nearby welfare offices to
collaborate on cases.
What Brande’s schedule demonstrates is the breadth of knowledge that social workers
were expected to wield in their daily routines. Not just beholden to one single authority or
responsibility, Brande moved in and out of a number of different spheres of relief. She moved
from schools, to hospitals, to private homes, and back to her office. Even within one context—
say, for example, a school—Brande collaborated with principals, doctors, and students. To
operate in those spheres, to move in and out of the different spaces and interact with the different
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authorities that she does, Brande and others like her required a wide breadth of knowledge to
work productively not just with the cases in her charge but also the authorities and experts who
advised her. To acquire this knowledge, Brande not only had to earn her formal education, but
also she had to embed herself deeply into the community that she served, to meet her
community, and to build relationships with those around her.
Welfare workers found themselves caught amid countless community and institutional
expectations, both to serve their local cases and their administrative supervisors. They were
asked by the Nazi state to evaluate the health and wellbeing of Germans while also monitoring
and explaining their political disposition. Social workers also had to develop close interpersonal
relationships with the individuals they served, developing their trust not only as agents of the
Nazi state but also as responsible civil servants—a label that was becoming increasingly
obscured in the Third Reich, as the latter was often conflated with the former.
Often, social workers were expected to monitor and explain the political dispositions of
their caseloads. In April 1936, for example, Hilgenfeldt demanded reports local welfare offices
across the country regarding the election results of the March 29 Reichstag vote, which asked
Germans to approve of a single-party list for parliamentary “elections.” Despite the
astronomically high approval rating, pockets of dissent still remained, and Hilgenfeldt demanded
that social workers investigate, in particular, working class neighborhoods in urban Germany to
uncover an explanation. The circular, addressed to “all welfare office leaders,” asked local
social workers to investigate if the social relationships in these suspicious neighborhoods
experienced especially high poverty compared to other parts of town.
This circular reveals a deeper political inflection to Nazi perceptions of poverty, one that
aligns with the moral interpretation of poverty. By asking welfare workers to investigate the
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political inclinations of their cases, Hilgenfeldt expressed a deeper skepticism over the political
loyalties of the poor, or, more specifically, deeper Nazi concerns about Communism. In his
mind, the poor seemed reluctant to support the Nazi cause. In these working-class areas, social
workers reported varying relationships between working class people and the Nazi Party. In
some working-class districts of Hamburg, no animosity appeared to exist at all. Yet in others,
relations appeared strained. To a greeting of “Heil Hitler!” one social worker reported his
suspicion when he received answers of “Good morning,” rather than a reciprocal Party
salutation.78 Other reports remarked that an especially high number of men under the jurisdiction
of Hamburg’s Welfare Office III remained in protective custody for political offenses.
Another social worker helped to confirm Hilgenfeldt’s worries about the relationships
between needy Germans and Communist resistance. He reported that his jurisdiction, a segment
of the northern Hamburg borough Winterhude, was an “outspokenly Communist area,” a phrase
the social worker dramatically underlined.79 He continued to explain that most of the inhabitants
should be sent to concentration camps. When they visited the local relief office, needy petitioners
were described as “consistently grumpy and never satisfied” despite receiving equal treatment
compared to other welfare areas in the city. Without considering the relationship between the
NSV’s effectiveness and the mood of working-class Germans, social workers investigating the
election results of 1936 helped to establish this connection between needy communities and the
politically subversive, further deepening administrative suspicion about the “moral alignment” of
poor Germans and their “compatibility” with the propagandistic ideals of a German community
as it was constructed by the NSV.
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While relief workers like Brande hoped to build relationships with the individuals in the
community where she worked, others found such relationship-building to be more challenging.
Indeed, relief petitioners often viewed social workers and relief agents with skepticism, if not
outright disdain—disdain that often emerged from moments where poor Germans experienced
what they perceived as discrimination and unfairness at the hands of local welfare agents. These
same sentiments were expressed across the pre-war years of the Third Reich, from early in 1933
while the hardships of the Great Depression could still be felt straight through past 1938 when
the German economy could claim full employment. Ultimately, the Nazification of conceptions
of poverty often created an underclass of poor Germans who had difficulty claiming membership
in the national community simply because they had no job and could not make ends meet.
It was not uncommon for needy Germans to file complaints to their local welfare offices
about the attention or care they might (or might not) have received. Every Pfennig mattered for
destitute individuals, and often petitioners filed complaints over very small discrepancies in
relief. While some instances might have been resolved with relative ease, others found
themselves bitterly at odds with local welfare agents, where more than localized animosity came
to the fore. Indeed, as poor Germans complained about the treatment they received at the hands
of social workers, they simultaneously revealed their own worries about the new dynamics of
poor relief under Nazi rule.
Else Marschawski complained bitterly to her local welfare office in Charlottenburg that
she had not received the support to which she believed she was entitled. In July 1934,
Marschawski, who lost her wealth and engaged in a protracted battle with the German
government over her pension, insisted that she had only received 88.55RM when she had
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expected 99.20RM.80 She made numerous attempts to recover the monthly 10.65RM that she
believed was promised to her.81 Countless letters had been ignored. Numerous requests for
meetings had been denied. Marschawski even visited the relief office herself to demand an
answer—where she waited for over two hours and failed to meet with anyone.82
Having grown weary, Marschawski finally wrote directly to Karl Augustin, the mayor of
Charlottenburg, to express her frustration with her local social workers. She complained with
candor about her situation, arguing that never in her 50 years of life had she ever been treated in
such a way. “I cannot believe the current behavior of our city councilors,” she lamented.83
Along with being ignored, Marschawski claimed she was threatened by welfare workers who
also disparaged her character. This treatment not only offended her, but also, Marschawski was
certain, would disturb Hitler himself. “This goes against Hitler’s will,” she argued, “because he
wants only the best for the Volk, and he feels for the needy and the war-wounded.”84
Marschawski did not trust her local welfare office. She believed they actively worked
against her wellbeing by denying her the entitlement she was owed. Despite the NSV’s mission
claiming to support and protect the German people, Marschawski believed her local welfare
office actively worked against her, threatening and disparaging her. Worse, not only did the
Charlottenburg welfare office create untold challenges for Marschawski, but also it actively
worked against Hitler’s own will. The social workers who denied Marschawski her entitlement
also impeded the “wishes of the public,” interests that Hitler stood to protect.85
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Through her complaints, Marschawski revealed her own personal imaginings of German
social dynamics under the Third Reich. Her case is a nuanced one, for she already received relief
from Nazi welfare authorities and instead demanded that the relief office fulfill its obligations to
her. Nevertheless, her wellbeing was at stake and, in her mind, thousands of other Germans like
her.
Marschawski’s sentiments were by no means isolated. Many others also expressed the
same sense of abuse and powerlessness that she felt. Max Quaquill, another disgruntled Berlin
petitioner, took his discontent beyond written complaints. Quaquill hoped to borrow a black suit
and patent leather shoes from his local welfare office in Berlin. He was searching for a job and,
with his limited income, could not afford adequate attire for upcoming job interviews. However,
he experienced considerable difficulties once he met with his relief officers. According to
Quaquill, he met with an officer Beinke in October 1934 who, despite listening to Quaquill’s
requests, ignored him and ultimately threw him out of the office.86 Repeated attempts to borrow
the suit and shoes proved to be equally unhelpful for Quaquill. In a letter to municipal officials in
Berlin, Quaquill complained that the social workers in his Berlin office thought themselves to be
“little kings” and treated him abusively. His frustration grew until, after returning to his welfare
office again, forced his way into Beinke’s office and punched him in the face.87 Quaquill himself
fully admitted to the charge saying that he experienced shell shock while fighting in World War I
and as a result, he was “a little excitable.”88
Quaquill’s frustrations with his social workers persisted beyond the physical attack—for
which he was fined 50RM. He reported that welfare workers tried to bribe him before he could
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receive the benefits he was guaranteed, identifying specific agents who tried to extort him. In one
instance, a Berlin agent Bialluch kicked him out of his office after Quaquill would not pay a
bribe for relief. Along with bribes, he was relentlessly insulted and even threatened with
sentences in concentration camps—a threat he claims to have received on two different
occasions.89 Indeed, he described an especially preposterous scene when he attempted to visit his
welfare office to meet with the Oberexpedient of his Berlin office. After spending hours in the
waiting room, he claims never to have met with the supervisor. Instead, Quaquill claimed that the
supervisor tried to leave secretly so the two would not have to meet. According to Quaquill, he
spotted the supervisor trying to tiptoe down the hall unnoticed.90 All of these encounters made
dealing with his local relief office in 1934 a nightmare for Quaquill.
Quaquill, like Marschawski, met considerable resistance from relief officers. These
experiences inspired animosity beyond simple ordinary bureaucratic annoyance. Instead, they
incited within petitioners like Quaquill and Marschawski deep frustration about the direction of
German society. Because their needs were not met, poor Germans often felt unrepresented and
unheard. Quaquill worried that much of the ineptitude of his local welfare office emerged from
the Party nepotism so emblematic of the Nazi welfare system as a result of ideological
realignments. He lamented, “We should be hiring educated people of the highest quality, not
men who have risen quickly through the Party!”91 They even lamented a system that they believe
was unfairly biased against them. Quaquill worried sarcastically, “It is self-evident that the
unemployed are always guilty, and there is never any reason to question welfare workers.”92 At
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the heart of this sarcasm ultimately rested the fundamentals of Nazi ideology toward poor
Germans: that there was something critically wrong with the unemployed. All of this created a
system that ignored the needs of poor Germans and jeopardized, not improved, their wellbeing.
Quaquill concluded a letter of his demanding, “Soon you must create a league for human
rights!”93
These negative views did not emanate from a fundamental distaste for the Nazi regime.
They were not the sentiments of unruly or disruptive resistors. In fact, Quaquill and Marschawski
saw themselves sympathized and supported Hitler’s mission. Quaquill professed his support of
the Nazi Party. “I gave my vote to Hitler,” he claimed in an October 1934 letter to his welfare
officer.94 Marschawski too evoked Hitler’s name several times over the course of her
correspondence with welfare and municipal authorities. She praised Hitler, stating “Hitler is a
shining example to us.” She praised the new order that she believed Hitler would bring by
eliminating the “unclean elements” of German society too focused on their own ideas and
feelings. She felt sure that had Hitler heard about her injustice, the Führer himself “would begin
a cleaning” on her behalf.95
These sentiments reveal that, despite the hardships they experienced and the animosity
they encountered, Quaquill and Marschawski, among many other poor Germans, did not
completely reject the Nazi Party. They even seemed to admire and support Hitler’s mission,
seeming themselves as apart of Hitler’s plan. They believed—especially Marschawski—that
Hitler had their best interests in mind. The impediment was Nazi welfare. The relief programs—
aimed to ensure the strength and cohesion of the German people—in fact worked to divide the
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German Volk, driving a wedge between materially destitute and comfortable Germans. Where
ideologically speaking, Nazi interpretations of poverty claimed to work to strengthen the Volk,
many did not see it that way and viewed the practical implementation of that ideology to work
actively against a strong German society.
Conclusions
The German Association of Public and Private Welfare (DV) assembled in May 1938 in
Würzburg to discuss the state of German welfare in the Third Reich. The DV, originally founded
in 1880,96 aimed to coordinate collaboration between the various disparate German relief
organizations.97 The assembly brought together officials, organizers, and relief workers from all
across Germany from all different levels of administration. This once active assembly—despite
committing to regular annual meetings—had only met once before during the Third Reich, in
1933. Rather than protecting the interests of various private relief organizations in the German
Reich, it instead had become a mouthpiece for Nazi officials and social workers to present their
ideas about poor relief.
Oskar Martini delivered a keynote speech in which he commended the state of Nazi
welfare in the wake of the end of mass unemployment across the country.98 Since the 1920s,
Martini had been a prominent figure in German social work. Trained as a lawyer, Martini began
a career in social work in Hamburg in 1920 and eventually emerged as the president of the
Hamburg welfare office in 1936.99 In his speech, Martini celebrated Nazi welfare as an
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innovation in uniting German people. German relief initiatives had driven people apart in past
generations according to Martini. Divided along political, economic, and religious lines, Martini
argued that these groups only served their own special interests and generated social tensions
across German society. Now, under the guidance of National Socialism working toward the
wellbeing of the Volk, German welfare aimed to supersede these divisions to inspire unity
throughout society. He argued that Nazi welfare promoted “the deepest connection with the Volk
and the truest sense of comradeship.”100
His message rang with a sense of optimism and unity as he heralded what he called the
end of “mass unemployment” in Germany.101 By creating work, building and protecting families,
and educating young people, Martini sketched a bright future for the German Volk, “the focus of
all National Socialist Welfare.”102 Yet he spoke very decisively about the “welfare concept of
‘asocial,’” which he condemned as “dangerous to the community … who do not deserve welfare
relief but instead police violence.”103 His words pointed to habitual criminals as well as political
and “racial” enemies of the state, those who had been deemed “outsiders” of the German Volk.
Yet Marschawski and Quaquill along with thousands of other destitute Germans, were not
habitual criminals. They were not “racial enemies,” and they often even expressed sympathy and
support for Hitler’s vision of the future. Nevertheless, they experienced considerable challenges
from social workers. They were met with abuse. They were often told they did not deserve
welfare and, as a result, found themselves beyond the boundaries of the German Volk, all due to
their social status. While these individuals might not have disliked Hitler, they found deep and
unsettling problems embedded within the welfare apparatus itself and the ways in which it
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worked to divide, not unite, German society. While the end to unemployment might have
signaled progress for Martini, it also pointed ominously toward social exclusion for those who
could not work.
Over the course of the Third Reich, notions of poverty changed. While Weimar era
reformers sought to ground policy in social scientific research, Nazi-era social work transformed
poverty into a matter of party politics and moral integrity, affecting not just the ideological
underpinnings of poverty but also the institutional organization and the practical approaches to
poverty. Nazi officials demonstrated a general ambivalence toward socio-economic causes of
poverty and instead interpreted it as a moral threat which jeopardized the cohesion of the
German Volk and the integrity of future generations. In the world of the NSV, poverty did not
represent a socio-economic concern to be eradicated or a material impediment to individual but
instead an expression of moral vulnerabilities.
The Nazis projected onto poverty new moral meanings, intertwined with political
identity, and this changed the dynamics of social work under the Third Reich. Expertise and
education no longer constituted an important prerequisite for social work. Instead, party loyalty
played a critical role in determining competent “social work,” and this established a new
benchmark for expectations within the NSV.
Lastly, these new interpretations of poverty had to be applied in real-world settings. Yet
social workers themselves were pulled in countless different directions, expected to build trust
within the communities they worked while also serving the interests of the Nazi state. This meant
navigating the expectations both of Party functionaries and superiors as well as various expert
and professional circles and, as a result, combining the tactics and expertise of social work with
the exclusionary racism of National Socialism. Through its redefining of poverty, the NSV was
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able to use social work to draw boundaries of the Volksgemeinschaft and perpetuate a culture of
exclusion.

186

CHAPTER FOUR
“The First Act of the National Socialist Greater German Reich”:
Welfare and Exclusion in Eastern Europe, 1939-1941
Welfare work constantly evolved in the Third Reich. From a seemingly piecemeal
approach, welfare workers had begun to shape an apparatus that included more than just racial
discrimination. The very idea of poverty under Nazi rule was changing, and that meant welfare
and charity shifted from a social safety net into a Nazi vetting process, a mechanism for
identifying and supporting those most valuable members of the German Volksgemeinschaft. The
NSV, in particular, became a means of discriminating not just against Jews but also other social
“outsiders.” Such practices, however, could not remain contained within the borders of the pre1938 Nazi Germany, or Altreich. Indeed, just as the NSV waged its wars against poor Germans
in the Third Reich, the rest of Germany began mobilizing for a war against Europe. This chapter
investigates the relationship between Nazi poor relief and imperial ambitions. It argues that the
NSV, which invaded Poland along with the Wehrmacht in 1939, played a critical role in securing
Nazi imperial goals by transmitting German values and establishing a German presence in
occupied Europe. Ultimately, the values of National Socialist charity helped to usher Hitler’s
fantasies violence and destruction into Eastern Europe.
Adolf Hitler wished to master Europe.1 From his earliest writings in Mein Kampf, Hitler
expressed his ambition to see Germany expand beyond its borders. Hitler claimed, “Germany
will either be a world power or there will be no Germany.”2 For Hitler, Germany’s very identity
hinged on its ability to establish a worldwide dominion. The first step of this process, the means
by which Germany could prove its mettle and character on the world stage would be to assert its
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dominance over Europe. Hitler saw Europe not just as a critical store of valuable natural
resources but also a central fulcrum from which he could control the world.3
While scholars seldom debate Hitler’s own imperial aspirations, they do argue over how
Hitler hoped to realize these goals. How could Germany become a world power? Did Hitler have
any kind of plan? AJP Taylor’s classic argument presents Hitler as a conventional statesman who
lacked any extraordinary vision or articulate plan for world conquest.4 Taylor’s argument does
not insist that Hitler had no ambitions but simply that his fantasies existed simply as that—
fantasies with no real designs. Other scholars, like Andreas Hillgruber and Klaus Hildebrand,
argue that Hitler did, in fact, have a very clear imperial program to lead Germany to war and
ultimately establish a world dominion.5 No doubt Hitler’s own ideological aspirations themselves
shaped the direction and attitudes of National Socialism and its foreign policy. They alone,
however, cannot adequately explain Germany’s expansion.
Of course, Germany’s imperialist ambitions hardly originated with Hitler himself and
indeed have much deeper historical roots that stretch back into the 19th century. As a result,
historians have launched more probing inquiries about the systemic explanations for German
imperialism, beginning in the 19th and into the 20th centuries. Scholars have relied on
modernization theory to argue that Germany’s 20th century ambitions, including Hitler’s own,
have roots in rapid industrialization, as industrial and political elites together conspired to project
German interests both into Africa and Eastern Europe. 6 Others have expanded on this
modernization theory to describe what has been deemed “social imperialism,” whereby industrial
3
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and political elites, in particular Bismarck in his dealings with German workers, crafted imperial
ambitions to mediate and control social conflict.7 Still others, including Mark Mazower, insist
that Nazi imperial aims rested largely on geopolitical efforts to control the resources of Eastern
Europe. By controlling Europe, the Nazis believed they could control the world.8 Such
scholarship not only encouraged historians to look to the role that other groups played in shaping
Nazi foreign policy. It also they have encouraged a more historical approach to the matter of
Nazi expansion.
Recently, scholars have looked elsewhere, beyond the small cadres of social, commercial,
and political elites, to understand Nazi expansion across Europe. Götz Aly, for example, argued
that Nazism’s ideological program was not enough to convince ordinary Germans that
expansion, war, and genocide was in their own best interest. Instead, he looked at the spoils of
war, namely the appropriation and redistribution of Jewish wealth, as justification for support of
imperial expansion.9 He argues that the wealth accumulated by Nazi imperial expansion
benefited ordinary Germans to such a degree that it generated considerable support for the Nazi
regime—establishing a kind of welfare state from the spoils of war. Soldiers in particular, Aly
argues, stood to benefit materially from world war as they regularly sent back home to their
wives and families any number of valuables like jewelry and currency or even basic necessities
like food and clothing.10 Of course this scholarship has not gone without critique, and indeed
quite severe criticism of its methods and evidence.11 While the material-ideological dichotomy
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set up by Aly might not be altogether useful, he has nevertheless opened up interesting avenues
of inquiry regarding materialism and support of Nazi expansion efforts.
Not just soldiers and civilians within the Altreich, but ethnic Germans—Germans living
outside the recognized territorial boundaries of Germany—found they could benefit materially
from the persecution of Jews throughout Europe and the seizure of their property.12 Doris
Bergen, arguing for the conceptual malleability of the term “ethnic German,” demonstrates how
individuals could express “Germanness” through acts of violence and persecution against their
Jewish neighbors. Oftentimes this meant direct violence against a Jewish neighbor, but it could
also include informing local Nazi officers about the presence of Jews—resulting in their
deportation. These materialist ambitions were not limited just to German soldiers but expanded
to ethnic Germans, too, who hoped to claim the goods and belongings confiscated from their
Jewish neighbors and, in doing so, furthered the imperial ambitions of National Socialists.13
In spite of these materialistic interpretations, many scholars assert that ideology no doubt
played a central role in the development of Nazi imperial endeavor. Indeed in his foundational
work on the history of German imperialism, Woodruff Smith argues that the ideas that
culminated in Nazi imperial ideology contained within them a wide range of popular appeal.14
The pivotal concept of Lebensraum, for example, contained within it not just the violent fantasies
of committed racists but also romantic agrarianism.15 In this way, the Nazis expansionist
ideology had the power to forge together disparate groups and generate consensus. Other
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scholars have shown how the Nazis exploited fears about expanding Americanization and
Bolshevism to bolster their own nationalist interests as Germans faltered after World War I.16
Despite being “mere window-dressing” for establishing a Greater Germany, Nazis relied on
ideology to captivate a vulnerable German population and point them toward a seemingly
stronger future.17
Scholars of Nazi imperialism and expansion have created vibrant historical narratives.
These are stories that contain within them more than simply the roots of World War II. These
historical narratives help to explain the factors that contributed to unprecedented violent
exclusion and systematic genocide across Europe. Bound up in these explanations are dynamic
scenes, populated with marauding opportunists and rampant racists, from the highest-ranking
Nazis to ordinary German villagers. Since, scholars have written more nuanced narratives that
consider more seriously the ideological, materialist, and geopolitical conditions that contributed
to Nazi imperial expansion and war. However, what all these narratives share is the centrality of
exploitation, violence, and persecution to the Nazi imperial project in Eastern Europe.
It can be no surprise, then, that one dimension that scholars often overlook when
attempting to understand Nazi imperial violence is the role that, as counterintuitive as it seems
now, welfare and relief played in helping to achieve Nazi imperial ambitions. Under the banner
of German expansion, welfare agents and volunteers traveled in the wake of the Wehrmacht and
spread out to all corners of Europe. They established offices, evaluated cases, and distributed
goods to those deemed “needy.” As important as welfare agents were to the imperialist project,
these relief practices have remained largely absent from scholarship about Nazi war in the east.
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Often bound exclusively by the geographical and temporal boundaries of pre-World War II
Germany, scholarship about Nazi welfare practices does not generally investigate the extent, and,
more important, the consequences of welfare expansion throughout Europe. Perhaps the most
extensive investigation of relief during the war years, researched by Eckhard Hansen, remains
focused on domestic policy and institutional politics.18 Only recently have scholars began to
explore the NSV activities beyond the borders of the Altreich. Julia Torrie’s work highlights the
propagandistic role that the NSV played in supporting Wehrmacht operations in France while
Elizabeth Harvey’s study on women in the Nazi East shows that the NSV helped to promote
notions of “Germandom” abroad.19 Yet studies like Harvey’s and others do not confront directly
relationship between welfare and imperialism in a Nazi context. As a result, they have not yet
investigated any connection between the NSV and its relief practices and the violent exclusion in
occupied Europe.
This chapter explores the role that welfare played in facilitating and empowering Nazi
imperialism in the East. More than simply a domestic relief organization, the NSV had an active
and decisive role in Nazi efforts to expand into Europe. NSV agents followed close behind the
Wehrmacht as they marched through Eastern Europe. They helped to establish offices across
Western Europe, in places like the Netherlands, France, and throughout Scandinavia. NSV
officials and volunteers worked closely with SS officers from the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle,
VoMi, to care for “racially valuable” mothers, children, and families. They helped to distribute
goods to needy Germans and soldiers while also helping to educate and support resettling
18
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German families. Many of the services offered by NSV agents and volunteers closely resembled
the NSV program that developed in Germany during the pre-war years.
Just as has already been established that domestic welfare agents contributed to the
discrimination and subjugation of poor Germans and social outsiders before the war, this chapter
continues in this similar vein to establish a parallel relationship between welfare and violence
that developed in occupied Europe. Indeed, this chapter argues that welfare agents were
instrumental to the early stages of Nazi resettlement policy in the Eastern Europe, helping to
create the conditions under which the violent process of “reclaiming” Lebensraum for the
German Volk became possible. No doubt, the NSV cannot represent the sole explanation for this
unprecedented violence, especially considering scope of terror that unfolded in the East.
Nevertheless, by reconsidering the role charity played, this project opens new avenues to explore
a new set of agents and factors that contributed to Nazi imperial expansion.
Welfare workers did so in a number of different ways. First, by identifying and
supporting a select group of “acceptable” individuals, welfare workers drew boundaries between
insiders and outsiders of the German Volksgemeinschaft much in the same way they did in the
Altreich. Welfare agents helped to build not just an ideological boundary between “deserving”
and “undeserving” people but also helped to create a material divide between the two as well.
Second, they established familiar routines of work in occupied spaces. By creating offices,
establishing shelters, posting signs, and generally creating a presence, welfare workers began to
lay claim to foreign spaces. They remade characteristically “Polish” spaces—deemed by Nazi
occupiers as derelict and decrepit—to align with German expectations. In this way, NSV
workers and volunteers were among the first to begin the process of “reclaiming” European
territory on behalf of the German Reich.
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This proposes a heretofore unexplored connection between the morality of ordinary
practices of relief in the Altreich and the dynamics of exclusion of occupied Europe. Welfare
workers brought with them their expectations and values about both social welfare and Eastern
Europe with them as they followed the Wehrmacht into Poland. While the value systems
imported into occupied Europe cannot explain completely the extraordinary violence perpetrated
during the first years of World War II, it can begin to establish unexplored relationships between
ordinary life at home and imperial occupation abroad. The result is an investigation of a new set
of agents who participated in the exploitation and persecution of peoples across Europe. While
scholars have made connections between relief and persecution previously,20 never before have
the connections between violence and welfare been investigated in an imperial context.
This is not to suggest that the unprecedented display of violence was solely the result of
practices exported from the Altreich or that welfare practices in Nazi Germany were somehow an
exclusive laboratory for genocidal violence. To the contrary: just as welfare practices helped to
facilitate and reinforce the Nazi expansion so too did the experiences of war shape the meaning
and nature of Nazi welfare. In fact, factors like language—which was hardly a consideration for
relief workers in the Altreich—played an essential role in determining how relief was distributed
to those in need. Expanding throughout Europe and, in particular, into Eastern Europe meant
expanding into “enemy territory,” where more than just the general landscape changed.
As a result, this chapter looks at how world war and Nazi expansion contributed to the
ongoing making and remaking of welfare and charity under Nazi rule. To help understand this,
this chapter looks in particular to a question Elizabeth Harvey raises about “space in a territorial
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sense, and … what difference Nazi expansionism made to the conceptualization” of welfare and
poverty.21 The Nazi imperial project took welfare practices to places they had never before been,
and by doing so, fundamentally changed their scope and meaning. Relief agents, marching across
German borders, found themselves in new situations and encountered new groups of people.
Adapting to these new environments, they both drew on familiar techniques from home while
also creating new solutions to new “problems.” In doing so, welfare workers directly participated
in deepening the ideological divide between “Germans” and “non-Germans” and the material
divide and helped to solidify the racial hierarchies which made unprecedented violence possible
throughout occupied Europe.
Emergency Relief and “Community-Building” in Occupied Europe
On September 1, 1939, German soldiers invaded Poland. Nazi officials had already
begun to signal quite clearly their expansionist inclinations after the annexation of Austria and
Czechoslovakia in 1938, and increasing tensions in the “free” city of Danzig meant that the Nazi
army could mobilize once more.22 From a Nazi perspective, eastern German areas reported
“streams of refugees,” particularly from Danzig, fleeing the “terror of Poland” and violent threats
from the Poles.23 No doubt sensationalist, these perceived acts of aggression provided the pretext
for a Nazi invasion—while at once concealing any agreements about the partitioning of Poland

21

Elizabeth Harvey. Women in the Nazi East. P. 10. While Harvey’s inquiry explores the role of women—and
in this specific context, “womanly space”—she nevertheless provides a useful model for investigating the changes in
welfare and relief practices in occupied Europe.
22
Danzig, or Gdańsk, had been a part of West Prussia since the late 18th century and, as a result, developed a
considerable German population. Following the end of World War I, Danzig became a “free city” to be presided
over by the League of Nations—a decision that angered both the Poles, who had hoped to gain a considerable
industrial port, and the Germans. In 1933, the National Socialist Party won significant victories in the Danzig
Volkstag, effectively making the city a satellite of the Third Reich. See, for example, Carl Tighe, Gdansk: National
Identity in the Polish-German Borderlands. London: Pluto Press, 1990; Hans Leonhardt. The Nazi Conquest of
Danzig. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
23
Walter Hebenbrock. Mit der NSV nach Polen. Berlin: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1940, p. 7.

195

agreed upon between the Soviets and the Nazis.24 Once the invasion began, Nazi soldiers quickly
moved across Poland. They annexed Danzig on the first day and had conquered Warsaw,
formally taking control of the city by October 1. By October 8, the conquest of Poland was
ostensibly complete. Nazi officials had created two new Gaue from formerly western Polish
territory—Danzig-West Prussia and Wartheland—while also establishing a new administration,
the Generalgouvernment, to preside over parts of central Poland, run by long-time Nazi Party
member Hans Frank.25 While quick, the conflict was not easy. Around 16,000 German soldiers
died, while nearly 70,000 Poles lost their lives and just under a quarter of a million were taken
prisoner.26
Scholars have understandably focused their attention on the military activities that
constituted the opening moments of World War II, for these moments constitute the first steps of
the most devastating global conflict the world has ever seen. Yet as the Wehrmacht,
Einsatzgruppen, and the infamous SS-Totenkopf units invaded Eastern Europe, they did not do
so alone. It was not just military might that Hitler ordered into invade Poland. Indeed, the NSV’s
welfare agents and volunteers followed close behind, making relief workers among the first
agents to move into occupied Europe. Thousands of NSV workers along with around 1,300
affiliated women from the National Socialist Schwesterschaft mobilized. While this mobilization
of poor relief and support has largely gone unnoticed by historians, these relief efforts
nevertheless constitute a critical dimension of Nazi expansion efforts for the ways the NSV
sought to build relationships with local communities. Moving primarily with the 8th Army, the
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NSV transported thousands of agents along with hundreds of vehicles of supplies to embark on
community-building endeavors in Nazi-occupied Europe.
Much of the NSV’s account following the Wehrmacht has been recorded in the pamphlet,
Mit der NSV nach Polen, published in 1940. The pamphlet appeared in a series of Nazi
publications entitled “Erlebter Krieg,” along with other works like “Der Marsch nach Lowitsch,”
by Erhard Wittek.27 The publication, meant for a popular audience, follows various detachments
of NSV agents as they establish offices and begin relief projects in cities and villages across of,
what becomes known as, “former” Poland. It details over two months of activities, beginning
with the opening moments of the invasion of Poland and culminating—quite
propagandistically—with the triumphant arrival in Warsaw at the end of September.
Walter Hebenbrock, an NSV agent, wrote the work, though little is known about him, and
he left few clues in the text about his official title or position within the organization. One
historian has suggested that he worked for a specific emergency relief detail called the Hilfszug
Bayern, about which more will be explained below.28 While Hebenbrock does provide
considerable detail about the Hilfszug Bayern’s operations, nothing other than his knowledge of
the operation ties him specifically to the convoy in any way. The only other trace that
Hebenbrock left behind is an earlier article he published in the popular Nazi education
periodical, Der Schulungsbrief. This article, “Nationalsozialistische Wohlfahrtspflege ist
Gesundheitsdienst,” does provides a deep description of and statistics about the NSV’s various
projects but offers no information about Hebenbrock. The paucity of sources make it difficult to
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situate Hebenbrock professionally—much less glean any personal or sociological details.
Nevertheless, he reveals a strong professional commitment to Nazi welfare irrespective of the
professional or political capacity in which he served.29
While his formal relationship to the Nazi Party is unknown, Hebenbrock’s ties to the
NSV and the publication’s context—produced by the Nazis’ own central publishing house—
strongly suggest that the text’s character is propagandistic, as does the book’s stated purpose, “to
show the whole Volksgemeinschaft how the NSDAP and the NSV respond when they are
called.” Given this, the dispositions and characteristics attributed to ethnic Germans, Poles, Jews,
and other minorities must be scrutinized critically. This does not mean, however, that
Hebenbrock’s account is useless. It provides a close and unique look into the operations of the
NSV agents moving into Eastern Europe, and, perhaps more important, reveals how stereotypes
and prejudices against Poles, for example, were constructed by Germans in Eastern Europe. By
placing welfare workers at the center of his narrative, Hebenbrock demonstrates how practices of
relief featured centrally to project conceptions of German identity and Nazi ideology into Eastern
Europe.
Hebenbrock’s text portrays the NSV as a pivotal institution even before war had formally
begun. The vulnerability of Danzig, for example, figures prominently in the lead up to the
outbreak of war. Indeed during the summer months of 1939, NSV agents established their first
camp to support refugees fleeing “one threat after another” made by Poles toward German
Danzigers.30 They had also reportedly begun sending relief provisions to Danzig while eastern
German territories reported the “immense emergency among the ethnic Germans” who had been
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allegedly fleeing “the Polish terror.” Ethnic Germans, as opposed to Reichsdeutsche, were
groups of ethnic Germans who lived outside of Germany. Scattered across Eastern Europe in
places like Poland, the Baltic States, Bessarabia, and many other regions, ethnic Germans held a
privileged position in popular consciousness, especially in Nazi Germany foreign policy. In the
build-up and throughout World War II, Nazi propagandists relied on ethnic Germans to marshal
support for the war and justify expansion throughout Eastern Europe in particular.31 Hebenbrock
highlighted the perceived vulnerability of the ethnic Germans in Danzig and suggested to his
audience the deep investment NSV agents had made in the wellbeing of their displaced and
threatened comrades. So that even before the Wehrmacht marched across the border on
September 1, NSV agents had already begun to reach out to their “vulnerable” comrades.
According to Hebenbrock, the ethnic Germans experienced a state of emergency. This
narrative of emergency presented by Hebenbrock—along with other Nazi propagandists—
created a sense of continuity with domestic NSV policies before 1939. This sense of
emergency32, or Not, shaped critically the direction of Nazi relief programs. “The battle against
hunger and cold,” the tag line of the WHW, became one of the NSV’s most pervasive slogans.
Concerns about the wellbeing of the German family prompted the creation of the ubiquitous
Mutter und Kind program. These initiatives brought with them overwhelming propaganda
portraying Germans in as deeply at risk. Families, mothers, women, children, hard-working
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people, the Volksgemeinschaft itself: all of these entities fundamental to German identity were,
Hebenbrock claimed, under threat. 33
Without risk, without emergency, however, Germans could not sacrifice. And without
sacrifice, Germans could not build a spirit of national solidarity, perhaps the most central task of
the NSV. 34 Emergency, in fact, went hand-in-hand with the primary objective of the NSV:
promoting and establishing a sense of national solidarity. Programs like the WHW or Mutter und
Kind—as has been discussed previously—aimed to bring Germans together and to delineate the
boundary between insiders and outsiders. “National Socialist welfare has the great obligation,”
wrote Hermann Althaus, “to create strong and happy experiences for every last good-meaning
member of the Volksgemeinschaft.”35 This obligation extended not just to those Germans who
lived inside the Altreich’s boundaries. Indeed, the obligation to create “a connectedness among
the Volk” extended into newly acquired German territory: Austria, Sudetenland, and much of
Eastern Europe. Despite following behind the Wehrmacht and the infamously ruthless
Einsatzgruppen, welfare agents of the NSV moved into occupied Europe charged with a mission
of community-building—at least propagandistically speaking.
If central to the NSV’s work was the mission of “national solidarity,” then it might come
as no surprise that Nazi welfare agents moved quickly into newly-conquered European
territories. Initially, this “community building” project began immediately and hinged on the
distribution of emergency relief. Already mentioned were the loads of supplies that NSV
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officials had begun sending to ethnic Germans in Danzig. Once they crossed the border—the
first stop being Danzig—relief workers began distributing relief to mothers, children, and the
thousands of ethnic Germans seeking refuge in Danzig. However, relief workers moved across
Poland rapidly. By September 2, they were reporting for duty in Teschen. As early as September
3, NSV agents were ordered to begin operations in the city of Graudenz, a city just miles from
the German border with itself a large German population.36 Once they had arrived, NSV agents
immediately began to distribute relief and warm meals to more than 3,000 “needy comrades.”37
According to Hebenbrock, the demand for relief was unending. “Day and night,” he wrote, “the
telephone clattered. One telegram after another rolled through.”
The response to emergency manifested itself in a number of different forms. According to
accounts, NSV agents repaired boots, they darned socks. They distributed medicines. They
converted gymnasia into shelters. They delivered milk to infants. These are the small tasks that
could constitute NSV agents’ workdays. However once those agents arrived in Eastern Europe,
their primary task involved distributing material relief, mainly food and clothing, to local
communities. In particular, the NSV relied on the services of the Hilfszug Bayern to provide
support to needy individuals. This convoy, consisting of at least fifty field kitchens, provided the
materials and facilities to dole out large numbers of meals to those in need. 38 Beginning as a
local undertaking in Munich, the Hilfszug traveled to various Nazi events and local factories to
provide meals to needy German workers. Now its resources were directed eastward to support
needy soldiers and ethnic Germans.
36
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The Hilfszug had already made its way through newly-annexed places in Europe,
including the Sudetenland and Austria. Now the agents of the Hilfszug Bayern turned their
efforts toward Poland and travelled alongside the 8th Army.39 By September 30, 1939, the
Hilfszug Bayern had already made its way to Warsaw, which one agent described as “a proud
day.” Hebenbrock described the arrival as “a special day in the history of the NSDAP and the
NSV. Now the people of Warsaw will experience our mission.” 40 The agency brought with it
around 100 heavy vehicles laden with food and supplies. NSV workers prepared over 170,000
liters of warm soup and brought into Warsaw over 200,000 kg of bread.41
According to their own statistics, NSV agents distributed millions of portions of soup and
bread to Poles. Some 8.1 million portions of soup and 5 million portions of 500g bread were
distributed to Poles alone from September 30 to November 5, 1939.42 To their own ethnic
German comrades, NSV agents offered not just bread but also pork, beef, sugar, rice, honey,
various fish, and even tea and marmalade.43 In this way, the NSV helped not only to distinguish
on paper racial differences between “insiders” and “outsiders,” but indeed they worked to
establish a kind of social divide between those considered “German” and those deemed to be
“less.”
This kind of relief response in many ways resembled past experiences with Nazi
expansion. Upon annexation of Austria in March 1938, NSV officials poured in resources and
manpower. Hundreds of trainloads—including the Hilfszug Bayern—of food and clothing
quickly rolled across the border. According to the NSV’s own statistics, over two million
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Austrians received emergency aid from the agency, amounting to over 23M Reichsmarks worth
of aid.44 In addition to providing overwhelming emergency relief once arriving, the NSV wasted
no time establishing a permanent presence throughout Austria. The organization, not one year
after arriving, had already established nearly 2,000 Hilfs- and Beratungsstellen throughout the
seven Gaue in Austria. Along with these smaller shelters, NSV agents had begun hundreds of
kindergartens for children of varying ages as well as organizing welfare schools and education
seminars for its own aspiring agents.45 Once the invasion of Western Europe began in Spring
1940, these same kinds of tactics would be employed in France as well.46
Operations in Austria, like those in Poland, were perceived to have propagandistic value.
Austrian Volksgenosse suffered, NSV agents insisted, from a debilitating state of emergency
from which they needed to be rescued. Individual Austrians themselves expressed need for relief.
Henriette Wendling, a director of a kindergarten in Rosental—a small rural village in southern
Austria—reported that most of her children arrived to school malnourished. She painted a dismal
picture, suggesting that her students often arrived to school much too thin. Many of them, despite
only being between 4 and 5 years old, had begun to lose teeth.47 Similarly, Dr. Rudolf Mach48,
reporting from Weitensfeld, described the dire and “catastrophic” conditions in his hometown.49
Unemployment was rampant, homeless shelters were in disarray, and it was not uncommon to
find young boys and girls sleeping in barns for shelter.50
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These narratives also justified the invasion of Poland by the Wehrmacht and the NSV.
Wilhelm Janowsky, who would become the NSV Gauamtleiter for Schleswig-Holstein, cast the
Anschluss of Austria as a similar kind of “freeing” operation and that the NSV had a critical part
to play.51 A state of material emergency had gripped the Austrian people, demanding NSV
attention. Material deprivation could create deeper moral vulnerability and put at risk millions of
German kin.
Nazi ambitions across Europe were much bigger than simple occupation and “community
building.” Hitler wished to conquer Europe. He hoped to build an empire. And that required not
just the occupation of space—as the NSV had done once the Wehrmacht moved on across
Europe. It also meant transforming space.
Making Polish Space Familiar
The sounds of war swept quickly across the Polish countryside, through its cities, and
onward throughout Eastern Europe. In its wake, the NSV stayed and the overtures of war found a
more administrative accompaniment. The roar of gunfire met the diligent tapping of typewriters,
shuffling of files, and scratching of pens. Where German soldiers moved artillery and weapons,
welfare agents rearranged desks and filing cabinets. NSV workers opened offices in the wake of
an advancing Wehrmacht and soon began implementing familiar practices they conducted in
their local agencies back home. Agents reviewed files, evaluated cases, and distributed relief to
the eligible ethnic Germans who petitioned. These practices, however, constituted much more
than the mechanisms of poor relief. Instead, they represented the importation of customs and
values from the Altreich. By practicing relief beyond the borders of Germany, NSV agents began
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to establish a sense of familiarity in unfamiliar territory. One relief officer even commented,
“This is almost like home.”52
The NSV was not simply in the business of emergency relief. Since its inception, the
NSV had been intended as a critical mechanism for Nazi community building throughout the
Third Reich—however successful it actually was. It was in this same mode that the NSV sought
to establish a firm foothold in occupied Eastern Europe: working to create “community.” While
“community building” might have been a propagandistic goal, one aimed at building consensus
for Nazi war efforts across Europe,53 it still does not capture the agency’s broader mission in
Eastern Europe. “German” community could not be built in “Polish” space and, as a result, the
NSV had to make fundamental changes to their newly occupied landscape in order to make this
space suitable for German habitation. They had to establish Lebensraum, or living space, for the
German Volksgemeinschaft.54 This project meant not simply occupying space but indeed
“remaking” space, transforming it from its “Polish” character into something more suited for
German inhabitants. The NSV proved pivotal in this process. By setting up offices and
establishing work patterns, welfare agents started remaking occupied space, making it more
familiar and, in their eyes, more “German.”
NSV Reichsleiter Erich Hilgenfeldt gestured toward this deeper goal of transforming
foreign space in his foreword to Hebenbrock’s volume. He celebrated the NSV’s collaboration
with the Wehrmacht, stating, “It is but a matter of course,” he wrote, “that the NSV would help
the Wehrmacht to bring home old German lands,” casting the relationship as a foregone
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conclusion, as a natural collaboration.55 Together, the NSV and the Wehrmacht helped to
instigate the “Befreiung,” the “rescue” or “liberation” of “German spaces in the East.”56 Of
course while this relationship between relief and the army is important, but Hilgenfeldt’s new
fixation on space represents a critical shift in the mission of the NSV.
Indeed, Hilgenfeldt’s language represents, for the first time, a recognition of the NSV’s
mission beyond the borders of the Altreich. The efforts of the NSV had previously focused
almost exclusively on domestic issues. Its primary initiatives, the Mutter und Kind and
Winterhilfswerk (WHW), worked to rehabilitate and bolster the German Volksgemeinschaft
through education and material relief. Collection days like the Day of National Solidarity and the
Day of German Police aimed to build relationships in German communities. As noted in
previous chapters, shifting conceptions of poverty under Nazi rule meant that relief often lost
economic and social dimension, resulting in a distinct focus on the moral make-up of individuals.
So that when the NSV began to turn eastward after September 1939, it assumed new
responsibilities and took on new practices that manifested themselves in new obligations abroad.
The NSV’s distinct turn eastward, not just physically—in terms of marching out toward
Poland—but also ideologically, put the organization in line with a long-standing fascination with
the East by many of National Socialism’s highest-ranking officials. In Mein Kampf, Hitler
himself spoke at great length about the relationship between Germany and Eastern Europe. Yet
he was not the only one with distinct ideas about Germany’s eastward fixation.57 Other central
Nazi figures, including Josef Goebbels and Heinrich Himmler, had romantic fantasies about the
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possibilities of the East. They imagined the German Volk could grow and thrive there, but first it
had to be “freed” from the “subhuman” inhabitants who occupied it.
The German obsession with the East of course predates National Socialism and was by
no means exclusive to the movement either. Popular literature, like travel books, described
enthusiastically Eastern Europe’s potential.58 This popular fascination was bolstered by academic
research.59 Building on a relatively new discipline of “Eastern European Research” that emerged
at the turn of the 20th century, Nazi scholars conducted research on Eastern Europeans used to
justify a special historical racial hierarchy and assert Germans as the supposed bearers of culture
and civilization.60 National Socialists managed to capture a wide range of imaginings and desires
about the East and harness them toward a singular goal.61 Hitler made such imaginings a
centerpiece of his foreign policy. And once the Wehrmacht invaded Poland, the NSV became a
central feature of that policy.
This not to suggest, however, that the NSV’s program had never before considered
foreign policy or developments beyond Nazi borders. Indeed, many of Nazi Germany’s border
regions saw the NSV as a critical agent in protecting notions of “Germanness” in the face of
foreign encroachment—especially from the East. The physical presence of the NSV was a tactic
that Nazis had used before, even prior to any acquisition of new territory invasion of Eastern
Europe. Whereas most historians focus on the NSV as an exclusively domestic institution that
served the needs of the German population, it was not without a more outward-looking program.
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East Prussian authorities, for example, met with NSV agents in August 1935 to establish
kindergartens and youth centers on Germany’s borders, perceived to be vulnerable to Eastern
influences.62 In other regions, including Western Prussia, local authorities requested funds that
would bolster nearby NSV schools and education programs. These programs attracted students
from across Germany and provided opportunities for what Elizabeth Harvey has called
“borderland activism,” efforts by Germans and, in particular, women to contain any threat that
Polish influences might have on German borderlands. Along with many different organizations
like the Reichsluftschutzbund and the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA) that
facilitated activities and initiatives to promote Germandom in border regions, the NSV became a
critical stronghold for the promoting and protecting of German ideals in the face of external
threats.63
Even before their move into Poland then, welfare agents and relief programs had been
recognized by Nazi authorities as critical propagators of German identity. More than just
“community builders,” then, NSV agents were seen by municipal authorities as effective
protectors of “Germanness.” Education and relief programs constituted a central part of that
defense. While the bulk of the NSV’s early work in Poland might have been improvised material
relief, relief agents quickly set about establishing more permanent footing in Poland. Barely two
weeks after arriving, the organization had already set up ten separate local offices across
Warsaw, having already divided the city into various administrative districts that much
resembled the administrative Kreise in Germany.64 They established a complex card catalog
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system by which to document and monitor those eligible for relief and the amount of relief that
each petitioner received, the same kind of Karteikarten system on which relief workers relied in
Germany. Much more than simply establishing poor relief in occupied Europe, these practices
and facilities helped to establish continuity with relief practices in Germany.
Not long after, the NSV established more concrete laws about distributing emergency
relief for those in Poland. On October 15, the Special Commissioner for the NSV in Warsaw
Karl Janowsky issued directives which restricted who could receive relief from the NSV.65
Needy Poles, beginning on October 25, had to register with local NSV authorities to be eligible
for emergency relief. Petitioners had to provide basic personal and biographical information as
well as detailed descriptions of their economic circumstances and proof of need. Once submitted,
petitions were reviewed multiple times before provisions were approved. The directive ended by
stating definitively, “The Jewish population is excluded from support.”66
These initiatives, in many ways, resembled the same kinds of efforts that NSV officials
and workers practiced in local branches across Germany. They registered local petitioners,
scrutinized their cases closely, and made decisions accordingly. Much like at home, “need”
hardly carried with it any kind of socio-economic relevance. While, as statistics demonstrate,
NSV agents did provide some material support to Poles who did not qualify as ethnic Germans,
they hardly offered relief substantial enough to alleviate suffering in the long term. In doing so,
they not only helped to build racial hierarchies in Poland by identifying “deserving” recipients
according to various subjective factors, but also they privileged them by providing much needed
material support and education opportunities—very often at the direct expense of those deemed
to be below them.
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These new relief laws formally began the NSV’s stay in Poland and signaled the start of
their efforts to remaking the space in which they worked. These formal rules separating Poles
and Germans signaled publicly the NSV’s intentions to categorize individuals. With that came a
similar kind of marking of space. Hitler himself in Mein Kampf argued that the remaking of
space was essential to the establishment of Lebensraum for the German Volk.67
“Polish” space was marked with any number of signifiers and symbols. Where NSV agents
perceived general apathy or disorder, this was deemed to be “Polish” space. This “enemy space,”
Feindesland, was often defined by the perceived characteristics of the individuals occupying it.
NSV agents labeled cities like Skierniewice as “Polish” space not because of their geographical
location but because of the destruction and disorder agents claimed to find upon entering—and
disregarding the fact that the Wehrmacht had been through and ruthlessly annihilated groups of
Polish resisters--violence Hebenbrock described as “appropriate.” 68 Nevertheless, it was in these
spaces that the ethnic Germans were perceived to be “vulnerable” and “victimized.”
More than just perceived destitution signaled “Polish” space to NSV agents. Specific
symbols also expressed to relief workers more deliberate signs of Polish nationalism. Upon
entering the village of Zduńska Wola in late September, a town not far from Lodz, NSV agents
passed a large statue of Mother Mary guarded by a German soldier.69 While for some, it stood as
a revered symbol of the mother of Christ. However, for Nazis, the relationship between Roman
Catholicism and Polish nationalism was undeniable.70 As a result, NSV agents read the statute as
a direct affront to German ideals. Nevertheless, a Wehrmacht soldier stood guard of the statue so
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the structure would not be defaced. Hebenbrock reported sarcastically, “We cannot destroy this
inflammatory Polish thing so as to not feed the world horror stories about the defacing of
religious monuments.”71
Moments like these highlight the relationship between space and identity that welfare
agents forged in occupied Europe. Similarly one worker, while entering the city of Lodz, noted
that the city “was never pretty.” He estimated that fewer than 100 meters of “respectable roads”
had been paved and one could not escape the “overbearing squalor” of the city.72 Łódź,73 in
Hebenbrock’s account, represented a chilling example of the “backwardness” to which ethnic
Germans had been exposed. These spatial identities held by welfare agents shaped the ways that
workers evaluated both the Ethnic Germans and other local individuals.
In order to become suitable for German habitation, to become proper Lebensraum, this
space needed to be remade. And the NSV represented one of the first agencies involved in that
remaking. In Lodz, a number of NSV agents seized living quarters at the Hotel Savoy. About the
accommodations, one officer commented, “We must get accustomed to this filth and bid farewell
to German cleanliness.” Yet the same officer expressed his surprise upon entering the Łódź NSV
headquarters for the first time. “Out of contaminated spaces, we have created a bright, friendly
agency from which NSV work can be led.”74 The metaphor here is undeniable and speaks the
NSV’s broader project of “remaking” Polish space into German space.
Spatial reconfiguration took many different forms. NSV agents built one of the first
refugee homes in Poland in Łódź just days after arriving. Perhaps not surprisingly, they operated
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out of a German evangelical church, St. Johanneskirche, which stood in the city since 1880.
Twenty-five volunteer women ran the home and, within the first ten days, they tended to over
2,000 ethnic Germans.
Much in the same way that the WHW inundated public space to claim it on behalf of the
NSV, relief agents followed the same kinds of tactics once they moved into Poland. The NSV
posted badges throughout town to announce the arrival of the agency. Signs adorned walls letting
needy petitioners know where they could apply for relief. In the city of Łódź, NSV agents draped
banners across the town square that read “Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt.”75 The NSV
did not simply claim space, but also it advertised the agency’s presence. No doubt this served a
practical objective to let those in need know where to register. It served ideological purposes as
well. This contributed to the remaking of space that weighed so heavily in Nazi conceptions of
Lebensraum. These same signs, badges, and placards hung on buildings, lamp posts, and doors in
German villages, too.
These kinds of gestures changed “Polish” space and made occupied Europe feel “almost
like home” to relief workers. And for Hebenbrock, this work had a much deeper meaning. About
those ethnic Germans who received relief from the new institutions and programs organized in
Poland by the NSV, Hebenbrock wrote, “They experienced the first act of the National Socialist
Greater German Reich.”76 The NSV substantiated bonds between newly occupied Europe and
the Altreich. Yet to do so meant to reinforce hierarchies and to subjugate violently indigenous
populations. It meant interpreting space and, as a result, culture as inherently hostile and relying
on tactics of relief to obliterate that culture. While movements of troops, capture of cities, and
occupying of space meant that Nazi influence was expanding throughout Eastern Europe, these
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acts, for Hebenbrock, did not constitute the “saving” or “freeing” that Hilgenfeldt discussed in
the foreword of the volume. Instead, it was the activities of the NSV which confirmed the bonds
between the Altreich and the new occupied East.
Resettlement and Defining the “Volk”
If Nazi authorities hoped to remake Eastern Europe into “Germanic” space, to “reclaim”
this lost space, then the NSV and its operations proved pivotal to the remaking of that space.
They did not simply occupy space. Procuring space and imbuing it with a sense of “Germanness”
was one task. However, it could not be completed without the selective removal and resettlement
of people. Nazi resettlement policy ultimately changed some of the NSV’s obligations and
expectations. With the invasion of Eastern Europe came efforts to “reclaim” and inhabit
Lebensraum—space into which the German Volksgemeinschaft could grow.77 Nazis worked to
transform radically the landscape of Eastern Europe by deporting elsewhere Jews, Poles, and
other “less valuable” peoples out of this newly occupied land.
Now that Nazi organizations like the Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt der SS (RuSHA) and
the Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (RKF) had been created to oversee
both the removal of “foreign” populations from the Greater German Reich and to resettle ethnic
Germans into newly-acquired German Lebensraum effectively, the obligations of the NSV and,
as a result, the ultimate meaning of Nazi welfare changed dramatically. These two organizations,
both formed after the invasion of Poland, meant that Nazi resettlement policy could unfold
rapidly. Upon arriving in Danzig, Hebenbrock expected to find over 12,000 ethnic Germans in
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need of assistance, ethnic Germans who would eventually be evaluated and transported
accordingly.78 The NSV took part in the screening, selecting, removing, and resettling of Eastern
Europeans and, in doing so, helped to spread Nazi perceptions of racial hierarchy throughout
occupied territory. This new obligation to the East meant new tactics of screening and new
policies of evaluating “Germanness.”
Identifying “ethnic Germans” proved tenuous. This no doubt reveals the tenuous nature
by which the concept of “ethnic German” was defined.79 The varied means by which Eastern
Europeans sought to lay claim to this signifier—either through language or some other
ambiguous signifier like “character”—that they understood how vulnerable and malleable the
term was. Some went as far as to attack violently their Jewish neighbors to demonstrate to
German evaluators the extent of their “ethnic German-ness.” Yet welfare workers for the NSV
played a central role in solidifying the rules according to which “ethnic German” could be
practically defined. They represented an interface where Poles, for example, could put their
“volkdeutsch” characteristics on display—for better or worse.
Language emerged as a persistent theme as welfare officers evaluated petitioners’ “need”
in Poland. This signaled a distinct change in the way that need had been evaluated in the Altreich
where language seldom factored into evaluations. Instead, as been noted previously, relief agents
began to evaluate more “racial” background and, rather than need, the “moral character” of
petitioners. Nevertheless, language had always constituted an essential part of German identity in
a National Socialist context. And even when language often seldom factored into NSV relief
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evaluations before the outbreak of World War II, it still occupied a privileged position when
evaluating German identity.80
One relief worker recounted a “nice experience” while working at an office in Poland. A
man came into an NSV office claiming to be an ethnic German, but he carried with him no
papers or identification. Not only did he claim to be an ethnic German, but also he insisted that
he had been a member of a German commando squadron at one time. He then began shouting
military commands throughout the office, “Stand still!” “Look left!” “Now right!” “Battalion
return!” He then began naming off his regiment and battalion commanders, yet, the relief worker
recalled, he spoke very poor, broken German aside from these military commands. When the
welfare agents commented on his poor German and suggested he visit the Polish relief agency,
he insisted he would not leave and that he “would take his own life” if he was not recognized as
a German. The agent finished his account by stating, “We did not recognize him as a German,
and he did not kill himself.”81
The nonchalance about suicide is certainly striking. It belies both a deep suspicion about
the veracity of the man’s account as well as a general indifference about his ultimate fate. Yet
this anecdote also reveals how the evaluation of petitioners had begun to change in occupied
territory. In this case language played a critical role in assessing the petitioner’s stake to the
Volksgemeinschaft. Because the petitioner, at least according to the account, could not
demonstrate any real command over the German language, no NSV agent trusted the story he
presented. His lack of command of the German language so undermined the story that welfare
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agents saw no need to evaluate further. Indeed, they had been so convinced of his “non-German”
status that they were willing to let the man kill himself.
Of course, language was not the only new criteria that relief officers considered as they
evaluated potential needy ethnic Germans. In other instances, NSV agents paid close attention to
the behaviors, characteristics, and dispositions of individuals. On the streets of Łowicz, Polish
farm women peddled fruits and vegetables. Young Polish boys with “their familiar Polish caps”
hawking “anything not nailed or bolted down.”82 Other evaluators suggested, “The Poles appear
very uninterested and have little proclivity for work.”83 Filled with unruly vagrants and peddlers,
the streets of Łowicz closely resembled, in the eyes of German occupiers, the seemingly manic
and amoral urban spaces of Weimar Berlin, to which Nazi police responded with overwhelming
force during the War Against Beggars in September 1933. These same moral standards were
applied to the evaluation process that welfare agents practiced in occupied Europe.
In this way, the NSV helped to clear newly conquered territory. Those ethnic Germans
deemed “racially valuable” could be transported to camps to begin the resettlement process back
to the Altreich or into new German Lebensraum. Others—namely Poles and Jews—were
transported to the newly-formed Generalgouvernment in central Poland, forced into ghettos, and
experienced a horrific fate. While seemingly achieving Nazi foreign policy goals, this process
created considerable tension not only with Germans but also sparked dissonance about the very
notion of “Germanness.” Indeed, the criteria of language proved much trickier as ethnic Germans
resettled among Germans. Even if their command of the German language proved acceptable by
NSV officials, that did not mean that it was their language of choice. Many businesses and
officials complained about the increase Polish speaking they heard as a result ethnic German
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resettlement. One factory manager from Braunkohlen- und Brikett-Industrie in Mückenberg
wrote to complain that while German might be used in an official capacity, Polish can be heard
regularly in the streets, markets, inns, and restaurants. “Under no circumstances,” he complained,
“will we endure this situation any longer.”84 As a penalty for those who spoke Polish in his
factory, the manager proposed that on the first offense, a fine of one-half day’s income would be
assessed. Upon the second offense, the police would be alerted.85
Writing from the most eastern reaches of Oberschlesien, this factory manager no doubt
encountered a host of ethnic Germans resettled in German territory.86 Yet perhaps more
revealing is the disconnect between the NSV’s work and the realities of resettlement. These
identities, which Nazis held as binary, proved to be much more malleable and diverse.87 Nazi
propaganda, and in some cases Germans too, dealt in absolutes. The factory manager from
Mückenberg insisted, “It is self-evident that the members of the German Volk must only speak
German.”88 An essential dimension of German identity to both this factory owner and as
expressed through Nazi propaganda made this claim. Yet those recognized as ethnically
German—members of the German Volk—often defied these expectations to a degree that
enraged members of the German population. This process, as a result, further laid bare the
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contentious nature of defining “ethnic German” and the complications that this malleability
caused Germans.
Once ethnic evaluation took place, the NSV worked with the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
(VoMi) to arrange resettlement into the Altreich or other newly seized spaces in Europe. The
VoMi began in 1935 as an organization tasked with monitoring and organizing outreach
initiatives for ethnic Germans. Gradually over the course of the 1930s, Heinrich Himmler
worked the organization into the fold of the SS.89 Once World War II began and Nazi forces
conquered territory across Eastern Europe, the VoMi became a pivotal organization in the
resettlement of ethnic Germans into this newly-occupied space.
Along with evaluating potential resettlement candidates, NSV agents also bore the
responsibility of providing adequate food and clothing for resettled families. This meant
arranging collections and coordinating logistics to ensure that VoMi camps had sufficient
supplies to accommodate incoming charges. One VoMi camp in Landsberg, a small Kreis in
southern Bavaria, requested a whole host of supplies to accommodate the new ethnic Germans
arriving to the camp. The local NSV administrator had requested ten pairs of men’s shoes, fifteen
pairs of women’s shoes, twenty-five pairs of children’s shoes, sixteen women’s shirts, and thirtysix children’s shirts along with clothing for toddlers. Welfare agents constantly worried that
ethnic Germans would not have suitable clothing. Often, when families took care to pack, they
would bring nice “Sunday clothes.”90 Those who had no time fled with only scraps of clothing or
nothing at all.91 NSV agents, then, sought out appropriate “work” clothes, including pants, shirts,
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and boots, to accommodate relocating ethnic Germans. Among other things, NSV agents were
ordered to find bedding, duvets, and pillows for families as well.92 All of these things, which
contributed to the Lagerstimmung, or mood of the VoMi camp, were essential elements in caring
for resettling ethnic Germans.
Along with supplying any number of resources, NSV agents were often entrusted with a
plethora of odd jobs to help facilitate VoMi activities. Often agents had to oversee the logistics
of train travel for ethnic Germans back to the Altreich.93 Indeed NSV agents were reprimanded
by Regierungsrat Dr. Bethke in Lodz for oversights in transporting of an ethnically German
family back to Germany.94 They tracked down lost baggage and ensured that it eventually
arrived at its rightful destination.95 Finally even party planning fell at the door step of NSV
agents, as relief workers were expected to find suitable party favors for a Christmas party for
ethnically German families.96
These new obligations to the VoMi placed the NSV at the center of the Nazi resettlement
project as they cared for the wellbeing of resettling ethnic Germans. Nevertheless, this stretched
the resources of the NSV quite thin. The number of resettled ethnic Germans in VoMi camps
grew over the course of the first two years of World War II, and this created considerable tension
domestically. As early as 1940, VoMi camps in Gau Bavaria, for example, could not provide
incoming ethnic Germans with suitable clothing. Local NSV welfare agents put out orders to
collect old clothes that could be repaired.97 These kinds of collections became increasingly
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common over the course of the war, as the Nazi war economy increasingly restricted the kinds of
resources available to the general population. As the NSV’s responsibilities increased, so too
their resources began to dwindle—an issue that created considerable tension with
Reichsdeutsche receiving benefits. Perhaps nowhere is this tension demonstrated more than
during a nationwide shoe collection drive organized during the Fall of 1941. From 15-27
September 1941, collectors canvassed streets and plazas asking for Germans to donate any kind
of footwear.98 The war time economy and goods had become scarce, especially shoes. As a
result, Germans hardly understood what was asked of them. Especially in rural areas, Germans
viewed the collection drive as “absurd.”99
The NSV diverted a substantial amount of resources to VoMi camps as ethnic Germans
flooded in following the outbreak of World War II. Additionally, after an agreement between
Hilgenfeldt and Himmler, the NSV also took on the responsibility of caring for those “reGermanizible” people—individuals ethnically different from but potentially useful to the
German Volk.100 This signaled a considerable shift in priorities for the NSV because of the way
it diverted attention away from the German citizens who had been receiving relief before the
war. Still maintaining its domestic program—including the WHW which continued to be wildly
productive over the course of the war–the new obligations of the NSV hardly changed its
mission but had dramatic implications for the Greater German Reich more broadly. Relief
agents, by serving as evaluators, caretakers, and facilitators essential to the Nazi resettlement
project, the NSV’s own operations helped to shape the racial and social dynamics of the Greater
German Reich. In doing so, however, the NSV signaled not just a definitive shift in its own
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priorities. It also signaled to German citizens that Nazi interests ultimately lay beyond the
borders of the Altreich.
Conclusions
By the end of 1939, over a million members of the NSV lived beyond the borders of the
Altreich, and the agenda of the NSV had begun to change dramatically. 101 By projecting
“community building” beyond the borders of the Altreich, NSV agents expanded the scope of
their work to new geographic spaces. The NSV had begun to look eastward, and these new
operations proved critical to Nazi imperial ambitions and, indeed, facilitated the mechanisms of
persecution, exclusion, and violence that has come to characterize Nazi imperialism in Europe. If
these welfare agents hardly fit the image of a marauding opportunist or programmatic antiSemite, they nevertheless promoted through their work the racial hierarchies and social
persecution that attended their work in the Altreich.
When the NSV moved into Poland, it signaled a definitive shift in relief policy and
practice for the organization. While National Socialists had already demonstrated an obsession
with Eastern Europe, the welfare organization now developed a foreign policy of its own--one
that fell in line with the Nazi leadership’s eastward gaze. Where the army had conquered, the
NSV began claiming by hanging placards, signs, and banners bearing the organizations insignia.
In small ways, NSV agents began to “reclaim” spaces—establishing offices and camps, replacing
“Polish disorder” with “German Sauberkeit.” Even to the degree that space even became
“familiar” to some, welfare agents in Poland helped to establish a narrative which both vilified
and openly persecuted indigenous Polish populations. This worked to normalize Nazi racial
hierarchies in the occupied East.
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No doubt Hebenbrock’s account of the NSV’s mobilization east proves problematic for
historians due to its propagandistic nature. Even so, his propagandistic mode can be interpreted
not necessarily as a hindrance. In fact, Hebenbrock’s work can be read as an ideological
expression of NSV foreign policy. His work helps to establish important continuities with pre1939 NSV work and, as a result, critical continuities between the Altreich and the Greater
German Reich.
Nevertheless this chapter demonstrates that the NSV, which had before lacked the
historical attention in Nazi empire-building, proved essential in facilitating National Socialist
expansion eastward. Welfare agents helped to realized long-held conceptions of Lebensraum in a
very real sense by transforming “Polish” space into “German” space, and ultimately facilitating
the violent process of resettlement.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Destitution and Total War: Making Ends Meet at the End of World War II, 1942-1945
The arrival of total war in Germany sparked a monumental shift in perceptions of need in
among German civilians. Allied bombings destroyed material goods and supply lines. Ration
restrictions meant that basic necessities were increasingly scarce. The increasingly dire material
conditions on the German home front meant new and unprecedented challenges for the NSV.
This chapter explores how total war shaped Nazi relief efforts. The NSV’s uncompromising
ideological commitments inhibited the amount of relief it was prepared to distribute,
exacerbating the material destitution that many Germans faced. Consequently, Germans began
reevaluating their communal bonds with one another and reconsidered the applicability of Nazi
ideals of Volksgemeinschaft to their situation. To survive the war, Germans began to reimagine
the limits of permissibility that shaped their imagined communities. They did not jettison values
of collectivity, but they did not hesitate to act on their own individuality, even when it meant
transgressing the Nazi social norms that were crumbling around them.
Almost as quickly as the NSV began to plant its roots into Eastern Europe and assist in
claiming Nazi Lebensraum, the tides of war changed. Nazi Germany’s grotesque and violent
march across Europe extended into the Soviet Union after Hitler violated Molotov-Ribbentrop
non-aggression pact by commencing Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941. Much to the
surprise of the Nazi Supreme Command as well as Germans back home, the German army was
beaten back at the Battle of Stalingrad at the beginning of February 1943 and would never regain
its offensive momentum. The military situation had become more difficult for the Wehrmacht,
and a path to victory seemed increasingly unlikely.
As the German army retreated and the situation on the eastern front deteriorated,
conditions on the German home front became much more perilous. Allied forces began making
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regular bombing raids across Germany, attacking populated urban centers and valuable industrial
hubs. On February 14, 1942, Royal Air Force Bomber Command issued a directive sanctioning
the pervasive bombing of German industrial centers with the intention not just to destroy German
military production and but also to shatter civilian morale. Historian Ralf Blank argues that no
dimension of German life went untouched after air raids increased following the first years of
World War II.1 The faint overtures of the early 1940s soon crescendoed into an unbearable
symphony of fire and destruction. Strikes against Lübeck, Cologne, and Rostock in Spring 1943
demonstrated the new intent of the Allied bombers. Soon the Battle of the Ruhr in March 1943
targeted Germany’s most densely industrial region, battering cities like Essen, Dortmund, and
Wuppertal. Few cities witnessed the level of devastation wrought on Hamburg in July 1943 as
Allies executed Operation Gomorrah. According to surveys conducted by United States troops
after the end of the war, estimates suggest between 34,000 to 38,000 individuals died while and
possibly one million were evacuated.2 Soon, Nazi Germany found itself teetering on the brink of
destruction as Europe deteriorated into horrific scenes of violence and devastation.
The attacks on Hamburg represent a distinct turning point for those living through World
War II inside Germany. The earliest Allied attacks in 1940 were focused on specific military
targets, for Allied bombers were reluctant to unleash indiscriminate bombing on German civilian
populations. In fact, initial raids in early 1940 were light and often caused more spectacle than
destruction.3 However, by 1942, Allied Bombers—predominantly led by the British Royal Air
Force—began targeting civilians in populous cities like Berlin and Hamburg along with more
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strategic industrial targets, including the coal mines and power plants of the Ruhr Valley that
powered much of Germany.4 Certainly some cities suffered more destruction than Hamburg did
in July 1943. Kassel, for instance, lost a higher percentage of citizens than Hamburg after its
attack in late October 1943.5 Darmstadt, Pforzheim, Dresden, and Swinemünde, like Hamburg,
all endured single raids in which casualties numbered beyond 10,000. However, Operation
Gomorrah, the Allies’ codename for the attack on Hamburg, was a historically significant crisis
for how it was interpreted by home front civilians. Germans on the home front for the first time
began to reap the consequences of the genocidal seeds they themselves had sown across Europe.
Through these tactics, Allied bombers signaled “the erosion of the principle of noncombatant
immunity” and ushered total war into the Reich.6 In spite of the material and psychological
battering that Germans experienced over the next two years, they nevertheless endured until
Allied troops breached the borders of Germany and occupied Berlin itself in May 1945. This
paradox—civilian commitment in the face of certain defeat—has inspired invigorated inquiry
into the relationship between the Nazi state and German society during World War II as scholars
attempt to explain why Germans held out for so long.
After decades of relative silence on the dynamics of German society during the war,
scholarship on the subject of the social dynamics of the German home front began to emerge
toward the end of the 20th century. Scholars have relied on various models of consent and
coercion to explain civilian commitment to the war effort. Indeed, a boom in scholarship around
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the late 80s explored the nature of German “resistance” to Hitler’s regime where some, like
Joachim Fest, argued that Germans remained relatively supportive of the Nazi regime during the
war while others like Martin Broszat explored the various nuances of German resistance and
non-compliance. 7
Historians have turned to everything from wartime propaganda to prescient prewar
economics as sources of inspiration for popular consent which compelled home front civilians to
support a seemingly losing war effort.8 These explanations, however, have their limits, and
scholars quickly problematized these interpretations. Wartime propaganda, according to Gerald
Kirwin, lost its power to mask effectively the realities of Germany’s wartime situation. Certainly
civilians felt emboldened during the first moments of Allied bombing, but Nazi propaganda
failed “in substituting for this real world of military debacle an ersatz propaganda world” in
which military victory was imaginable in the face of Allied bombing.9 Mark Roseman similarly
argued that Nazi economic policy could only provide limited social stability. Since German
rearmament and wartime preparations, he argues, began during the first Four Year Plan in 1936,
civilian society actually changed very little during the first few years of World War II. It was not
until 1942 and 1943, when civilians arguably could no longer rely on Nazi institutions for
protection, that German popular support of the Nazi regime plummeted. Nazis then turned to
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coercion and terror—including compulsory work laws and severe criminal punishment, along
with extrajudicial violence against citizens—to compel civilians to support the war effort.
When public support for the war began to fail, Nazis turned to coercion. Historians have
highlighted, especially during the last moments of the war, a pronounced spike in violent
Gestapo repression amid widespread institutional collapse, for example, in the Rhineland as
Allied forces breached western German borders.10 Robert Gellately highlights the increasing role
of the Gestapo and violence for organizing German society, particularly toward the end of the
war. Even a hint of resistance was met with severe punishment, though, he argues, Germans still
largely expressed their support for a Nazi dictatorship.11 Contrastingly, Peter Fritzsche points to
perceptions by German civilians that Hitler had “declared war on us” to highlight the extent of
violence wrought by Nazi officers on German civilians in particular regions to maintain order in
the last moments of the war.12 More recently, Dietmar Süß also favors an interpretation of the
German home front that places coercion at the center of social cohesion. In particular, Süß
highlights the increasing role that local Party leadership in the strict enforcement of wartime
criminal regulations.13 These local and national policies of coercion, scholars have argued,
organized by various dimensions of the Nazi state apparatus, kept Germans committed to the war
cause until the very end.
Together, scholarship has presented various images of wartime German society that fall
along a continuum of consent versus coercion, often vacillating between a stalwart and persistent
German Volksgemeinschaft versus a crumbling and non-existent home front community. The
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breadth of this continuum is exemplified by two pieces of scholarship. The first, by Neil Gregor,
breathes new life into older narratives of capitulation and defeatism offered by scholars like
Martin Broszat and Marlis Steinert.14 Gregor conducts a case study of Nuremberg, a city that
suffered its most severe attacks in August 1943 and January 1945 with less severe attacks in the
meantime. Gregor aims to dispel the idea that Germans established a Schicksalsgemeinschaft, or
community of fate, that forged unity between home and battlefront. He argues that society had
effectively dissolved in Nuremberg by 1945.15 He claims to be filling a historiographical gap left
by generations of historians reluctant to “relativize the Holocaust by drawing attention to other
‘atrocities’ committed and other mass suffering experienced during war time.”16 He is also wary
of feeding post-war myths of German victimhood that have been adopted into popular memory.
To do so, Gregor demonstrates that local Nazi institutions in Nuremberg were largely unprepared
for increasingly frequent raids against German cities and, as a result, institutions could not
provide sufficient relief for urban Germans. This led to an increasing number of Nurembergers
voluntarily moving away from the city, seemingly abandoning any commitment they might have
had to a broader Nazi community. Gregor convincingly demonstrates how Party and municipal
relief efforts failed to ameliorate the devastation wrought by Allied bombing. Yet his argument
about the dissolution of German society ultimately hinges on population statistics, equating mass
evacuations away from urban spaces with social collapse in the same way that committed Nazis
themselves equated desertion with treason. In doing so, Gregor reproduces Nazi perspectives and
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values and, as a result, reinforces the propaganda that he himself hoped to abandon with his
argument.
Contrastingly, Richard Overy presents research to argue for the near polar opposite of
Gregor’s reading. Overy, taking a broader perspective than Gregor’s case study, tracks the shifts
in civilian society as the beginnings of Allied air raids through pivotal turning points and through
the pinnacle of Allied destruction: the firebombing of Dresden in February 1945. Overy argues
that, due to their highly cooperative nature, Nazi civilian defense programs successfully
encouraged public consent and strengthened a collective commitment to the “people’s
community.” His investigation of civilian defense focuses primarily on semi-voluntary initiatives
organized by Party or government actors. Associations like the Luftschutzbund not only provided
German civilians with a sense of security amid the devastating Allied attacks, but also they
provided the impetus for renewed social bonding. This civilian participation represented, for
Overy, a “community obligation that matched the wider claims of the German dictatorship to
have created a rearmed and psychologically reinvigorated people” preparing to face the unknown
challenges of total war.17 He goes so far as to argue that this collective spirit helped to mitigate
the effects of Allied bombing, ensuring that “industrial production, food supply, and welfare
were all maintained until the very last weeks when Allied armies were on German soil and Allied
bombers were pounding ruins into ruins.”18
Jörg Friedrich has controversially advanced arguments similar to Overy’s by suggesting
that Allied bombing made little impact on the outcome of the war. Consequently, for Friedrich,
the seemingly unnecessary attacks launched by Allied forces amounted to mass murder inflicted
on German civilians. Friedrich’s language, describing bomb cellars as “crematoria,” for example,
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evokes parallels between Allied bombing and the Nazi Holocaust in extremely problematic
ways.19 This chapter does focus on Allied destruction of the German home front, but it does so
with the intention of understanding how total war shaped experiences of destitution and poverty
during the war and how Germans responded to those experiences. It is not the goal of this
chapter to litigate Allied bombings, and it is beyond the scope of this project to engage literature
that does so. This chapter is deeply uninterested in drawing historically irresponsible and harmful
parallels with the Holocaust.
Gregor and Overy turn to different metrics to gauge popular commitment—Gregor
looking at everyday practice, and Overy relying on industrial output. Yet despite these seemingly
contradictory interpretations, these various strands of scholarship do share one common thread.
They all insist, whether implicitly or explicitly, that civilian commitment to the war effort
depended on deeper personal convictions about National Socialism. According to this line of
historical interrogation, Germans sustained their war effort because they supported a Nazi
approach—either through consent or coercion. More than that, consent or coercion depended
largely on the strategies of institutions and the tactics of local officials. Scholars tend to credit or
blame Nazi officials for their ability or failure to marshal popular participation. These
perspectives certainly provide useful insights into some of the most critical institutions and
policy that influenced the German war effort, but they also limit what scholars can argue about
wartime society. By adopting these perspectives, scholars reproduce the language and values that
Nazi agents used to define and describe society. It rebuilds the historical landscape using only
the building blocks provided by Nazi institutions. Since Nazi institutions and policy were
designed to establish an idea of Volksgemeinschaft in the real world, what results is a historical
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landscape in which “society” emerges as nearly equivalent to the Nazi social ideal. Where
Gestapo agents unleashed violence upon social “disorder,” for example, in reality they responded
to social values dissonant with notions of Volksgemeinschaft. Since these historiographical
perspectives are tied so closely to Nazi social ideals, they can speak more about the collapse of
or rejection of conceptions of Volksgemeinschaft rather than a sweeping collapse of German
society more broadly.
New approaches have helped scholars break down this consent-coercion binary and move
past the institutional barriers that have limited historical inquiry. Scholars have begun looking at
history closer to the ground, telling the individual stories of those living on the home front. Peter
Fritzsche, for example, explores the narratives that Germans told themselves about the violence
that had been perpetrated across Europe.20 Fritzsche delves deep into the personal diaries and
letters left behind by civilians to map the language, anecdotes, and moments that Germans used
to narrate their wartime experiences. Fritzsche argues that Germans did not rely exclusively on
propagandistic messages from Nazi authorities to frame the war unfolding around them. They
instead pieced together for themselves, from knowledge gained through observations in everyday
life to rumors exchanged in bars to intimate conversations with family members, their own
explanations and justifications for a war of genocidal violence. As the war turned more dreadful
for the Germans in 1943, they shifted from a narrative that acknowledged the destruction of the
Jews to one that emphasized their own victimhood.21 In doing so, Fritzsche has established a
much more nuanced social landscape on the German home front. He amplifies the voices of
civilians over the regime to demonstrate that civilians took charge of their own relationships and
were not simply manipulated into participation by various institutional strategies.
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This sustained scrutiny of the consent-coercion model prompted Ian Kershaw to ask in is
2011 book, “If neither terror nor support fully explains [why Germans held out for so long], what
does?”22 Kershaw’s own explanation, which emphasizes the “mentalities of ‘charismatic rule’”
and places Hitler at the center of the regime’s appeal proves largely unsatisfying for its sustained
inquiry into the nature of Nazi power. But his question inspired new scholarship which has led to
much more convincing explanations. Nicholas Stargardt continues Fritzsche’s investigations into
the individual wartime experiences that civilians stitched together on their own. He seeks to
understand “what Germans thought they were fighting for” in World War II.23 For Stargardt, the
war proved to be the most important lens through which Germans understood their lives
beginning in 1943. What truly moved German society was the war itself, for it constituted a
conflict on which hinged the very fate of the German nation. The war confronted Germans in
their everyday lives with the “Manichaean metaphors of … ‘victory or destruction’” and made
real a sense of impending doom that had, until the summer of 1943, existed largely as rhetoric.
Popular responses to wartime crises—central for Stargardt is the defeat at Stalingrad and the
firebombing of Hamburg—brings Stargardt to the well-trod historiographical concern over the
relationship between the Nazi state and German society that, until now, has largely seen a
positive correlation between Nazi success and public consent.24 He recognizes that public
confidence in National Socialism fluctuated over the course of the war, often independently of
developments on the front. Stargardt writes, “Germans did not have to be Nazis to fight for
Hitler, but they would discover that it was impossible to remain untouched by the ruthlessness of
the war and the apocalyptic mentality it created.”25
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What Stargardt has done is decouple the historical understanding that popular
commitment to World War II equated to support of National Socialism. Germans cared about
winning the war because they cared about surviving a conflict for which losing, in their minds,
equated to their total demise. German civilians could not bear to imagine the consequences of
losing a second world war—a war during which they waged unrelenting genocide. What results
is an interpretation of German society in which popular opinion of the Nazi state indicates little
about public commitment to a war effort. It was the war, not National Socialism, that made
convincing the cataclysmic mindset of “victory or destruction” that many Germans inhabited
toward the end of the war. This, as a result, creates new historiographical possibilities that push
scholarship beyond the rut that limited possible social dynamics to the mechanisms of Nazi
institutions. It allows the complex realities of the home front to emerge so that scholars can see
that Germans fought not necessarily to preserve National Socialism. They fought to protect the
social relationships, present livelihoods, and potential futures they all imagined for themselves. 26
This chapter follows this historiographical path blazed by Stargardt. Yet where Stargardt
asks why Germans fought until the very end of World War II, this chapter investigates how
Germans survived until the very end. For surviving the war was not simply a matter of
discovering a reason to fight. Total war created pervasive need among Germans on the home
front. Writing in an editorial for the Nazi publication Das Reich, Propaganda Minister Joseph
Goebbels lamented that Allied attacks made life more “primitive,” and had robbed cities like
Berlin of “its housing, its culture, its churches, and theaters, and museums.”27 Deprivation and
homelessness had become common experiences for civilians in the last years of the war. While
some experienced the direct violence and devastation of Allied attacks, lost homes, belongings,
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and kin, others felt the burdens as thousands of civilians fled cities for rural spaces. Allied
attacks disrupted supply lines and rail roads, making access to food and clothing a considerable
challenge. Rations could only supply Germans so much relief, and many found such provisions
to be insufficient, if not inaccessible. This chapter, then, asks two simple questions: how did
Germans secure the basic necessities, and what do those tactics reveal about the dynamics of
German society at the end of World War II?
This chapter mines both formal, institutional solutions to material destitution as well as
more informal and, in some cases, illegal tactics, for the rich details these practices unveil about
shifting social dynamics on the home front. This is why Stargardt’s innovations are so critical for
this chapter: for the way they recast actions that might have been previously understood as
delinquent or malicious against the Nazi state. There is certainly no doubt that Nazi law
enforcement and some civilians too interpreted black marketeering or looting as threatening to
the war effort and, consequently, a signal of a collapsing German society. Instead, this chapter
understands them as tactics of survival—not signals of a collapsing home front but of shifting
social patterns to cope with the consequences of total war.
This chapter begins by uncovering the depths of material deprivation that arose during
the last years of World War II. It highlights not just the consequences of destroyed bodies and
bombed homes but also smashed infrastructure. Irregular and insufficient rations and material
goods had an impact on civilian health as well as civilian psychology. The availability of
goods—and the capacity to orchestrate their regular distribution—gives clues about the state of
the war. Total war in Germany created an iteration of destitution in which civilians—in
particular urban dwellers—had a difficult time not just making ends meet but imagining a future
beyond war. As food became both more meager and less accessible, individuals and families
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developed anxieties about how they might survive the war, a reality that jeopardized their futures
as much as a bombing raid. They began to lose sight of the temporality of World War II, that it
“was never unlimited and unbounded,” and, with that, any deeper hope that they might witness
its end.28
Next, this chapter investigates formal Nazi responses to destitution on the home front. It
is necessary to explore the formal mechanisms of Nazi relief in order to understand their limits.
The NSV, the lead institution for alleviating material suffering during the war, largely remains
absent from narratives of the German home front. When it has been discussed, scholars have
largely focused on the institutional logistics or the economic consequences without the broader
social or cultural consequences of these policies.29 The administrators of the NSV unsurprisingly
organized wartime relief aimed to achieve ideological goals as much as relief goals. The
institution sought, above all else, to perpetuate Nazi convictions about a morally- and raciallyhomogenous community. This meant closely overseeing the ideological commitment of NSV
workers as well as providing relief only to those members of the Volksgemeinschaft. This topdown insistence on ideological integrity often clashed with new social dynamics of total war, and
what resulted was a much smaller relief network than that which functioned during peacetime.
Labor was already low as the NSV competed with both local war economies and army service
for capable women. However, wartime animosity between the NSV and confessional social
workers led to quick dismissals of educated employees and compounded labor shortage
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problems. Ideological commitment was often compromised as social workers had to improvise to
provide services and, in more nefarious cases, took advantage of civilian vulnerability.
The activities of the NSV, however, only reveal one part of the story about how members
of the home front found material relief. When Allied bombing brought destruction to German
doorsteps they learned to adapt in their everyday lives. They found ways to reduce fire risks, to
protect themselves, and to protect loved ones, all the while reshaping their relationships with one
another and the communities they had built.30
Finally, this chapter ends by addressing how individuals in Germany themselves coped
with the material changes during total war. As the material realities of prolonged total war began
to set in, many civilians proved reluctant to accept the parameters dictated to them by Nazi
welfare officials or to operate within the strictures of Nazi social values. Indeed, Germans looked
beyond the strict moral confines of Volksgemeinschaft in order to make ends meet in their
bombed-out landscapes. That meant establishing new relationships with one another and viewing
individuals not necessarily as supportive comrades but rather as entrepreneurial opportunities.
Slogans like Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz, which encouraged sacrifice for the collective good,
fell by the wayside as Germans sought to protect their own interests while bombs fell on their
cities, homes, and families. They aimed to solve their material problems in their own way, by,
for example, reluctantly participating in Nazi collection drives and turning to foraging, trading,
bartering, and law-breaking. Stephen Fritz has argued that such an individualistic spirit only
emerged late in the war and in specific geographical locations—namely in the west—“where
Anglo-American dominance could no longer be disguised.”31 Members of the home front,
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however, began to turn away from Nazi social values soon after the attacks on Hamburg, if not
before. Many, if not most, of these new tactics transgressed the social ideals of
Volksgemeinschaft in favor of a new entrepreneurial tactics. As civilians sought to make ends
meet to endure the last moments of World War II, they did not retreat from society but instead
reimagined their relationships to one another and found ways to relate to one another. This
chapter does not constitute a comprehensive catalog of the survival tactics or the innovative
solutions that civilians devised to provide for themselves and their families. But it does provide a
glimpse into the various ways that civilians traversed social norms—and, in some cases, German
law—in order to eat a meal or protect themselves.
This did not mean, however, that Germans completely abandoned the collectivist values
of Volksgemeinschaft at the end of the war. Instead, Germans navigated various social and moral
values and deployed the ones most beneficial to them. Particularly among evacuees relocated to
rural spaces, Germans expected to be received with certain values and treated to certain
accommodations due to a shared camaraderie that resulted from a common heritage. Evacuated
Germans were often dismayed not just at the material circumstances they found in the rural areas
to which they had been relocated, but also by the (lack of) hospitality that their hosts exhibited.
This emotional distress belied deeper expectations about community, a marriage of convenience
between German evacuees and Nazi social ideals as endangered civilians sought to carve out
some semblance of security and comfort amid the falling bombs.
When taken together, these patterns of behavior reveal that German civilians navigated
the material uncertainties of total war at home by simultaneously transgressing and upholding the
values of Volksgemeinschaft to their own individual benefit. This willingness to navigate varying
social and moral codes reveals to scholars an indifference toward Nazi ideology among home
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front civilians in the last moments of World War II.32 Rather than completely abandoning Nazi
values or reinvigorating their commitment to them, German civilians reformulated their social
attitudes toward one another in ways that protected their own self-interest, i.e. finding a reliable
source of material relief for themselves and their family members. In doing so, Germans did not
abandon wartime society altogether but instead worked to remake the dynamics of home front
society in order to survive the war, at once legitimizing the war as a motivating force while
simultaneously denying any generalizations about renewed commitment to National Socialism.
Ultimately this chapter tells a story of how Germans faced the death they found all
around them. In the final stages of World War II, Germans on the home front faced everyday
battles with scarcity. The NSV attempted to resolve these conflicts by channeling Germans
through their institutions, which sought to maintain the same ideological foundations upon which
they had been built since even before the Third Reich: the communal good over the individual
good. In some cases, this commitment to ideological integrity, to Nazi ideals, often took
precedents over the administering of services. As will be seen, Nazi officials often fired qualified
workers who were ultimately deemed to be ideologically liable—leaving considerable gaps in
coverage for Germans in need of resources. Struggling Germans, however, proved that they
would not accept the material conditions dictated to them by wartime economic rationing. Nor
would they accept the social models dictated to them by Nazi relief institutions. Instead, they
found their own solutions, secured their own relief, and built their own networks to try to outlast
a war to which they had committed themselves.
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Total War and Total Destitution
Allied bombs obliterated much of the German industrial urban landscape from 1943 until
the collapse of the Third Reich. In just the few months following the Casablanca Conference,
civilians endured thousands of tons of bombs and incendiaries. First, the industrial Ruhr Valley
witnessed the harshest attacks. At the start of March 1943, Essen experienced week-long
sustained bombing which resulted in nearly 100,000 people homeless and nearly 2,000 dead.
Later in May, Dortmund withstood nearly 4,300 tons of bombs—the largest attack to-date—
which destroyed around 19% of the city’s housing. The 10-day attack on Hamburg, one the most
devastating of the war, resulted in 34,000 dead. A United States Strategic Bombing Survey, a
report published just after the end of World War II, used rather striking language when
describing Operation Gomorrah: “The three raids which occurred from 24 July to 3 August,
1943, created what is believed to have been the worst holocaust in history.”33 Citizens of Kassel,
a city of only 150,000 people, saw over 400,000 incendiary bombs fall on their city in October,
resulting in yet another firestorm and death estimates that reach as high as one in ten people.
Those on the home front could only retreat to their bunkers as some of Germany’s most populous
and productive regions were battered by a superior air force.
Allied forces would only amplify their strength. British Air Ministry officers, working
alongside fire department engineers and chemists, sought to harness the destructive capacity of
fire so it could be unleashed at will. They investigated city planning, building construction, and
even the testing the flammability of ordinary household furniture to understand better the
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conditions for firestorms like those in Hamburg and Kassel. Targeting technology, long an
Achilles heel of aerial bombardment, improved as well.34 This resulted in extreme damage.
Nearly 80% of the buildings in Cologne were destroyed over the three years of intensive air
bombing. Darmstadt in September 1944 and Dresden in February 1945 hardly endured their own
firestorms. This is to say nothing of Berlin, a symbolic target that endured the highest tonnage of
bombing of any German city, or any of the dozens of other German cities that experienced raids.
All told, the total dead in Germany amounted to nearly 400,000.35
Figures like these have shaped the historiographical debate about the impact of the Allied
bombing campaign on Germany’s war effort. Not only do they highlight the physical toll on the
population as a whole, but also they speak to the devastating effects that attacks had on German
industry, stifling munitions production. Put more simply, material conditions deteriorated
quickly on the German home front. Need and destitution became commonplace among German
civilians living on the home front. Scholars debate how these new material conditions ultimately
affected Germany’s ability to wage war. Did Allied bombing, scholars ask, impede the ability of
civilians to wage and win World War II? Adam Tooze, for example, argue definitively yes, that
that Allied bombing played a decisive role in ending World War II.36 Still others, including
Richard Overy argue that only the physical invasion of Germany by Allied forces ultimately
doomed the Third Reich. A collective spirit and strong connections between the Nazi state and
German civilians offset the negative effects that bombing had on industrial output.
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The point of all of this is to demonstrate how total war and Allied bombing, often in
unexpected ways, affected the availability of basic necessities for German civilians. What
resulted were unique challenges to Nazi relief initiatives that proved insurmountable in two
ways. First, the extent of the devastation created such conditions that the NSV and supporting
relief operations could not adequately provide for German home front communities. Second, the
gap between popular need and institutional support was so wide that Germans turned away from
the NSV, began questioning the use of Nazi values, and found their own solutions to the material
destitution that total war had brought. Allied bombing did not simply destroy buildings and
bodies. Once air raid sirens silenced and civilians emerged from the bunkers, they had to contend
with new material realities. Failing utilities and destroyed infrastructure led to irregular food
supply and insufficient emergency services which threatened the immediate wellbeing of home
front populations. Where civilians did not experience this new destitution first-hand, they felt its
aftershocks as tight rations and widespread shortages meant that rural civilians also felt the
deteriorating material conditions too. These new conditions not only jeopardized the stability of
everyday life but also inspired pervasive anxieties about material wellbeing.
It is almost impossible to generalize about the experiences and conditions that emerged in
bombed-out cities. Cities like Hamburg or Kassel, which witnessed devastating firestorms, dealt
with considerably different issues than, say Dortmund, an early target during the air war, or
Augsburg, a target Allies only reached with regularity until the end of the war. Each city, as a
result, experienced its own individual challenges that derailed municipal services, material
distribution, and ordinary life. For many cities, fire proved to be an especially taxing effect of
Allied bombings not simply for the destruction that it caused but the logistics to fight it. Already
by May 5, 1942, firefighting forces were stretched beyond their limits in Cologne. According to
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sources collected by the USSBS, around 2,000 fires burned in the Cologne after the May 5 attack
that could not be put out because a lack of water and manpower.37 While city officials could call
on the support of neighboring cities like Düsseldorf, Bonn, Aachen, and Dortmund, these cities
themselves had already exhausted their resources. Not to mention, the policy of “mutual aid”—
which obliged nearby cities and towns to aid attacked cities—ended in October 1944.38 Fire
response times slowed dramatically. During peace time, an emergency responder in Cologne was
expected to arrive at a fire scene in three minutes. In 1944, a fire fighting crew could expect to
take an hour before arriving on the scene, and once they arrived, water was seldom available.
Moreover, bombing caused irregular water service for the entire city of Cologne—both for
emergency services and normal residents—from October 5, 1944 until March 10, 1945.39
Hamburg also dealt with concerns over firefighting. But while the water utilities
remained reliable, other scarcities meant that many of Hamburg’s emergency response workers
lacked proper equipment and even sufficient nourishment. Firefighters in Hamburg often lacked
adequate food and water, many did not have appropriate clothing and, very often they did not
have sufficient gasoline to make it to the fires. To solve this problem, emergency workers were
allowed to requisition necessities, including food and boots, from local civilians, meaning that
basic societal norms about private property vanished in the face of total war.40 Civilians, as a
result, worried that while their homes burned, firemen might commandeer the shoes right off
their feet.
Fires destroyed buildings and resources, and the fighting of fires strained already limited
materials—just one example of the residual effects that bombing had on German cities. Attacks
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interrupted some water and electricity services, which ultimately truncated emergency services
and industrial output. Even a seemingly well-intentioned national reclamation protocol for
salvaging belongings after air raids became overly-complicated and meant that civilians had less
control over their things. After an air raid, homeowners were required to remove all of their
belongings and move them to the streets where they were subsequently collected by the
Luftschutzpolizei and moved to nearby collection points. Only there could civilians reclaim their
belongings and begin to move back into their homes. Since few Germans heeded Nazi
instruction early in the war to draw up inventories or mark possessions with names and
addresses, civilians found it difficult and, in some cases, impossible, to reclaim their belongings
from local collection offices. In such cases, War Damages officials simply sold unclaimed
goods.41 This is to say nothing of the plundering that lines of personal effects attracted.
While each city had its own peculiarities that resulted in their own material challenges,
all civilians experienced together wartime rationing. Beginning in August 1939, Nazi officials
instituted a complex and differentiated system of Verbrauchskategorien, whereby ration
allotment was determined by one’s work.42 New food and clothing ration cards were issued
every four weeks, which allowed Nazi officials to tweak rationing according to wartime
developments. In 1939, a “normal consumer,” or Normalverbraucher, was allocated 700 grams
of meat, 350 grams of fats, 280 grams of sugar, 110 grams of marmalade, and 63 grams of coffee
per week. This rationing system played directly into the social values of “sacrifice” and
“community” embodied by Volksgemeinschaft ideology.43
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One scholar has argued that German civilians expressed relative satisfaction with the
rationing system due to its responsive and differentiated nature to cater to particular needs.44
However, statistics show that civilians hardly received the rations they needed. Almost
immediately after beginning the system in 1939, Nazi officials increased ration restrictions. After
the first rationing period, bread, eggs, and meal were included in rationing brackets when they
had not been subjected to rations prior. Meat rations continued to drop considerable over the
course of the war, where meat consumption in 1943/44 was 67% of the level it was in 1939/40.
In addition, these rations could hardly be considered nutritional. The Reich Ministry of
Food and Agriculture allotted food according to weight: grams of meat, fat, and bread have no
intrinsic nutritional value. In studies conducted by the US Strategic Bombing Survey after the
war, a leading German nutritionist, Dr. Mahla from the Schwabinger Krankenhaus in Munich,
indicated that, when adjusting ration allotments, Nazi agronomists followed no accepted standard
for “recommended dietary allowances” observed by war economies in, for example, the United
States and England. An analysis conducted of the ration period from October 18 to November
14, 1943 indicates that none of the calorie requirements for adults came close to the
recommended allowances while rations for nursing mothers and children far exceeded
requirements. Normalverbraucher received rations of 2,159 calories despite a recommendation
of 2,400 while 0-3-year-old children received 2,135 calorie rations while only needing 1,200
rations. Perhaps the biggest discrepancy came with nursing mothers who received 4,975 calories
per ration (exceeding the category for “very heavy workers” by almost 500 calories) while only
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needing 3,100 calories. As a result, the US Strategic Bombing Survey argued, “It must be
concluded that the physiologic value of the German diet was maintained largely by chance.”45
Rationing adjustments were responses to both developments on the home front and the
battle front. Rationing was especially sensitive to developments in Eastern Europe where Poland
and Ukraine occupied critical positions in Nazi food strategy. Since World War I, Germans
relied heavily on imports to satisfy their food requirements, a concern that the Nazi Food and
Agricultural Ministry hoped to rectify. Once World War II began, Nazi administrators worried
because they only had enough stockpiled resources to last through 1940. To alleviate these
worries about food supply, Herbert Backe developed the “Hunger Plan” with the goal of securing
food sources for German populations while simultaneously starving to death between 20 and 30
million soviet civilians. However, despite the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union after 1941, the
available stocks of food could not prevent continual rations cuts. In fact, ration cuts in April 1942
demonstrated to civilians that Nazi administrators had few answers for the food problems that the
regime faced and inspired deep anxieties on the home front.46 What followed were increasingly
brutal harvest and allocation policies, whereby Polish rations were drastically cut, and over 1
million Jews were immediately disqualified from rationing altogether, resulting in an uptick in
rations by October 1942.47
Developments like these ensured that Nazi administrators secured adequate food stocks.
However, a substantial portion of these resources went to Wehrmacht soldiers. And availability
of food did not always mean accessibility of resources—especially to civilians on the home
front. As a result, it is important to consider the impact that Allied attacks had on both
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availability and accessibility. Bombardment also destroyed food storage, greatly diminishing
Germany’s wheat and rye output. In addition, refrigeration capacity was reduced by 35 percent.48
The shortage of water in cities like Cologne certainly jeopardized the safety of local residents,
for it inhibited both fire fighters as well as air-raid defense measures. But it also dramatically
endangered the health and well-being of city residents long after the Allied planes had left. After
an attack on Munich in September 1944, over 50 percent of the 6,000-square-meter Linde
Kühlhaus was destroyed. This resulted in the destruction of over 2 million eggs, 400,000
kilograms of butter, and around 100,000 kilograms of meat.49 Normal consumers during the
corresponding ration period were allotted 250 grams of meat, meaning that the destruction of the
Kühlhaus resulted in the loss of over 400,000 rations of meat. By February 1945, according to
reports compiled by the Morale Division of the US Strategic Bombing Survey, “uniform
distribution of food was no longer possible” due to the severe damage dealt to food
infrastructure.50
Allied bombing made destitution a very real part of total war. The residual effects aerial
attacks had on municipal utilities and ration supply meant that civilians grew increasingly
uncertain about where they might find basic necessities, whether or not they were sufficient, and
how they might keep hold of them. According to SD reports as early as July 1943, “nearly every
region of the Reich” feared that ration cuts were imminent, signaling a general unrest not just
among vulnerable urban populations but also among more stable rural populations as well.51 A
sense of fragility had descended on the civilian home front. Some did not even trust leaving their
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belongings in their own homes during air raids. In June 1943, civilians in the Rhineland
petitioned local authorities to bring their belongings with them into air raid shelters. They
believed they could protect their property better if they brought them to the cellars with them.
Clothes, linens, and other necessities came to air raid shelters with civilians—despite the space
they occupied.52
These popular sentiments reflected how material insecurity bled into the everyday
moments of civilian lives. During bombing raids, they worried about the safety of their things.
Once attacks had ended, mothers “of growing and adolescent children have sleepless nights
because they often do not know what they will bring to the table.”53 All of this material anxiety
led the SD to report, “No one knows how long the war will last and which material challenges
are still to come.”54
Whether real or imagined, Germans had reasons to worry about their things during World
War II. This made it increasingly difficult not only to survive day-to-day but also to plan for the
future, or even to imagine what a future might look like. Nicholas Stargardt argued, “Such utter
and complete commitment to serve [the war effort] was only thinkable because it was never
unlimited and unbound. It had a temporal dimension.”55 Yet that temporal dimension could only
be sustained, “dreams of a post-war life” dreamt, if material conditions enabled it. These were
the deepest consequences of wartime destitution.
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Protecting Volksgemeinschaft: NSV and Wartime Relief
These were the material conditions to which the NSV was expected to respond. The Nazi
relief organization now operated in a perpetually vulnerable and constantly changing landscape.
Scholars insist that, over the course of World War II and especially during the intensified Allied
bombing raids, the NSV was “successful” for its ability to provide material relief to bombed-out
civilians and orchestrate initiatives to move Germans out of harm’s way.56 In fact, this represents
the prevailing narrative about the NSV on the German home front, with only a few
problematizing wrinkles.57 Certainly to some degree these narratives hold true. Relatively few
Germans starved to death over the course of the war, and the NSV, collaborating with the Hitler
Youth and the National Socialist Women’s League, provided emergency services and shelter.
However, as has been demonstrated over the course of this dissertation, these were not the
fundamental goals of the NSV. The institution’s goal was to protect Nazi social values and to
perpetuate an ideologically homogenous Volksgemeinschaft. These goals, perhaps
unsurprisingly, continued to shape NSV institutional ambitions and, largely, relief initiatives
throughout the course of the war. Nazism, not relief, was more important to the organizers of the
NSV—and this had consequences.
Nowhere are these consequences of privileging ideology over relief more evident than in
the NSV’s response to the growing staffing problems it faced throughout the war. Perhaps one of
the biggest obstacles facing NSV Reich Leader Erich Hilgenfeldt and the organization’s
administrators over the course of the war was a critical shortage of relief workers. Even before
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the war, relief workers were scarce.58 But once the war started, Hilgenfeldt faced a two-fold
problem. First, he competed with German industry for increasingly coveted women workers,
who made up the vast majority of case workers and caregivers at relief agencies. In a letter from
August 30, 1943 to the Baden Gauleiter Robert Wagner, Hilgenfeldt described his frustrations
with the lack of workers he had at his disposal. He wrote, “Women would like to accept relief
jobs, but because of the demands of the war economy, they must refrain.”59 Hilgenfeldt could
only imagine this problem becoming more acute: “While the need for women relief workers
grows with the length and the effects of the war, the influx into the occupation is always
diminishing.”60
Second, Hilgenfeldt demanded skilled relief workers. Youth and child home workers
required particular education that demanded years of study. To help facilitate this huge demand,
Nazi officials opened new schools to train women social workers, very often in rural spaces to
keep women away from danger while also in close proximity to the schools and homes where
they would most likely work. NSV officials in Hannover, for example, planned to open in 1943 a
new school in Bad Salzdetfurth to train teachers and caregivers for youth homes.61 The NSV
even launched a concerted propaganda campaign hoping to attract more and more women to
social work, encouraging women not only to seize the opportunity to support their Fatherland but
also develop valuable skills as a mother and a caretaker.62 Before the war, Hilgenfeldt anticipated
that the NSV would require an estimated 30,000 extra nurses and volunteers to support the
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Wehrmacht and the home front. However, making education more accessible did not encourage
women to flock to social work. Indeed, the NSV struggled to attract women to its schools, and by
1943, approximately 1,500 positions in NSV schools went unfilled. As Hilgenfeldt predicted
before the war, the NSV struggled to marshal a sufficient work force to cope with wartime
burdens.
These were not simply the concerns held by top-level national officials at the NSV.
Concerns over shortages were also expressed on the operational level. These concerns led to
increased tension between trained relief women and administrators who, in many cases, lacked
any real social work experience or education. It was common for supervisors to deny requests by
relief workers, no matter the rationale, to leave their positions because of a shortage of labor. Ilse
Köhrer, working in Strasbourg, was one such case. Strasbourg became the administrative seat of
Gau Baden-Alsace after the Nazis invaded France in 1940. This southwest region became a
critical location for German evacuees fleeing Allied attacks once bombing intensified after 1942.
Along with receiving elderly and vulnerable Germans, this region served as a reception area for
children and their mothers as a part of the Kinderlandverschickung initiative, accepting people
evacuated from Cologne-Aachen and Westfalen-Nord and -Sud—heavily bombed industrial
regions that included cities like Dortmund, Bochum, and Münster. 63 Before 1943, Baden-Alsace
had accepted over 46,000 mothers and children—18,000 of whom were children between the age
of 3 and 10—both from Nazi evacuation schemes and private relocations.64
Baden-Alsace was emblematic of the demographic upheaval and institutional rearranging
that many reception areas experienced during 1942 and 1943. Even in regions targeted with
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moderate bombing frequency underwent drastic reorganizing of its relief infrastructure. Gau
Süd-Hannover-Braunschweig, for example, experienced sustained Allied bombing attacks over
the course of 1940 and 1941. Home to the Continental Rubber Factory, the city of Hannover and
its surrounding areas represented a strategic target for Allied bombing raids. The persistent
nature of these raids encouraged evacuation out of Hannover and into the surrounding rural area.
Roughly 20,000 school children had been evacuated from Hannover by the NSV during the first
half of 1941, while by Spring 1942, some 50,000 individuals had been evacuated from Hannover
into the surrounding rural areas to places like Braunlage, Northeim, Wahmbeck, Bad
Salzdetfurth, and Boffzen.65 Beginning in 1943, regional relief administrators invested heavily in
these rural villages after seeing their relief operations go uninterrupted over the course of 1942.
Opening a new child home in Diekholzen, a village just 50 kilometers from Hannover, created
places for 60 children but also required at least four new relief workers to educate and care for
the children.66 Over the course of 1943, Gau officials expected to complete construction on three
new homes to accommodate mothers and children in addition to repurposing local buildings, the
Ville Marie and Schloss Loseck, for refugee homes.67 All of this meant considerable volatility
among the over 2,000 relief workers in the Hannover region.
This movement created an unstable situation for NSV supervisors and the welfare
workers they oversaw. It was in this type of environment that Ilse Köhrer requested to leave her
position as a local relief worker in Strasburg due to family issues. In her letter of resignation, she
explained that her mother was old and quite frail while her father suffered from heart disease and
needed constant attention. Köhrer found it “impossible” to leave her house for long periods of
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time and, as a result, she wrote to NSV Gauleiter Philip Dinkel requesting to leave her job at the
end of 1942. Dinkel perhaps represents the epitome of a Nazi relief administrator. A World War
I veteran who spent time in a French prisoner-of-war camp, Dinkel trained as a banker. He
experienced bouts of unemployment throughout the 1920s before finding temporary work at a
bicycle factory in Heidelberg, among other places. He joined the Nazi Party in 1931 and worked
in lower-level party leadership until he was appointed in September 1934 as NSV Gauleiter of
Baden.68 A man with no experience in social work and very little experience in leadership and
management, Dinkel was recognized for his Party loyalty rather than his administrative acumen
or welfare insights. With a quick reply, Dinkel denied her request to leave work, insisting that it
was “out of the question” for Köhrer to consider leaving in such circumstances.69 Köhrer was
just one of many examples. In October 1943, Frau Annelise Kohlenberger, another NSV relief
worker in the Baden-Alsace region, was also denied her request to leave her job. Only after
documents from her doctor proving she was pregnant could she then quit as an NSV worker. 70
Numerous other accounts of women denied leave or suddenly moved from place to place
to accommodate the influx of evacuees highlight the chaotic nature of relief work for some
women.71 Experienced and trained women like Köhrer and Kohlenberger were invaluable
resources to the NSV. Of course, “eligible” social worker did not simply mean those who had
undergone requisite NSV education. It also meant those who displayed acceptable Nazi
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commitment—and despite growing concerns among NSV administrators about a depleted work
force, they had no trouble terminating those who did not fall in line ideologically. Frau Elisabeth
Kley and Frau Ruhard were two such workers. As late as July 1944, the two women worked as
Kindergärtnerinnen in a day care center in the small village of Molsheim in Gau Baden-Alsace,
highly-sought after roles that, as has been demonstrated, Nazi relief organizers desperately
sought to fill.
No matter their seeming value, both Kley and Ruhard found themselves under
investigation by their supervisor after a minor incident with a young child. During a relatively
routine day, one child managed to climb atop a high chair and, after being warned, fell off and
broke an arm.72 The incident itself caused minimal alarm among Kley and Ruhard’s supervisor,
for the incident could have occurred on any given day. Kley and Ruhard were reprimanded for
not paying closer attention to the child, but their supervisor seemed to be relatively unbothered
by this specific situation. She continued to explain, “Since children can be unpredictable, this is
no reason to replace or dismiss the two women.”73
Despite the seeming commonplace nature of the accident, Kley and Ruhard’s
supervisors—which included the chief administrator of the kindergarten and local welfare
agents—expressed deep concern about the two women’s “competency” for child care. Kley and
Ruhard both allegedly volunteered in the debriefing their strong commitment to Catholicism.
Frau Kley apparently professed “energetically” that “she interprets her entire work as a Christian
woman. She attends church daily, and from this comes her duty to look after children.”74 Her
supervisor recalled, “She repeated and emphasized emphatically that in all things, she firstly
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thinks of how to fulfill her duty as a Catholic.”75 While she “made a right phlegmatic
impression,” Frau Ruhard expressed solidarity with her colleague and affirmed her own Catholic
convictions. For these reasons, both women were judged as overly critical of the day care’s child
care methods and could no longer contribute productively or “objectively” to the day care’s
mission. They could no longer carry out their work in a “National Socialist spirit,” and as a
result, the two were fired from the Kindertagesstätten Düttlenheim.
Ultimately, we know very little about these two women. The sources offer no clues about
whether or not they were married or had children—all information that would be useful for
understanding their supervisors’ decision to dismiss them. It would have been common, and
perhaps likely, for Kley and Ruhard to have families, but we cannot be certain. Additionally, we
can probably assume safely that neither Kley nor Ruhard were Nazi Party members. Typically,
correspondence like these would refer to a Party member as “Parteigenoss/in.” In this case, the
two women are simply referred to as “Frau.”
What we do know is that these two Catholic women were fired from their positions in
child care while the NSV worried about the availability of caregivers at a time when more
children—many of whom coming from the heavily Catholic area of Cologne-Aachen—than ever
were evacuated into Baden-Alsace. This occurred at a moment when Nazi skepticism of Catholic
commitment was growing with special worry over Catholic influence on German children.
A report from September 6, 1944 on the mood in Pforzheim, a southwestern German
town not far from Kley and Ruhard’s Molsheim of roughly 60,000 inhabitants, made this
distinction quite clear.76 The report noted that the general population was “quite serious and
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some segments are depressed.”77 The advancing of Allied forces from the west, particularly the
approaching tank battalions, made the population “very nervous.” One villager had been
overheard asking, “Do we have no more soldiers on the battlefield?”78 Nevertheless, the report
suggested that, for the most part, the population remained hopeful. They still trusted in the
“strong hand of the Führer” and believed unflinchingly in the Endsieg. They had heard rumors of
new weapons and new operations that could turn the tide of the war. Pforzheim remained largely
hopeful, if impatient and anxious.
Religious circles, however, expressed a different mood. Especially in Catholic circles,
confidence in the war effort had dropped to nearly zero by September 1944. “Most [Catholics] in
this Kreis have lost the belief in a victory,” the report read.79 It should be noted, too, that while
sentiment in religious circles appeared disillusioned and disgruntled, the report also described the
mood in working-class communities to be “very unpleasant.” As a result, we can recognize
considerable divisions within German communities during this time. It is difficult to gauge the
propagandistic sheen on these reports, but since many Stimmungsberichte were often confidential
reports, one might assume that reporters sought to characterize local sentiment as best they
could.80 Whether or not the war created rifts or exposed them is difficult to answer. No matter—
what this report shows is that the NSV’s propaganda about collective solidarity could not
overcome reports from the front.
In moments like these, the NSV—like many other mechanisms of the Nazi war
machine—arrived at the intersection of ideological commitment and wartime pragmatism. The
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increasing volatility of the relief environment in southeast Germany met the growing skepticism
about Nazi commitment by Catholics. In this landscape, Kley and Ruhard’s supervisors, Party
members likely with no education in the mechanisms of social welfare, deemed their Catholic
convictions no longer viable in the world of Nazi-led relief. Catholic ideas, they judged,
threatened the stability of local evacuee relief and the dynamics of the Volksgemeinschaft. As a
result, they were no longer allowed to take part in the NSV’s institutional community-building
project and, despite the widely-recognized shortage of educated social workers, were fired from
their positions. However counterintuitive this decision might appear from a relief standpoint, it
aligns perfectly with the primary purpose of the NSV: to protect and propagate the ideological
goals of National Socialism. The ends justified the means—even if that meant intentionally
understaffing NSV relief institutions.
While NSV administrators carefully scrutinized and dismissed seemingly unacceptable
social workers in Baden for their Catholic convictions, they simultaneously worked to identify
and praise those examples they deemed exemplary of Nazi commitment. Publicists and
propagandists told stories of heroic “ordinary” civilians, motivated by a collective Nazi spirit,
overcoming the profound hardships of total war. One such example appeared in an NSV
publication celebrating the ten-year anniversary of the Mother and Child program entitled, 10
Jahre Mutter und Kind. Here, one NSV relief worker recounted her experiences of the Julitage,
or July Days, the colloquial name for the attacks on Hamburg in July and August 1943. Drawing
comparisons with the early Kampfzeit of the Nazi Party—the foundational moments of Hitler’s
political movement—she recognized the existential weight that popular responses to Allied
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bombing had for defining the nature of a German Volksgemeinschaft. It was in these moments,
the unnamed relief worker commented, “that people welded together a real community.”81
After warning sirens went silent on the July 25, the woman and her daughter, a member
of the BDM, quickly made their way to the nearby reception area, where mothers with their
young children had already begun to gather. In a room full of commotion, she and her daughter
began giving instructions and providing comfort. They carefully distributed infant formula to the
young babies but soon ran out. Bombing disrupted the utilities, meaning gas and electricity could
not be used to prepare the next batch of formula. More challenges arose: women sought medical
assistance, lost children, and sought ways to escape Hamburg altogether. Together with her
daughter and another volunteer helper, the woman managed to direct people to nearby hospitals,
prepare suitable formula for the babies, gather bread for the mothers, and provide coffee and
milk as refreshments for others waiting.82 This day and this support, the woman wrote, could not
have ever been possible without the “exemplary collaboration” that occurred after the July
attacks. What the NSV achieved that week, she recalled, “was superhuman.”83
When she returned to her regular office hours, she recalled individuals who came for
help. She commented that often people would come for help and recognized her from those days
in July. “You helped me so much,” they said. It was in these moments of improvised relief, of
impromptu expressions of community that, in the minds of committed Nazis, bound individuals
together. This strength of spirit could withstand even the most devastating Allied attacks.84
Any other details about this woman, her daughter, or the other individuals whom she
assisted have been lost to history. This account, nevertheless, celebrated the response of the NSV
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to wartime emergency and aligned with its prewar initiatives to inspire and project spontaneous
expressions of Volksgemeinschaft. Throughout the war, the NSV clung to its collection drives
orchestrated as a part of the WHW, now the KWHW for Kriegswinterhilfswerk. Favoring
continuity over any kind of change, organizers continued to make a large spectacle of these
events to draw Germans into the streets to offer donations. Much like the earliest collection
drives in 1933, the first Reich street collection drive of 1943 featured some of Germany’s most
famous athletes carrying collection boxes amid the enthusiastic crowds of donors. Alongside
these elaborate street spectacles, Eintopfsonntage remained a monthly observance through
1945—though the WHW badges stopped on a national level after March 1943 while some local
organizations still continued to distribute them.85 These public rituals of “cooperation” and
“sacrifice” even spread to Nazi camps like Auschwitz where SS personnel participated in their
own observances. Door-to-door collection drives and events on behalf of the WHW were
common among the Auschwitz officer staff. The first drive of the 1943/44 held in early
September 1943 generated over 10,000RM from the SS staff.86 In celebration of the collection
days for March 1944, Auschwitz staff organized a movie night to follow the day’s street
collection as well as a Sunday soccer match followed by an Eintopfsonntag dinner.87
The NSV reached deep into the Nazi machine of death. Even as late as December 1944,
Auschwitz officials reported that the street collection drive from 16 and 17 December 1944
raised 158,943.17 RM, an increase from their last collection of nearly 140,000RM.88 This is
particularly remarkable considering this massive sum was collected just weeks before the
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liberation of Auschwitz, occurring before the forced death march to Wodzisław Śląski (Loslau),
suggesting that the NSV played a critical role in relocating death camp assets and appropriating
Jewish wealth that had been confiscated upon imprisonment.
NSV officials felt these kinds of efforts were necessary, as wartime conditions meant that
popular support for the NSV and its initiatives waned. Popular support for the WHW had been
faltering since the start of the war. The majority of collection goods and funds were no longer
coming from voluntary donations made by ordinary Germans. Garnished wages comprised the
vast majority of money collected.89 Moreover, goods confiscated from murdered Jews
constituted a considerable portion of the in-kind donations.90 Items like jewelry and furs often
went directly to high-ranking Party members while less valuable clothing was often sold to the
NSV. In one instance in Fall of 1942, the local NSV office in Posen (Poznań) in Warthegau
demanded 3,000 men’s suits and 1,000 women’s dresses to be distributed during the upcoming
WHW drive. When a portion of the clothing arrived from Auschwitz, relief organizers only
found mismatched pants and jackets, many spattered with blood and still donning the yellow
Jewish star.91 The murder and genocide of the East ensured that the NSV could continue to
protect National Socialist values.
While Germans proved increasingly reluctant to contribute to the WHW, outright scandal
tarnished the NSV’s public image and invited widespread suspicion of the relief institution. Few
scandals generated as much national attention as the NSV embezzlement case in late March
1942. NSV Gauleiter to Schleswig-Holstein Wilhelm Janowsky, along with a number of Nazi
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Party accomplices stole from public food resources following the massive Allied raid on Lübeck
on March 28, 1942. Janowsky—a member of the Nazi Party since 1931—and his accomplices
stole clothes, shoes, and food for themselves while also selling other basic necessities on the
black market.92 The crime ultimately resulted in long prison sentences and the execution of
Janowsky, a sentence celebrated widely by the home front public. Indeed, the SD reported that
public sentiment across Germany demanded severe punishment for Janowsky for the injustices
done to them.93
In addition to this high-profile scandal, other more local instances of impropriety created
dissonance between the image the relief institution hoped to convey and the message its practices
sent. For example, the Nazi judicial bulletin Richterbriefe discussed in its May 1943 issue an
instance of an NSV agent exchanging WHW coupons for sex from a soldier’s wife.94 According
to the report, a 50-year-old married NSV office director began an adulterous relationship with a
needy war wife in 1940. On several occasions, the director gave the woman, in exchange for sex,
WHW coupons that entitled her to free or rebated groceries and other basic necessities. In his
commentary on the case, Reich Minister of Justice Otto Georg Thierack confirmed the
Sondergericht ruling which condemned the NSV director as a Volksschädling and sentenced
him, according to the Volksschädlingsverordnung, to one year in prison.95 Thierack judged that,
while the act of adultery itself was “especially reprehensible,” this case represented a “borderline
case” with regard to the Volksschädlingsverordnung. What ultimately defined the perpetrator as
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a Volksschädling was the exchange of WHW-coupons—an act which, according to Thierack,
undermined the Nazi war effort.96 The Reich Ministry made clear that working within the NSV
were agents contributing to the detriment of the German war effort.
Against this backdrop of total war, the NSV struggled both to realize its ideological
mission and address the material anxieties of civilian populations. The NSV strove to assert its
ideological message in the face of Allied attacks, intentionally sacrificing the scope of its relief
network amid an influx of needy Germans. Messages about a strong and united
Volksgemeinschaft advanced through propagandistic messaging and public spectacles were
undermined by high-profile episodes of institutional corruption. This is to say nothing of the
ordinary struggles that home front civilians continued to face. While NSV administrators looked
to profit off needy Germans, women stood from early morning hours amid the rubble of ruined
cities in the hopes that they might use their rations points to buy something for dinner.97 They
scrambled between bakers, grocers, shelters, reception areas, and welfare offices—a complicated
and unorganized dance simply to endure the poverty wrought by total war.98 A striking
dissonance emerged between the goals of the NSV and the needs of civilians. As members of the
home front began to realize that the NSV could not provide the kind of relief they imagined,
civilians started to devise their own solutions to make ends meet.
Improvised Relief: Germans Reevaluating “Community”
NSV relief unfolded within this specific Nazi framework, determined both by the
economic situation of wartime as well as the ideological parameters of Nazism. While this might
have been the type of relief that Nazi officials like Hilgenfeldt envisioned to provide to needy
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Germans, it was still not enough to alleviate the suffering among civilians on the ground or
assuage deep material uncertainties. One Bavarian man, whose opinion was captured by Nazi
intelligence officials in late June 1943, aptly summed up feelings common across war-torn
Germany. Amid expectations of rations soon to be shortened, the man exclaimed, “Until now I
have been living just off the rations. The benefit was that I lost twenty pounds this past year,
though I was already fairly slim.”99 Not content to live on such meager rations, he looked
elsewhere. “Now, I buy anything I can get my hands on, and I’ve already gained eight
pounds.”100
Perhaps somewhat tongue-in-cheek, this sentiment nevertheless reflected a reality of the
home front experience: Nazi policies and NSV initiatives left many civilians wanting. War, as
we have seen, produced conditions of scarcity in varying degrees across home front
communities. Nazi propaganda encouraged civilians to endure these material hardships, as
expressions of solidarity with the troops on the battlefield and gestures of commitment to the
Nazi cause. Yet civilians, many like the increasingly svelte Bavarian man, proved reluctant to
passively accept the material conditions of the home front. They sought out a number of clever,
entrepreneurial, and even illegal solutions to their destitution—sometimes at great risk to
themselves. In doing so, they both reinforced and transgressed the values of Volksgemeinschaft
and remade relationships with those around them.
Despite a prevailing mood, especially among urban civilians, that the NSV was not
adequately providing for the needs of endangered German civilians, Nazi officials still expected
individuals to support the state in funding social welfare programs. The persistent organizing of
elaborate KWHW drives demonstrates this. In addition to these familiar drives, the NSV also
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orchestrated smaller, item-specific drives throughout the year, targeting specific goods like food,
fabric, and rubber, among others. One such collection drive carried out between May and June
1943 asked that Germans across the Reich donate any clothing, fabric, and shoes they might
have to spare, with the proceeds to be redistributed among needy Germans. Much to the dismay,
however, of Nazi relief officials, civilians all across the Nazi Reich responded to this drive with
“a certain indifference and criticism.” 101
SD officials tried to explain the widespread reluctance to participate in this collection
drive by suggesting that “very few Germans had extra shoes or textiles available.” They reported
that many Germans, after “searching their coffers, boxes, and closets” simply had nothing left to
spare. This was certainly a reflection of the availability of goods—especially considering the
reduced clothing rations that had been instituted at the beginning of 1943. Ration periods were
changed from 12-month to 18-month cycles, but individual allotments remained the same,
meaning a reduction in clothing allotments by a third. Moreover, an increased frequency of
collection drives meant that Germans often had little left to give to fellow citizens. Since the
beginning of the war, the WHW expanded by a month, beginning in September rather than
October actually increasing the obligation placed on German civilians to donate. The arrival of
the Spinnstoff- und Schuhsammlung in May, just a month and a half after the end of the WHW
period, was largely unexpected. Indeed, SD officers indicated that Germans across the country
were “surprised” since most “did not expect another collection drive so soon.”102
These justifications from an official Nazi organization might come as no surprise.
Portions of the SD report from June 10, 1943 portrayed a German community willing, yet simply
unable, to support fellow Volksgenossen. The report conjured images of Germans scraping the
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very bottom of their proverbial barrels to find anything that might help. It was simply the matter
that these gestures of goodwill and solidarity could not be substantiated with actual material
contributions—not that Germans lacked any moral commitment to one another. It should be
noted, however, that this SD report offers no evidence to support these claims that Germans went
to exceeding lengths to find donations. Where it was common practice for SD officials to cite
local Stimmungsberichte, provide excerpts from personal letters, or recount overheard
conversations, this segment of the report offers no such evidence. Instead officers simply
speculate that Germans searched high and low for items to donate. In doing so, the SD tried to
craft a reality compatible with the moral shape of an idealized German Volksgemeinschaft
manufactured by the NSV and Nazi propaganda. Even in the face of unprecedented hardship, this
report suggests that Germans could muster a sense of collective obligation that conformed to
Nazi social ideals.
It is difficult for historians to access the myriad of reasons that encouraged or
discouraged civilian participation in wartime collection drives, especially when the bulk of
extant source material speaks from a Nazi institutional perspective. Official voices in these
sources very often portrayed a civilian population that fit neatly into the social boundaries that
National Socialists had constructed for themselves, easily presenting evidence that demonstrate
“good comrades” and “national sacrifice,” much like the “superhuman” NSV worker who helped
so many after the Hamburg attacks. Certainly some Germans gave what they could because they
had committed themselves to a Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. Yet even within these institutional
sources, Nazi officials left behind in their reports traces which suggest that popular motivations
were not nearly as neat or simple as they had been portrayed. There is no doubt that material
goods were increasingly scarce on the German home front as the war dragged on, but despite the
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SD’s explanation, material deprivation hardly explains completely why some Germans
contributed to Nazi collection drives—or when conceived more broadly, supported a Nazi
community-building initiative during wartime—and some did not.
Civilians did have materials to donate but some chose not to. Some found simple ways to
repurpose their belongings, clinging to even their shabbiest clothes to make something new.
Some wore their garments down “to the last shred.” Others found new uses for their clothing
scraps and worn shoes. Instead of giving them away, women repurposed tattered straps of fabric,
“making new out of old” or “making one from two,” often finding ways to make clothes or
diapers out of older, seemingly unusable leftover cloth. One SD official generalized about the
German mood by citing one housewife’s comments: “If one cannot buy anything new, then one
has to depend on old things. I have old clothes that I could donate to collections, but I have to
turn them into hand towels or cleaning rags.”103
In addition to finding new purposes for old fabrics, Germans also sought new sources for
textiles. The SD reported that Germans, in particular in Hamburg and Karlsruhe, even took their
old military uniforms that had been “uselessly hanging in closets.” An SD report suggested that,
“considering the critical situation of the textile provisions that have been expressed, these such
reserves of fabric must be exploited,” meaning that civilians at home cut up, reworked, and
remade military uniforms. This portrays quite a striking and symbolic image. Germans
repurposed Nazi military uniforms, literally tearing apart the fabric of National Socialist
symbols, in order to make something more practical to benefit their own situations.104
Many of these tactics developed in urban spaces that had been hit hardest by Allied
bombing, though SD reports only seldom mention the names of localities on which they were
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reporting. But rural Germans, too, expressed reluctance to participate in collection drives, for an
SD report indicated, “Only in seldom cases do rural households have extra old clothes or shoes
available.” Not least of these reasons included the increased material burden that forced labor,
Ostarbeiter, put on farming families.105 The huge influx of forced labor after 1942 created
burdens not just for the Nazi state but also for the individual employers—in this case, farmers—
charged with overseeing them, burdens that proved almost too challenging to bear.106 Forced
labor camps sprung up near every industrialized city in Germany, subjecting primarily Russian
captives to vicious work regimens and meager food rations often tied to work performance.107
These ration systems had been very carefully planned by agronomists like Herbert Backe,
navigating extreme scarcity, so that Russians were not taking food from German mouths.108
The case was somewhat different in rural spaces, where often Germans developed
different relationships with the forced laborers working in their midst. While malnutrition and
harsh conditions were still common, foreign labor had less oversight in the more sparselypopulated German farmlands. Germans developed more personal relationships with forced labor,
so much so that Jill Stephenson argues, “Many in the native rural population simply recognized
them as fellow humans with personality traits, convictions, and a family history, rather than as
faceless members of an enemy alien force.”109 As these relationships subverted the racial
hierarchies that Nazi ideology outlined, they shaped how rural Germans participated in Nazi-led
relief. For their own reasons, some rural Germans chose to do precisely what Backe and his
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agricultural scientists aimed to avoid: they gave basic necessities to forced labor at the expense
of donating to the NSV.
Certainly these only represent civilian responses to one single collection drive during
May 1943. The responses described here are not meant to be representative of the entire civilian
population. They are significant, however, for two reasons. First, this collection drive, organized
and conducted before the devastating attacks on Hamburg, unveils a palpable reluctance to
support Nazi-led collection drives at this time, revealing a distrust or lack of faith in Nazi relief
institutions developed among some civilians even before decisive strikes against the German
home front had been landed by the Allies. Second, the uncertainties over Nazi-led relief to
provide for individuals inspired civilians to seek out their own solutions to material destitution.
They tested out new tactics that might bring in a few extra Reichsmarks or secure a bit of extra
food. As civilians grew anxious about developments in the field, dwindling material resources,
and rumors about rations, they began to reevaluate the basic foundations of the communities they
had built over the course of the Third Reich. They began to push against the collectivist values of
Volksgemeinschaft and explore their own individual endeavors. The NSV was undoubtedly a
valuable resource for needy Germans, but it alone could not provide adequate relief, and many
civilians found themselves prepared to do what they needed to do to try and achieve that
security.
The tactics developed by civilians ranged from the seemingly harmless to the openly
threatening in the eyes of the Nazi state. Foraging, for example, had become a very real option
for many.110 Especially in eastern and southern cities and towns nestled in the nooks of
Germany’s forests, including around Saarbrücken, women and children took buckets into the
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woods to collect berries.111 Saarbrücken’s location in Western Germany, as well as the
concentration of coal and steel industries there, meant that it received persistent attention from
the RAF in the summer of 1942. The first substantial attack on Saarbrücken occurred during the
nights of July 29-30.112 During the July attacks, one young 14-year-old school boy recalled, “I
began to shake all over my body … you could hear each heavy strike getting closer, dull and
threatening in increasingly shortening intervals, through the crash of roof tiles and shatter of
building windows. God, bombs everywhere! The explosions made everything quake and
tremble!”113 The two-night raid resulted in 155 people killed and hundreds more injured.
These attacks converged with a nationwide drop in fruit availability. Rations had fallen so
sharply that by 1944, the allotment for “normal consumers” was only one third of what it was in
1941. 114 Complaints from all over Germany about the availability of fruit littered SD reports.115
In response, SD officials reported that in July 1943, hundreds of individuals near Saarbrücken
crowded the local train stations, heading to nearby forests in order to pick berries. Judged by
station officials to be “considerably unruly,” “swarms” of eager women and children “overran
ticket control as people sought to be the first into the forest.”116
Foraging afforded some individuals an opportunity to supplement Nazi-led relief
measures and secure a bit of dependence from the NSV and rationing. SD reports noted that,
“First and foremost, foragers collected for their own needs,” indicating that Germans merely
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sought to fill nutritional gaps left by rationing.117 However a poor fruit crop created high
demands, and ambitious foragers capitalized. In Saarbrücken, a woman with a “full but small
Heidelbeer bucket” swapped her day’s work for a 50-mark note, and such incidents were not
unusual. Around Frankfurt an der Oder, reports described Germans trading 5kg of blueberries for
1/2kg of bacon. Other types of berries could attract more valuable exchanges, as the SD reported
Germans could use berries to trade for bread, bread vouchers, sugar, clothing, or clothing ration
cards. Some civilians too used foraging not simply to barter for material goods but also more
favorable wages. Farmers near Frankfurt an der Oder worried for their own yields as they
insisted berry-picking was to blame for an increase in absenteeism on their farms. The SD agents
quoted one farm-hand-turned-berry-picker as saying, “We can earn between 75RM and 100RM
daily with the berry harvest. When we can earn that working on a farm, we will stay.”118 The
penalty for absenteeism during the summer of 1943, a mere 5 RM fine, was meaningless when
such profits could be earned. These opportunities might not have made civilian life comfortable
during the latter years of World War II. But civilians could improve their diets and find a bit of
extra bargaining power to secure basic necessities this way—ensuring more material security in
the face of scarcity.
In areas where such foraging was possible, many Germans took advantage of this
opportunity. However, when local Nazi officials suggested foraging as a legitimate nutrition
strategy, some responded angrily. In an article titled “Ernährung aus dem Walde” published in a
Karlsruhe newspaper in the summer of 1944, Germans were encouraged to eat dandelions. The
article read, “The dandelion is a widely-available wild vegetable. Its substantial blooms emerge
in large numbers during the first weeks of spring.” In addition to their ready availability,
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dandelions supposedly also paired well with a number of wartime dietary staples. The article
continued, “When harvested with their stems, they go well with meal and potatoes to make a
delicious dish whose mild taste pleases everyone. Additionally the leaves of the dandelions are
very enjoyable and help make, especially in winter, a nice salad.”119 Civilians openly mocked
such campaigns. In a conversation between two women overheard by the SD, one woman
sarcastically commented, “Only the best husband finds a field and leads his family to graze in the
grass.” She continued, “I now know why so many are so sharply against house pets, because the
grass is for human nourishment.”120 This sarcasm speaks volumes, for it lays bare the complexity
wrapped up in the act of foraging. Civilians laid claim to foraging not as only as a nutritional
scheme but as a power strategy with which they could try to navigate a total war over which they
had no control. To be told otherwise they viewed as condescending.
There is a reason that this seemingly menial, limited, and timid practice deserves such
attention, for foraging represents a sign of a departure for parts of civilian society during World
War II. For some, it was a technique to survive the war, to find nutrients beyond the amount
allotted to them by rationing. For others, it was a bargaining tool. Whether in local trading or
labor relations, foraging provided some individuals the extra income to secure basic necessities
and to take more ownership of their own material wellbeing. This is not to argue that foraging
was an act of resistance or an expression of disapproval against the Third Reich. It does reveal,
however, that civilians had not relinquished their own ambitions of individualism amid the
pressures of conformity and collectivism essential to the values of Volksgemeinschaft. Through
whatever framework civilians chose to deploy foraging, it was a tactic to which civilians
themselves could lay claim beyond the reaches of Nazi-led relief—so that civilians derided
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attempts by Nazi institutions to make it a part of their relief strategies. This tactic altered,
however slightly, the power relations between individuals so that civilians did not look
exclusively to the state, but rather to one another, for solutions to the material challenges that
they faced.
Certainly not all individuals had access to foraging, and the moral “reward” of
contributing to the wellbeing of a Volksgemeinschaft by donating belongings for free very often
faded next to the gleaming luster that shone from the chance to swap goods for actual things.
Civilians worked with what they had to negotiate trades to secure their own material future.
Local newspapers featured sections to help facilitate trading among civilians. Individuals took
out ads to post items they hoped to buy, sell, or trade, everything ranging from women’s shoes,
coats, and common clothing to gas stoves, fur coats, and radio equipment could be found in these
advertisements. In early July 1943, over 850 Tauschanzeigen appeared in the local newspaper,
Der Führer, the district-wide party newspaper in Karlsruhe.121
Newspaper advertisements were only the surface of a much deeper and more complex
system of alternate economic exchanges, black marketeering, and smuggling that unfolded on the
German home front during World War II. Scholars have only recently begun to investigate the
network of black market trading during the war. Investigations about German black market
networks have largely focused on urban spaces after World War II, often casting wartime
networks as the fledgling precursor to their post-war counterparts.122 Far from simply existing as
the inchoate predecessor of post-war alternate economies, civilians participated in welldeveloped and complicated black market schemes throughout the war. According to Malte
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Zierenberg, these were fragile constellations of social relationships built on privilege and trust
not easily accessible to just anyone.123 Black markets were not distinct economic relationships
but also bound up in personal and familial connections, making markets both a reflection of
economic trends as well as social and cultural dynamics.
These networks often emerged where supply was plentiful. A man simply referred to as
H. took advantage of his capital after his necktie factory closed in winter of 1943, trading his
unused stocks of fabric for groceries and other basic necessities. 124 According to the SD, officials
noted that, for example, butchers often had “extraordinarily good and new clothes and on the
other hand, clothiers often had considerable supplies of food.”125 Farmers too often had an upper
hand in such trading. Over the course of 1943, one East Prussian farmer reportedly traded for a
sophisticated wardrobe: “one smoking jacket, one elegant summer suit, one street suit, two
winter coats, a summer jacket, numerous shirts, gloves, hats and a few pairs of shoes.”126
Soon after the appearance trade advertisements in the Karlsruhe newspaper, Reich
Economic Minister Walther Funk condemned such trading in a speech he delivered in June 1943.
Funk stated, “However understandable the trading of basic necessities might be in this time of
scarcity, this kind of exchange must be fought because through it, the fixed value of goods and
the belief in the value of money will be undermined.”127 He continued to charge all
Volksgenossen with the duty of discouraging and reporting any bartering, since it had
“demoralizing and shameful effects.”128 Notices appeared in future editions of Der Führer
similarly condemning such acts.

123

Zierenberg, p. 48-63.
Richterbriefe—Mitteilung des Reichsministers der Justiz—Nr. 15, 1 December 1943
125
SD-Berichte zu Inlandsfragen vom 20 Januar 1944.
126
Ibid.
127
SD-Berichte zu Inlandsfragen vom 23. August 1943 (Rote Serie).
128
Ibid.
124

272

In addition to these reprimands, black marketeering came with harsh punishments. Fines
and prison time for violating numerous war regulations—namely, the
Kriegswirtschaftsverordnung, first passed in September 1939 but expanded in March 1942 to
include stricter regulations, could grow to hundreds of marks, years in prison and, in the most
severe cases, death.129 Facing the potential for death, civilians still chose to participate in
elaborate trade schemes and networks. These networks are historically significant for what they
reveal about popular responses to total war. Yet no matter how civilians chose to frame their
bartering and trading, SD agents’ responses are equally significant, for the intelligence service
read the spread of black marketeering as evidence of shifting social attitudes. As civilians
recognized more and more the usefulness of the black market, the SD feared that Nazi values
were fading from German society. Any vigilance for Volksgemeinschaft was disappearing. By
January 1944, the SD identified that, “The long duration of the war has led to a general
relaxation of the strict idea of the reprehensibility of additional provisions for Volksgenossen.”130
The SD reported, “During the first years of the war, bartering and smuggling in any form was
frowned upon by most Volksgenossen. Gradually, however, the population has explored every
conceivable method and way to circumvent the regulations of the war economy.”131 This was
seen not simply as a disregard for Nazi regulations but a more threatening turn away from
foundational social cohesion. The SD worried, “The sentiment, that these activities detract from
the community, is hardly there. Among many, it is the view that everyone in the current difficult
times should see their own way through, and it is up to each individual to draw on the sources
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available to him.”132 While the SD worried about the fading relevance of a Nazi community,
civilians seemed to embrace it. They not only recognized black marketeering as common but
also as essential. One civilian commented in 1944, “The feeling about it is that one would
actually be stupid not to try to procure something through restricted means.”133 In the minds of
civilians, survival depended on black market trading.
Some ordinary civilians wove black marketeering and other solutions into their everyday
lives to make ends meet. Along with the SD, however, Nazi jurists expressed considerable
anxieties about the divisiveness that such practices spread, and crimes against property became a
common fixture of juridical discussions during the latter years of the war, especially in the
publication, Richterbriefe. Richterbriefe was a monthly publication produced by the Reich
Ministry of Justice after Otto Georg Thierack became justice minister in August 1942. Thierack,
a committed Nazi, actively advocated the strict persecution and destruction of the Nazis’ “racial”
enemies especially through what he called, “extermination through work.”134 The publication
was a response to perceptions that Nazi courts lacked consistency in administering its rulings.
Organized thematically, each issue of Richterbriefe presented a number of cases, offered
commentary, and provided legal guidelines and ideological expositions written by Thierack
about how particular crimes should be adjudicated.
While Richterbriefe provide interesting accounts of criminal activity during World War
II, they prove an especially challenging source for historians. The descriptions of court cases
often lack vital details about the context of the cases. They omit the names of the parties
involved and often do not include critical details about the defendants or the plaintiffs. Perhaps
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most challenging, they very seldom even indicate where such crimes or trials happened, making
it nearly impossible to contextualize each case in the unique war landscapes in which they
unfolded. Nevertheless, Richterbriefe help to investigate further into the world of wartime
material relief for two reasons. First, cases detailed in Richterbriefe show the kinds of property
crimes Germans committed, like trading, stealing, and plundering—often detailing the goods and
property involved and the settings in which such crimes unfolded. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the exposition offered both by the court judges and the Justice Minister help to
uncover larger fears about these crimes. Thierack provided commentary that reveals deeper Nazi
anxieties about the stability and viability of the home front that such property crimes inspired.
The April 1943 issue of Richterbriefe focused specifically on “Volksschädlinge bei
feindlichen Luftangriffen.” In it, readers found descriptions of crimes violating the
Volksschädlingsverordnung, a series of laws that punished individuals judged to have committed
an offense against the Volksgemeinschaft. This legislation, passed on September 5, 1939 just
after the beginning of World War II, anticipated the potential for problems to arise as a result of
an Allied air war.135 It prohibited vague actions like “community-endangering crimes” or
“crimes during air dangers,” as well as plundering—and all of these crimes could be punishable
by death.136
One might imagine that crimes committed against the Volksgemeinschaft and punishable
by death might include violent crimes and murders, but most of the crimes detailed in the April
1943 issue of Richterbriefe were property crimes. For example, during an air raid siren, an 82year old pensioner stole horse reins to make for himself a pair of suspenders. The suspenders
were found after the old man’s home had been searched. The court decided that since the man
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“entered a building that had been evacuated,” that he had committed a crime punishable by death
according to §1 of the Volksschädlingsverordnung and, as a result, was sentenced to death.
In another instance, a 22 year-old machine engineer, who had no prior convictions and
had just returned from the eastern front, was sitting in a bar with a friend after finish work at a
nearby coal plant. Their bout of drinking was disrupted by an air raid siren, during which Allied
bombers caused considerable destruction. Once the siren had stopped, the man took part in
salvage work. According to the Richterbriefe, the accused man helped a woman retrieve items
from her home before it collapsed, and he assisted a cobbler salvage some of his shoes. Before
leaving, however, the man placed a pair of shoes in his bag. When he was later seized by local
police, the 22-year-old was also in possession of 130 cigarettes, some photo paper, and a spool of
thread. The court that tried the accused sought a lighter sentence because of his clean record and
his “regular and satisfactory work, his participation and service in the war, and his contributions
to the salvage work.” Despite the “good impression” he made, the man was nevertheless
sentenced to death.137 In his commentary on the case, Thierack noted, “Even though there exists
in his character significant reasons to reduce the sentence, the death sentence cannot be
overturned.”138
Other cases included a 34-year-old unskilled worker, previously employed as a member
of the German Red Cross, who had been helping salvage property from burning houses. While
doing so, he procured an old mail bag, a leather pouch with ration cards inside, an alarm clock
and “a few other small things.”139 Another charge was brought against a 61-year-old man,
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described as an “invalid with no prior convictions,” who stole a pair of men’s pants and found in
the pocket three Reichsmarks and some cigarettes.140 Another worker, a 36-year-old tool maker,
was charged with plundering a grocery store by his house. After assisting with clean-up
operations following an Allied air attack, the defendant entered a bombed-out grocery store stole
lard, butter, sausage, and canned fish.141 All of these defendants received death sentences.
What is important to note about these cases is how integrated into society these civilians
seemed to be. These individuals did not stand idly by while Allies dropped bombs on civilians,
waiting to rob vulnerable people. They were actively involved in the war effort. Some, as
veterans, had been stationed on the war front. Others participated in clean-up and reclamation
efforts once the bombing had stopped, and they assisted fellow civilians to begin rebuilding their
lives. By most accounts, these individuals fulfilled the duties charged to them by Nazi authorities
to support a collective Volksgemeinschaft. Nevertheless, all of that was quickly undone through
the crimes they committed and, as a result, they were sentenced to death.
In response to these property crimes, Thierack spoke of the vulnerability of German
civilians and the importance of community cohesion. He wrote, “The German civilian population
has no weapons to battle these cowardly Allied attacks; its weapon is the unshakeable belief in
our just cause and the close union of our indivisible community.”142 Without naming the crimes
or criminals specifically, he framed plundering, theft, and marketeering as divisive agents
antithetical to the cohesion of the Volksgemeinschaft. He called their practitioners “cowards”
who “undermined the trust of all Volksgenossen,”—even though, according to the Richterbriefe,
many had participated actively in salvaging and support work after bombings had occurred.
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Thierack continued, “Whoever breaks this trust in the hour of the highest destitution and danger
becomes a cowardly deserter.”143 The language here is clear: civilians seeking out alternative
solutions to their material situation deviated from the collective path of the Volksgemeinschaft.
Thierack pitted the threatening expression of individualism against the Nazi values of
conformity—values perpetuated by Nazi-led relief schemes. While ordinary civilians might have
deemed it “stupid” not to participate in black market exchanges or alternative economic markets,
Thierack considered it “cowardly,” and such acts “must be punished so severely that the stock of
the Volksgemeinschaft remains secure under all circumstances.”144
This tension between civilian individualism and state conformity persisted over the
course of the war as material conditions continued to decline. Bombing would only increase.
Property crimes remained pervasive, so much so that another special of Richterbriefe appeared in
April 1944 addressing them. In his remarks, Thierack argued that Allied attacks aimed to insight
not just “confusion, panic, and fear among the civil population,” but also criminality. He
demanded it necessary that “for the defense of the future,” German courts must establish a
decisive and collective stance on plunderers.145
Ultimately, the lack of context provided in the Richterbriefe make them a challenging
historical source, and extrapolating from them proves exceedingly difficult. What they do reveal,
and why they are important to include here, is the dissonance between Nazi ideological and
popular civilian responses to wartime destitution. The Richterbriefe signal national concern from
the courts about crimes related to property and belongings like theft, marketeering, and
plundering. This concern emerged at a time when material destitution deeply crippled some,
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especially urban, areas across Germany, and Nazi-led relief initiatives did not address the
broader material insecurities that civilians expressed. They emerged at a time when civilians
believed it necessary to engage alternate relief solutions—including committing crimes—in
order to provide for their families and to survive the war. Where civilians saw tactics of survival,
Nazi courts saw opportunists and individualists, what Moritz Föllmer might call “illegitimate
individualism.”146 Yet, as Stargardt has argued, civilians were concerned with surviving an
existential and cataclysmic war and were not overly preoccupied with upholding Nazi social
values to do so.147 Foraging, trading, and “crime” were all responses to the new material
landscape of total war, tactics of survival that seemed reasonable and necessary to some ordinary
civilians while simultaneously threatening and potentially cataclysmic themselves in the eyes of
Nazi administrators.
Whether consciously or not, these endeavors represent methods by which civilians
subverted collectivist ideals that the NSV and other Nazi institutions sought to impose on the
German home front. Despite the perceived consequences that some of these alternative tactics
had, civilians were not seeking to jettison wholesale Nazi social values. While at once deploying
more individualist and entrepreneurial values, they also carried with them the ideals of
camaraderie and community grounded in Nazism. These expectations emerged especially during
encounters between evacuees and hosts, as evacuees carried particular expectations about the
hospitality they believed they should receive from their fellow German civilians. When evacuees
arrived to their reception areas, they very often narrated their experiences and reactions in
material terms. They took notice of the accommodations they received, the food they ate, and the
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goods made available (or not available) to them. These material conditions thusly shaped
relations with the local communities to which evacuees had been sent. When food or lodging did
not meet expectations—when evacuees felt as though their needs had been ignored—resentment
emerged. Due to expectations conditioned through Volksgemeinschaft values of camaraderie, the
realization of community relationships very much hinged on the material support offered to
vulnerable war evacuees.
The German home front was a mobile. Even beginning in 1939, Nazi officials
coordinated evacuations away from potential danger zones, focusing on border regions next to
France to protect civilians from possible invasions.148 Once bombing started, as has been noted
earlier, women and children were sent to various spaces with the intention to secure their safety.
The Hamburg firestorm alone produced hundreds of thousands of homeless and evacuees. One
such unnamed worker lost all his belongings in the Hamburg firestorm and had been evacuated
to Wittenberg. Upon arrival, the worker wrote a letter to his friend Paul. He described the frantic
manner in which he and his wife had been evacuated, having no time to pack or change. “I only
had my felt shoes when the soldiers came to get us,” he recounted.149 While the NSV did provide
evacuees with a small sum to purchase goods, stores had nothing to offer. The man recalled, “If
you did happen to find something you wanted, dear God, we were in Perleberg and Wittenberg,
where one walks into a store and are told, ‘We don’t have your size. Come back in two to three
months.’ It is this way in every store.”150 The worker closes his letter with a polite request to his
friend Paul that, if he can find them, to send along shoes to him and his wife. “Dear Paul,” he
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wrote, “if you can somehow manage, please send shoes for my wife and me.” This Hamburg
evacuee could find no support from the community in Wittenberg but could only hope that his
friend Paul might have the means to help.
The unnamed worker’s situation was not uncommon. Many evacuees found the material
situation in reception areas to be considerably lacking—not just in terms of the goods and
services available but also in the accommodations they were provided. A mother, also from
Hamburg, wrote from Nuremburg with desperation to her son. “Erich, your father asks if you can
find us new accommodations, otherwise we will perish from misery.”151 The mother described
the treatment she and her husband received: “The food in our accommodations is horrible. In the
morning there is a cup of coffee without bread, or sometimes they give us dry bread. Yesterday
there was thin soup without anything in it.”152 Not only was food bad and accommodations poor,
but also days were ruled by monotony. She continued, “I sit the entire day in the room and
freeze, lay in bed until 11. Father runs around all day while Inge sits next to me and knits
socks.”153
On one level, the mother grounded her “misery” firmly in the disappointing material
provisions she and her husband found upon arrival in Nuremberg. On another, more existential
level, she felt a sense of estrangement among people she expected would welcome her. She
believed that she and her family were being shut out from the local community, excluded both
from the social life of the community as well as the stocks of resources. “We sit here among a
people that has nothing for us, who kick their feet up with homemade bread and wheat bread but
we can hardly find a piece.”154 She felt disconnected from her hosts, as if they were mocking her
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with their leisure and their bread. Any expectations the mother had that their shared membership
in a Volksgemeinschaft or shared experiences of the war might bridge any differences between
her and her hosts vanished. She was evacuated away from her home only to find that she was not
accepted in her own country.
Moments like these contributed to what the SD described as a “cold and often unfriendly
receptions” that many evacuees faced once arriving in their reception areas. Warm meals,
sufficient clothing, tidy accommodations: all of these were expected yet very seldom were such
provisions found. Fleeing Germans often read this not as a consequence of increasing destitution
across the Reich but as a personal slight against new arrivals. In what the SD deemed a
“particularly vivid image” of the deteriorating relationship between evacuees and hosts, a
Hamburg woman complained about her reception in a letter to her husband. She escaped to south
Germany with her three children following the attacks on Hamburg in July, during which her
apartment had been completely destroyed. According to the SD, her departure from Hamburg
went smoothly; the NSV provided the woman and her children with train tickets and provided
other necessities “so that her children would not have to suffer.” She and her family were
evacuated to Linz in the Ostmark, and upon arriving, she immediately found the conditions to be
unbearable. She wrote to her husband, “You and all the others have no idea of the suffering of us
evacuees. I discourage anyone from coming here, where there is no understanding of our
position.” She continued to describe the form of her misery: “We must lie with hundreds of other
people on the floors of the train station in Linz. Nowhere is there a bed for a child. I did not sleep
the fourth night. … My cellar apartment in Hamburg was a thousand-fold better.” She begged
her husband to send money for a return trip, but not before the emotion of her letter spiked with
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rage. “No one here has any understanding! I wish that just once bombs would be dropped
here!”155
Dripping with frustration and rage, the Hamburg woman wished harm on her own
compatriots so that they might begin to understand her mindset. She felt neglected and uncared
for because of the conditions that greeted her when she arrived. Sleeping on floors, enduring cold
meals, lacking clean clothes—this signaled a rupture in her expectations of community that she
brought with her to the Ostmark, a rupture experienced to varying degrees by other evacuees.
Where she expected to find Volksgemeinschaft express itself through warm welcome, adequate
food, and comfortable accommodations, she only found a lack of support and a lack of empathy.
She was starkly confronted with the reality that Volksgemeinschaft had its own limits with no
absolute value. She could not rely on the support or consideration of fellow “Volksgenossen,”
and instead had to find her own solution, explore her own individualism, to rectify her dismal
situation. She closed her letter with a plea to her husband to send money for a train ticket
home.156
Conclusions
Civilians experienced new levels of destitution on the home front as Allied bombers
brought total war across German borders. This new landscape of total war inspired a
commitment to the war effort not out of deep conviction for Nazi ideology but for the insistence
on survival. So that when utilities failed, supply lines collapsed, food rations shortened, and
housing crumbled to the ground, ordinary civilians sought individualist and entrepreneurial
solutions as a means to secure their own survival. When the NSV could not offer civilians the
kind of material security that wartime demanded, they stepped beyond the collectivist values of
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Volksgemeinschaft not to leave it behind but to achieve a sense of security amid chaos. As
civilians explored various survival techniques, their endeavors often crossed paths with staunch
Nazi opposition, resulting in severe punishment and even death.
This chapter is not meant to offer a comprehensive investigation of the efforts that
civilians made as the deterioration of material conditions threatened their survival of the war. It
is instead meant to gauge how civilians manipulated and deployed various value systems to
ensure their survival amid total war. Indeed, civilians relied not on just one but instead relied on
a constellation of various values that permitted them to act in certain ways. For some, sticking to
the prescribed path by National Socialism and its relief initiatives only made sense. For others,
foraging seemed reasonable. For others still, marketeering, theft, and, even in some cases,
murder too became morally permissible. And while these tactics might have ensured the
continued survival of some civilians, German forces began surrendering in May 1945, sounding
the death knell of the Third Reich.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Contradictions of Nazi Welfare
By 1944, some of Germany’s largest cities were crumbling. Persistent raids and fire
bombings spread devastation beyond the civilian imagination and the NSV’s capacity. In the
meantime, Allied powers began to imagine and plan what a post-World War II world might look
like. In preparation for an Allied victory, President Franklin Roosevelt asked Dr. Henry Field, a
physical anthropologist, to lead a top-secret project within the Special Intelligence Unity
exploring the demographic and social impact that Nazi ideology might have on the German
population after the fall of the Third Reich. Field’s top-secret Studies of Migration and
Settlement, or “M” Project, commissioned Ruth Kempner, a social worker educated in Germany,
Italy, and the United States, to conduct a survey of German women’s social and professional
lives and to evaluate their possible “readjustment” needs as they transitioned into life after
Nazism.1
Kempner’s study began by examining women’s organizations, a critical undertaking she
argued because “[a]n acquaintance with these organizations is necessary in order to determine
whether the organizations as such or their members must be regarded as dangerous, useless, or
useful from the Allied point of view.”2 She was interested in the relationship between
institutional participation and ideological indoctrination, for, she wrote, “The knowledge of the
type of indoctrination of the organized women gives the background against which all
reconstruction, relief, education and readjustment work with German women and girls has to be
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performed.”3 For Kempner, these institutional relationships had a critical bearing on the kind of
place Europe would be after the fall of National Socialism.
Nazi relief featured prominently in Kempner’s study. Kempner described the
organization, responsibilities, and demographics of the NSV, depicting a network whose
tentacles transmitted Nazi ideology deep into German society. This was not simply the workings
of the committed Nazi Party members who organized and ran the NSV offices across the
country. Tens of thousands of German women worked in Nazi led welfare agencies, all of whom
had undergone education and certification programs organized under the supervision of Nazi
educators. Social workers visited homes, schools, and hospitals and brought with them their
social welfare expertise steeped in Nazi ideology. In addition to the scope of the NSV’s
professional services, hundreds of thousands of women volunteered to take part on NSV-led
relief programs. In all, Kempner estimated that, by 1944, these organizations had mobilized over
half of the female population in Germany.4 Due to their thorough saturation with Nazi rhetoric
and racist ideals, Kempner concluded that relief organizations posed a threat to the integrity of a
post-war Germany. She insisted that both the NSV and the WHW be disbanded, all Nazi relief
institutions abolished, and welfare taken over by local municipal authorities. Kempner
recommended disqualifying former NSV administrators from participating in any future
municipal relief project, and relief administrators elected by local communities.
Despite Kempner’s indictments against German relief workers under Nazi rule, it is
perhaps unrealistic to imagine a post-war recovery effort without the participation of at least
some of the millions of women who worked as Nazi-era social workers. Additionally,
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Kempner’s reductionist interpretation of women’s ambitions also overlooks the complex
motivations that pushed women into social work in the first place. This dissertation has tried to
show that these were not women motivated purely by Nazi ideology. Nevertheless, Kempner’s
conclusions ultimately reveal a perspective on poor relief that transcended the realm of
professionals and experts. She understood the power of the NSV to reach beyond the restrictive
confines of the welfare office, to mobilize groups of people toward a collective goal, and to reach
into the private lives not just of needy petitioners but also eager volunteers as well. For these
reasons, Kempner recognized that the threat posed by the NSV amounted to much more than its
persecution of the poor. Ultimately, Kempner indicted the NSV and its efforts for animating
millions of Germans to achieve violent ends.
In many respects, Kempner’s conclusions capture much of the essence of this
dissertation. Indeed, this dissertation has demonstrated that Nazi-led relief resonated far beyond
the professional relationships between case worker and client. The exclusion that Nazi welfare
generated did not rely solely on the modern, "scientific" mechanisms that have defined it for
previous historians. Instead, the fundamental ethos of Nazi welfare depended on the collective
and collaborative support of a broader German community. Slogans like “Gemeinnutz geht vor
Eigennutz” cannot work without at least the image of collective participation. This is not to
suggest that welfare actually established any kind of transcendent or classless community. The
realities of a Volksgemeinschaft are debatable, and this dissertation is ultimately unconvinced
that any kind of transcendent Nazi community emerged. The aspirations to Volksgemeinschaft,
however were quite real, and Nazi-led welfare became fertile ground where individuals could
imagine and participate in ideas about community.
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This dissertation has explored how millions of Germans found voice through Nazi relief
to shape and reshape social dynamics over the course of the Third Reich. It began by
investigating how the broad cultural conversations about begging during the Weimar Republic
influenced the Nazi Bekämpfung des Bettelunwesen. This attack on beggars represented not the
logical and inevitable result of calculated Nazi policy but instead a response to middle class
anxieties the pervasiveness of beggars. Representations and commentary about begging
proliferated during the Weimar Republic. While many Germans might have sympathized with
beggars in some cases, this ultimately did not change prevalent perceptions among the middle
classes that beggars represented a distinct form of modern disorder in a world structured
according to class. Bourgeois Germans dictated where things belonged in urban Berlin, and
beggars represented a challenge to a meticulously cultivated spatial order that enabled, among
other things, conspicuous lifestyles of leisure consumption. When National Socialists turned
their repressive powers against beggars, they confirmed—whether intentionally or not—this
bourgeois claim over urban space despite recent insistence by historians that the Nazi movement
was “anti-bourgeois” especially during the early moments of the Third Reich.5
This dissertation does not argue that the Nazi movement was, at its core, a bourgeois
movement by any means. But when viewed in a broader cultural context, the operation against
begging raises questions about the nature of early National Socialism and its social goals. An
early Nazi social agenda hardly emerged from any kind of revolutionary spirit but instead had
roots firmly planted in popular consensus. Race hardly played a factor in the public demonizing
of beggars. Instead, Nazis built a case against beggars based on concerns held by many middleclass Germans. This problematizes how historians understand early efforts by Nazi authorities to
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conceptualize and identify “enemies” of the Reich. At least in this case, beggars, not the
unemployment or homelessness crises of the Great Depression, emerged as an acute “social
problem” for National Socialists. Nazis met beggars with a similarly uncompromising force used
to handle other “problems,” namely Communists and Socialists, until some cities declared
themselves to be “beggar free.”
While this response to poverty demonstrates how Nazis used social policies to
manufacture enemies, they also deployed various social relief initiatives to try to build
community bonds as well. Collection drives like the Winterhilfswerk worked to unite Germans
together under a specific banner of Nazi ideals, emphasizing family values, hard work, and
“German” heritage. An entire language of symbols and gestures emerged through which
Germans expressed their participation in poor relief. Joseph Goebbels pointed to these gestures
as the existence of an authentic German Volksgemeinschaft, devoid of class, political, and
religious boundaries.
The aim might have been to create a culturally and racially homogenous national
community, but the overtones of class—in particular the emphasis on the same bourgeois values
that influenced the operation against beggars—cannot be ignored. Conspicuous consumption was
critical to the drive for two reasons. First, WHW organizers hoped to create huge spectacles to
show the nation, and indeed the entire world, the spontaneous expression of collective values that
Nazis had animated in an effort to legitimize a National Socialist project. Second, individuals
signaled to one another and, perhaps more importantly, SS agents that they had donated and, by
extension, their participation in Nazi poor relief. Any desire to give for the sake of giving was
matched by desires to give to demonstrate loyalty and, as a result, avoid public harassment. Far
from a homogenous and harmonious community, the WHW created a self-replicating mask of

289

bourgeois citizenship that reminded Germans of the divisions that existed within their
communities.
It would be too simplistic to argue that charitable Germans cynically recognized the
façade of “voluntary duty” that the WHW propagated, for some individuals gave willingly and
eagerly. However, others scrutinized and lamented the collection drives and, in their own way,
used their discontent to subvert, if not outright resist, the rituals of community of Nazi poor
relief. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the WHW are much more complicated than scholars have
previously demonstrated. The WHW was not simply an exercise in making or faking a German
Volksgemeinschaft—but rather perpetuating a particularly, and perhaps unwitting, bourgeois
Volksgemeinschaft that practically inhibited attempts at homogeneity.
Popular participation in Nazi welfare provides added context to the professional realm of
poor relief that, itself, existed as a much messier and contingent network of relationships that has
been previously captured. The motivating ideologies, the principles and “science” according to
which Nazi thinkers and officials defined “poverty,” lacked any real coherence. An ambiguous
mix of anti-Weimar and anti-intellectual strategies, NSV Reichsleiter Erich Hilgenfeldt, along
with a number of other welfare and social policy thinkers, grounded Nazi conceptions of poverty
in more traditional interpretations about moral “deficiencies.” This translated ultimately into a
barometer of Party loyalty. This created considerable tension for the social workers expected to
operate according to these “guidelines.” First, it generated suspicion among social workers as
Party loyalists questioned the commitment of the coworkers, many of whom had long
professional backgrounds that extended into the Weimar Republic as well as earlier ties with leftleaning political movements. Second, competing conceptions of Volksgemeinschaft often clashed
when social workers met with relief petitioners. Very often, petitioners expected relief and
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crafted narratives that portrayed them as victims deserving of support from the Nazi state. When
their petitions went unfulfilled, everything from resentment to physical violence erupted. What
emerges from this chapter is a view of professional welfare with much less direction than the
ultra-modern and “rationalized” interpretations of the 1990s.
Nazi poor relief did not remain confined to the borders of Germany but played a central
role in the Nazi imperial expansion, in particular into Eastern Europe. Poverty and destitution
served as a propagandistic narrative for Nazi expansion, first in Austria then in Poland. NSV
agents followed immediately behind the Wehrmacht soldiers when they invaded Poland on
September 1, 1939. In the wake of destruction wrought by Einsatzgruppen and Wehrmacht
soldiers, the welfare agents of the NSV set up offices, established routines, and claimed space on
behalf of Nazi Germany. This began a process of remaking “backward” and “degenerate” Polish
space into “productive” and “healthy” German space. NSV agents became critical components
not just in claiming imperial space but also transmitting Nazi ideals and racial hierarchies into
occupied territory. Moreover, these welfare schemes became one of many gears in the Nazi
genocidal machine that brutalized Eastern Europe. Welfare agents facilitated the resettlement of
ethnic Germans which accelerated the expulsion of Jews from German-occupied territory.
Perhaps more notoriously, the NSV and WHW came to depend on confiscated goods from
victims murdered in concentration and death camps.
Finally, World War II pushed the NSV to its limits of its abilities. Total war created
widespread food and material shortages and exacerbated a deep sense of material insecurity
among the civilian population. Forced to improvise, the NSV had to find new initiatives to
ensure that needy Germans got food, clothing, and shelter. However, Nazi-led relief could not
properly address the sense of insecurity felt by many. By remaining committed to ideals of

291

national community, the NSV compromised their own relief network, creating work shortages
and sowed popular distrust. Civilians took matters into their own hands and found their own
solutions to their wartime material challenges. Trading, marketeering, and crime all represented
viable options for home front civilians in Germany. They proved willing to transcend
Volksgemeinschaft values if it meant securing food that might enable their survival. What
resulted inside wartime Germany was not a collapse of society completely but rather shifting
social values. Home front civilians did not abandon their visions of Volksgemeinschaft altogether
but instead expanded the landscape of their social values. Civilians sought more individualistic
and entrepreneurial solutions to their material problems—often fully understanding the
ramifications that marketeering, plundering, and theft might have for their neighbors.
Welfare was not a singular concept in Nazi Germany. For some, it represented a path to a
racially-homogenous society. For others, it existed as an opportunity to help the downtrodden.
For still others, it constituted a last resort for food and shelter. More cynical Germans saw only a
thin veil of Nazi propaganda over a large-scale state scheme to steal from citizens. Such varied
perspectives projected onto welfare visions of life and death. Poor relief represented a path to
virtue and a path to destruction. It constituted a set of customs onto which Germans could project
their social ideals, their Volksgemeinschaft, only to be truncated and manipulated by Nazi
administrators toward violent ends. The contradictions that reside within a Nazi concept of
welfare evokes dystopian landscapes of George Orwell’s fictional Oceania. Just as Nazi practices
of welfare compelled Germans to participate simultaneously in acts of morality and destruction,
so too does doublespeak compel Winston “to know and not to know, to be conscious of complete
truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which
cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic
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against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it.”6 Nazi welfare represents an ultimate
contradiction that Germans under the Third Reich accepted. The “moral” acts of welfare enabled
the unprecedented evil of genocide.
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